Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was injured while performing work in the Adult Offender Work Program (AOWP), he filed suit against the county for its failure to accommodate his preexisting physical disability and failure to engage in the interactive process under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county. The court held that an individual sentenced to perform work activities in lieu of incarceration in the absence of any financial remuneration, is precluded, as a matter of law, from being an "employee" within the meaning of the FEHA. The court explained that, while remuneration alone is not a sufficient condition to establish an individual is an employee under the statute, it is an essential one. Because plaintiff earned no sufficient financial remuneration as a result of participation in the AOWP, he could not be deemed an employee under the FEHA. The court did not reach plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Talley v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

Saw worked for Avago’s Malaysian subsidiary and could acquire ordinary shares and stock options of Avago stock under a management shareholders' agreement governed by the laws of Singapore. The agreement allowed Avago to repurchase shares and options at fair market value should an employee be terminated “for any reason whatsoever” within five years from the date of purchase. After Saw’s position was eliminated in 2009, Avago repurchased his equitable interest. Saw sued Avago’s subsidiary for wrongful termination and obtained a favorable judgment in Malaysia. Saw separately sued Avago in San Mateo County, asserting that Avago breached the shareholders' agreement by relying on an unlawful termination to repurchase his shares.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Avago. Saw is not entitled to any relief under Singapore law. The shareholders' agreement's choice of law provision requires the application of the substantive law of Singapore. Whether his termination was lawful or unlawful under Malaysian law has no bearing on Avago’s contractual right to repurchase shares acquired by a former employee. Saw’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law under the express terms of the shareholders' agreement. Saw has no viable cause of action under an implied duty of good faith. View "Saw v. Avago Technologies, Ltd." on Justia Law

The parties’ arbitration agreement purported to waive class actions and any “other representative action” (the representative waiver). There was no dispute that this representative waiver was broad enough to cover a Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claim, and was thus invalid. The arbitration agreement went on to provide that the provision containing the class action and representative waiver was not modifiable nor severable. The arbitration agreement also contained a provision that if the representative waiver was found to be invalid, “the Agreement becomes null and void as to the employee(s) who are parties to that particular dispute,” the so-called "blow-up provision." Plaintiff Nichole Kec brought individual, class, and PAGA claims against defendants R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Reynolds American Inc., and three individual employees at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, alleging in essence, that she and others were misclassified as exempt employees, resulting in various violations of the Labor Code. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Reynolds American Inc., moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims except the PAGA claim. The court granted the motion. The court reasoned: (1) because defendants had not asked the court to rule on the enforceability of the representative waiver, it had not found the representative waiver invalid, and thus the blow-up provision had not been triggered; and (2) the blow-up provision could apply only to the attempted waiver of the PAGA claim, not to the arbitrability of plaintiff’s claims under the Labor Code. The Court of Appeal concluded defendants could not selectively enforce the arbitration agreement in a manner that defeated its goals. "Had the parties intended to permit defendants to proceed with arbitration notwithstanding an invalid waiver of representative claims, they would have simply made that provision severable, like every other term in the agreement. But that is not what they did. Instead, by specifically making section 5 not severable, the agreement evinces an intent not to allow defendants to selectively enforce the arbitration agreement." The Court issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate its order granting arbitration, and to enter a new order denying the motion in its entirety. View "Kec v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The lack of initials next to a jury waiver contained in an arbitration agreement, even though the drafter included lines for the initials, is of no legal consequence in this case.After plaintiff filed an employment-related suit against BaronHR, BaronHR moved to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration because the language of the agreement between the parties establishes their mutual assent to submit employment-related disputes to arbitration and to waive the right to a jury trial. Furthermore, plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the agreement and thus he is deemed to have assented to its terms. The court stated that the fact that plaintiff did not also initial the subject paragraph does not provide a basis for concluding the parties did not mutually assent to the arbitration agreement. View "Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc." on Justia Law

David worked as an RN at QVMC from 2005-2015, as an hourly employee. David clocked in and out of work using an electronic timekeeping system that automatically rounded time entries up or down to the nearest quarter-hour. After her employment ended, David sued QVMC alleging failure to provide meal and rest periods, and failure to pay minimum wages. David claimed she was not paid for hours worked off-the-clock, such as when she performed charting work, and when her meal and rest periods were interrupted by co-workers and charge nurses who asked her work-related questions. David also claimed she was not paid all wages because of the hospital’s time-rounding policy. QVMC argued that whenever David reported a missed break, she received an extra hour of pay and that it could not be held liable for missed meal or rest periods of which it was unaware. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of QVMC. QVMC’s rounding policy is neutral on its face and rounds all employee time punches to the nearest quarter-hour without consideration of whether the employer or employee is benefitting from the rounding. QVMC provided the breaks required by law: an employer is not obligated to police those breaks and ensure no work is performed. View "David v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center" on Justia Law

