Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant YourMechanic, Inc. sought to compel plaintiff Jonathan Provost to arbitrate whether he was an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of the California Labor Code before he could proceed under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) with his single-count representative action alleging various Labor Code violations against company. The Court of Appeal determined that requiring Provost to arbitrate whether he was an “aggrieved employee” with standing to bring a representative PAGA action would have required splitting that single action into two components: an arbitrable “individual” claim and a nonarbitrable representative claim. The Court concluded that a PAGA-only representative action was not an individual action at all, but instead was one that was indivisible and belonged solely to the state. Therefore, YourMechanic could not require Provost to submit by contract any part of his representative PAGA action to arbitration. The trial court therefore properly denied YourMechanic's motion. View "Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc." on Justia Law

Hooked developed an app for mobile devices. Hooked’s CEO and investors later wanted to sell the business. Apple showed interest. After two meetings, it was clear that Apple was not interested in buying Hooked for its technology or market share but might want to acquire Hooked so certain engineers would become Apple employees. Hooked declined but, short on cash, suggested to Apple that it “sell” three engineers to Apple and continue operating the less technical advertising aspect of its business, and provided the engineers’ resumes. Apple responded that it might consider paying a “finder’s fee” but instead contacted the engineers directly and hired them. Hooked demanded that its chief technical officer (CTO) return all Hooked confidential technical information. Hooked emailed Apple’s general counsel. Apple responded that it had no desire to use another company’s trade secrets and would facilitate the return of all confidential information.Hooked sued, alleging fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, interference with contract and prospective economic advantage, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices, and unjust enrichment. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for Apple. No legal wrong is committed when a company solicits and hires away its competitor’s employees; absent some independent illegal act, the interests of the employee in his own mobility and betterment are paramount to the competitive business interests of the employers. Hooked cannot show Apple did something that transformed ordinary free-market competition into an actionable legal wrong. View "Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Marivel Santos was employed by respondent Crenshaw Manufacturing, Inc. (Crenshaw) in January 2017 as a machine operator on the production floor. Santos alleged that sometime in the second week of January 2017, she was instructed by her supervisor, Jose Flores, to operate a material-forming machine utilizing a die without any protective guards or cages. Ordinarily, Santos would have had to use both hands to operate the machine. This time, however, Flores instructed her to operate it “from the side using a bypass button.” Using the machine in this manner allowed Santos to operate the machine with her right hand, leaving her left hand free to reach into the machine to “press down the part” being cut. On January 12, 2017, Santos was operating the machine in this fashion when her left hand was crushed underneath the die, mutilating and severely injuring it. She filed a workers’ compensation claim against Crenshaw, and the Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA) investigated. In the 1980s, the California Legislature passed Labor Code section 4558's “power press exception” to the principle of workers’ compensation exclusivity, giving a right of action to employees injured by their employer’s knowing removal of or failure to install a point of operation guard on a power press when required by the manufacturer. In this case, the issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether the power press exception applied when the manufacturer, 45 years prior to passage of the law, conveyed a more general requirement for guards which went completely unheeded by the present user. Under these unique circumstances, the Court concluded there were triable issues of material fact as to whether the employer violated the statute and reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the employer’s favor. View "Santos v. Crenshaw Manufacturing, Inc." on Justia Law

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) disciplined three of its firefighters for cheating on a promotional exam. One of the men appealed his discipline to the California State Personnel Board (Board). The other two did not. While the appeal was pending, CAL FIRE substituted new disciplinary notices against all three men, seeking to impose harsher penalties. Over the men’s objections, the Board allowed CAL FIRE to proceed. The firefighters filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial court, which the court denied.The court of appeal affirmed in part. CAL FIRE permissibly substituted its disciplinary notice against the firefighter whose appeal was pending before the Board, but not against the other two, because by statute their discipline became final 30 days after they did not appeal, (Gov. Code, 19575). View "Chaplin v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

The defendants require their employees to comply with various confidentiality policies. Current and former employees sued under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, 2698), alleging the employers’ confidentiality policies restricted their employees’ speech in violation of California law. The claims fall into three subcategories; restraints of competition, whistleblowing, and freedom of speech. The trial court dismissed, concluding the claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. In a settlement in a separate NLRB proceeding, defendant Google agreed to post a notice informing employees that they had the right “to discuss wages, hours, and working conditions,” and that “Google would “NOT prohibit [employees] from discussing or sharing information relating to [their] performance, salaries, benefits, discipline, training, or any other terms and conditions of employment.”The court of appeal reversed. Although many of the’ claims relate to conduct that is arguably within the scope of the NLRA, the claims fall within the local interest exception to preemption. The complaint does not mention union organizing or other concerted activity; it alleges violations of state law that can be proven without considering whether the actions violated the NLRA. The statutes protecting competition, whistleblowing, and free speech fit comfortably within California’s historic police powers and address conduct affecting individual employees, as distinct from the NLRA’s focus on concerted activity. This state-court action poses no threat to the NLRA’s exercise of its own jurisdiction. View "Doe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Five laborers filed suit against their former employer, Miguel Martinez, alleging violations of various labor laws. The Court of Appeal previously heard plaintiffs' claims; in its initial review, the Court considered plaintiffs’ appeal of a judgment that rejected all their claims against Martinez. Although the judgment was affirmed for the most part, the Court reversed to allow plaintiffs to proceed on two of their claims, one of which concerned Martinez’s failure to pay plaintiffs for rest periods, and another of which was derivative of their rest-period claim. As was explained, Martinez was obligated to pay his employees for the time they spent on authorized rest periods. However, the Court found nothing in the evidence to show he had ever paid his employees for this time. The case was thus remanded to allow the trial court to determine appropriate damages and penalties based on this failure. Following the remand, the parties raised various challenges to the trial court’s calculation of damages and penalties. Plaintiffs contended the trial court undervalued their damages and wrongly rejected several of their claims for penalties. Martinez, in turn, claimed that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s calculation of damages and penalties. Because the Court of Appeal find none of the parties’ several claims warranted reversal, it affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Sanchez v. Martinez" on Justia Law

For more than 10 years, Land worked as a field service specialist for DISH Network. After a customer complaint in 2015, Land’s supervisor filled out an “Employee Consultation” form that stated it was a “Final written notice” issued “due to policy violation: Falsification of Company records.” On the day before Land signed the consultation form, Dish received another customer complaint. Land admitted, “going to the customer’s home off the clock and taking his daughters.” The second consultation form indicated that it was a termination notice. Land applied for unemployment benefitsAn ALJ determined Land was ineligible for benefits because he had been discharged for breaking “a reasonable employer rule.” Land maintained he was unaware of any Dish policy forbidding employees from giving out their personal contact information to customers and from performing work during off-hours. He claimed he had gone back to the customer’s house to prevent a trouble call and to save the company money. The Appeals Board adopted the ALJ’s findings.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Land’s petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. The Appeals Board prejudicially abused its discretion in refusing to consider additional evidence proffered by Land. While the Board has considerable discretion in allowing or refusing to consider new evidence, the evidence was a customer’s declaration that would have “effectively refuted” the chronology of events set forth by the ALJ and adopted by the Board. View "Land v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The court of appeal previously concluded that San Francisco’s procedural approach to punishing Morgado for misconduct violated the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act by not providing a valid avenue for administrative appeal of his 2011 termination from his police employment and affirmed a 2014 injunction directing the city to vacate Morgado’s termination and reinstate him pending administrative appeal. Morgado was reinstated but was suspended without pay retroactive to his 2011 termination. In 2018 he obtained an order holding San Francisco in contempt for failure to comply with the injunction and requiring the city to vacate “unconditionally” Morgado’s termination and suspension, compensate him with front pay and benefits lost, and “refrain from ... any other action” against Morgado.San Francisco offset the payment owed to him based on his post-termination earnings from side income as a mortgage broker, a deduction of $181,402. Morgado obtained a second order of contempt, directing the city to pay Morgado the amount deducted and to re-assign him to administrative duties. The court of appeal vacated that order as not resting upon a “clear, intentional violation of a specific, narrowly drawn order.” The trial court again found the deduction inapplicable and ordered the city to pay the amount deducted. The court of appeal reversed, citing precedent that entitles the city to deductions for Morgado’s side income, and remanded for recalculation of the amount. View "Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the employee demonstrated his assent to the arbitration clause by signing the acknowledgment, and the employer had no duty to call the arbitration agreement to the employee's attention. The court found that provisions in the arbitration clause concerning arbitrator's fees and costs and attorney fees are unenforceable, but they may be severed, and the rest of the agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to sever the offending provisions concerning arbitration fees and costs and attorney fees from the agreement and otherwise grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Conyer v. Hula Media Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by his or her employer's Labor Code violations may be authorized to act as an agent of the LWDA to recover such penalties in a civil action. In the cases underlying these consolidated appeals, Plaintiffs Starks and Herrera, each acting as the LWDA's agent, separately filed substantially identical PAGA actions against their former employer, Vortex. Starks eventually settled with Vortex and Herrera moved to vacate the judgment and intervene in the Starks action.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Herrera's motion to intervene in the Starks action was untimely. The court also held that, because the LWDA accepted the proceeds from the judgment in the Starks action, Herrera, as the LWDA's agent, cannot attack that judgment. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Herrera action, because Herrera's PAGA claim, in substance, is encompassed within the Starks judgment, and thus its maintenance is barred by the LWDA's acceptance of the benefits of the Starks judgment. View "Starks v. Vortex Industries, Inc." on Justia Law