The county petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse an administrative hearing decision in favor of plaintiffs, two sheriff's deputies, who alleged that their reassignments violated both the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the county and the employee organization, and an established past practice that deputies would not be involuntarily reassigned in the absence of disciplinary issues, documented performance issues, layoffs, or pending disability retirement.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision granting the petition, holding that the arbitrator who heard the matter abused his discretion because his findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, plaintiffs failed to establish a violation by the county of the express terms of the MOU; the association failed to establish that the MOU was ambiguous or silent regarding reassignment of employees, and therefore there was no need to consider the past practices of the parties to determine whether the county violated its obligation to negotiate a change in practice; substantial evidence did not establish an unequivocal and clearly enunciated past practice that the department would not make involuntary transfers in the absence of a disciplinary action, documented performance issue, layoff, or pending disability retirement; the arbitrators finding that a binding past practice existed is unsupported by the record; and substantial evidence does not support a finding that the department made a unilateral change in its own established past practice when it reassigned plaintiffs out of their specialty assignments and back to patrol against their wishes. View "County of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sofia Barriga filed this lawsuit against 99 Cents Only Stores LLC, (99 Cents) individually, and on behalf of similarly situated current and former nonexempt employees of 99 Cents hired before October 1, 1999, pleading various Labor Code violations and violation of the unfair competition law. Plaintiff alleged 99 Cents had a zero-tolerance policy that required its stores to lock their doors at closing time, therefore, forcing nonexempt, nonmanagerial employees, who worked the graveyard shift and clock out for their meal break or at the end of their shift, to wait for as long as 15 minutes for a manager with a key to let them out of the store. According to plaintiff, 99 Cents did not pay its employees for the time they had to wait be let out, and the policy denied employees their full half-hour meal break. Plaintiff moved the trial court to certify two classes: (1) “Off the Clock Class,” and (2) “Meal Period Class.” 99 Cents opposed the certification motion, contending there was no community of interests among putative class members, and the lack of common issues among putative class members would render a class action unmanageable. Plaintiff moved to strike 174 declarations of employee declarants who were members of the proposed classes on the grounds the process by which they had been obtained was improper, and because they were substantively inconsistent with the subsequent deposition testimony of 12 of declarants. Concluding it lacked the statutory authority to strike the declarations, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike. And, based on all 174 declarations, the court concluded plaintiff had not demonstrated a community of interests or a commonality of issues among putative class members. Plaintiff appealed those orders. The Court of Appeal found the record demonstrated the trial court in this case was unaware of the need to scrutinize 99 Cents’ declarations carefully, and was either unaware of or misunderstood the scope of its discretion to either strike or discount the weight to be given the 174 declarations, including the declarations of employees who were not members of the putative classes, if it concluded they were obtained under coercive or abusive circumstances. The orders denying plaintiff’s motion to strike 99 Cents’ declarations and class certification motion were reversed, and the matter remanded for reconsideration. View "Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC" on Justia Law

The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) granted University Professional and Technical Employees' (UPTE's) petition for unit modification to add a new classification, systems administrators, into a preexisting bargaining unit. The University of California refused to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment for systems administrators. PERB granted UPTE's unfair practice charge against the University. The University appealed, arguing that the systems administrator classification did not share a community of interest with the existing bargaining unit as required under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Gov. Code 3560) and that PERB erred in not requiring proof of majority support by the unrepresented systems administrators subject to the unit modification petition.The court of appeal denied the petition. PERB’s finding that a community of interest exists is supported by substantial evidence. The job descriptions reflect a similarity in “common skills” and “job duties” between systems administrators and employees in the unit. The University fails to cite any evidence suggesting a disparity between the job descriptions and the employees’ actual skill sets. PERB properly counted the number of systems administrators at the time the petition was filed; PERB’s holding that it lacked the discretion to require proof of majority support from UPTE was not clearly erroneous. View "Regents of the University of California v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Konica service technicians, were required to drive their personal vehicles, containing Konica’s tools and parts, to customer sites. Technicians did not report to an office but usually drove from home to the first customer of the day and, at the end of the day, from the last customer to home. Plaintiffs sought wages for time spent commuting to and from the first and last work locations and reimbursement for mileage incurred during those commutes. The court determined that the commute time was not compensable, citing wage order 4-2001 and Labor Code 2802. The court of appeal reversed. If carrying tools and parts in a technician’s personal vehicle during the commute was optional, then the technician was not “subject to the control of [defendant]” for purposes of determining “hours worked.” Even if a technician was required “as a practical matter” to carry tools and parts during the commute, the technician would not be “subject to the control of [defendant]” during the commute if the technician was able to use the time effectively for the technician’s own purposes. However, if a technician was required during the commute to carry a volume of tools and parts that did not allow the technician to use ‘the time effectively for his own purposes, the technician would be “subject to the control of [defendant]” for purposes of determining “hours worked” and entitlement to wages. There are triable issues of material fact regarding those issues. View "Oliver v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The Private Attorney General Act (Labor Code 2698) allows an employee, as a proxy for state enforcement agencies, to sue an employer on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees for Labor Code violations. When the parties have an arbitration agreement, California law blocks the employer from enforcing that agreement with respect to representative PAGA claims for civil penalties; the agreement may be enforceable with respect to other claims, including claims for victim-specific relief (like unpaid wages). Lime rents electric scooters. Olabi entered into an agreement to locate, recharge, and redeploy Lime's scooters. The agreement required the parties to arbitrate “any and all disputes,” including Olabi’s classification as an independent contractor but contained an exception for PAGA representative actions.Olabi sued, alleging Lime intentionally misclassified him and others as independent contractors, resulting in Labor Code violations; he included claims under the Unfair Competition Law and PAGA. Lime petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing Olabi was required to arbitrate independent contractor classification disputes and that the PAGA exception did not cover the unfair competition claim or the PAGA claim to the extent that Olabi sought victim-specific relief. Olabi voluntarily dismissed his unfair competition claim and disavowed any claim for victim-specific relief. The trial court denied Lime’s petition and granted Olabi leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. The language of the arbitration agreement broadly excludes PAGA actions View "Olabi v. Neutron Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law