Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Vendor Surveillance Corporation (VSC) appealed an adverse judgment in its action seeking refund unemployment insurance taxes assessed by the California Employment Development Department (EDD). The outcome turned on whether project specialists hired by VSC between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2013 (the audit years) were classified as employees or independent contractors. The issue presented by this appeal was one of first impression: whether in making that determination, the trial court should apply (1) the ABC test announced in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.5th 903, (2018); or instead (2) the Borello factors (S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal.3d 341 (1989). "With little case law for guidance and an eye on appeal," the trial court analyzed the evidence alternatively under each standard and determined that project specialists were VSC’s employees. The Court of Appeal held that Borello provided the applicable standard in assessing unemployment insurance taxes during the audit years. Because the court’s findings under that standard were supported by substantial evidence and its qualitative weighing of the Borello factors was an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vendor Surveillance Corporation v. Henning" on Justia Law

Rio Vista Officer Collondrez responded to a hit-and-run accident. According to an internal affairs investigation, Collondrez falsified his report, arrested a suspect without probable cause, used excessive force, applied a carotid control hold on the suspect, and failed to request medical assistance. After hearings, the city agreed to pay Collondrez $35,000. Collondrez resigned. The agreement provides that Collondrez's disciplinary reports will only be released as required by law or upon legal process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, after written notice to Collondrez. Penal Code section 832.71 was subsequently amended to require the disclosure of police officer personnel records concerning sustained findings of dishonesty or making false reports. The city responded to media requests under the Public Records Act for records, giving Collondrez prior notice of only some of the disclosures. Media outlets reported the misconduct allegations. His then-employer, Uber, fired Collondrez. Collondrez sued.The trial court partially granted the city’s to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, finding that Collondrez had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims for breach of contract and invasion of privacy but not on claims for interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeal reversed in part, in favor of the city. The complaint arises from speech protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, but the trial court erred in finding Collondrez established a likelihood of prevailing two counts. View "Collondrez v. City of Rio Vista" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against two hospitals before the first hospital issued a final decision in the peer review proceeding addressing his reapplication. Plaintiff alleged multiple claims, including retaliation in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, a whistleblower provision that protects healthcare workers who advocate for medically appropriate care of a patient. The trial court sustained the demurrer filed by the first hospital, the hospital where plaintiff's reapplication privileges was pending.The Court of Appeal affirmed and concluded that plaintiff's claims against that hospital for unfair competition and conspiring with the second hospital to violate section 1278.5 failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court explained that, in this case, the hospital had yet to take any adverse action against plaintiff and his reapplication for privileges. Furthermore, the medical staff is a separate legal entity and, thus, its recommendation to deny plaintiff's reapplication is not an act of wrongdoing by the hospital. Therefore, the cause of action against the hospital had not yet accrued. View "Bichai v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Mosanthony Wilson and Nancy Urschel brought a putative wage-and-hour class action against defendant The La Jolla Group (LJG). Plaintiffs worked for LJG as signature gatherers on behalf of political campaigns and political action committees. LJG classified them as independent contractors and paid them per signature submitted. In the underlying lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged that LJG misclassified them and, as employees, they were entitled to a minimum wage, overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, expense reimbursement, timely final wage payment, and itemized wage statements. Plaintiffs moved for certification of a class of LJG signature gatherers, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs appealed the order denying class certification, contending the trial court erred by finding common questions did not predominate and the class action procedure was not superior to individual actions. They also contended the court erred by not granting a related motion for reconsideration. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that on the current record, the trial court erred by declining to certify a class for one cause of action, for failure to provide written and accurate itemized wage statements. The Court therefore reversed the order denying class certification in part, as to that cause of action only, and remand for reconsideration. Otherwise, the Court concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed. View "Wilson v. The La Jolla Group" on Justia Law

The University of California, Santa Cruz, Department of Technology Management workload policy described the standard course load and additional teaching responsibilities, with procedures for scheduling course assignments, stating that the chair “resolves any differences and has final authority for the teaching schedule.” The Department Chair informed Professor Akella that he would be assigned four classes in the 2015-2016 academic year because he was not participating in any undergraduate advising or undergraduate curricular leadership roles; no offsetting service or research activities justified reducing his teaching load. Akella refused the assignment and filed a grievance with the Academic Senate. Akella’s attorney wrote to the provost, concerning the course that Akella “will not teach.” The provost rejected Akella’s request. The Senate denied Akella’s grievance.Akella did not appear to teach the scheduled course in March 2016, which had about 80 enrolled students. A committee tasked with reviewing a disciplinary complaint and Akella’s response unanimously rejected Akella's argument that the workload policy limited the chair’s authority to assign more than three courses and recommended disciplinary action. The provost agreed. After a formal hearing, the chancellor adopted a committee report rejecting Akella’s arguments and recommending a 15 percent annual salary reduction for one year and a letter of censure to Akella’s personnel file. The superior court ruled in Akella’s favor. The court of appeal reversed. Substantial evidence in the record supported the university’s decision. View "Akella v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Sargent began working for the University in 1991 as an environmental health-and-safety technician. Sargent was the campus’s licensed asbestos consultant. Sargent sued, presenting abundant evidence about retaliation after he raised concerns about environmental hazards. A jury found in his favor on claims alleging unlawful retaliation and on a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code 2698, PAGA), which was premised almost entirely on violations of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Labor Code 6300, CalOSHA). He was awarded more than $2.9 million in PAGA penalties and more than $7.8 million in attorney fees.The court of appeal affirmed the award of attorney fees but reversed the award of PAGA penalties. Education Code 66606.2 does not bar PAGA claims against the California State University (CSU) system; CSU is not categorically immune from PAGA penalties because it is a public entity. Viable PAGA claims can be asserted against CSU only when the statutes upon which the claims are premised themselves provide for penalties. Here, Sargent brought some viable PAGA claims but ultimately failed to establish CSU’s liability for them because the jury found that he was not personally affected by the underlying statutory violations. View "Sargent v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

A Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) plaintiff may not be compelled to arbitrate whether he or she is an aggrieved employee. Petitioners filed suit against Zum under PAGA, alleging that Zum misclassified them and others as independent contractors and thus violated multiple provisions of the California Labor Code. The trial court granted Zum's motion to compel arbitration and ordered into arbitration the issue of arbitrability of petitioners' suit.The Court of Appeal reversed the order compelling arbitration, concluding that the delegation of the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator frustrates the purpose of PAGA and is therefore prohibited under California law. The court explained that the California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, and several Courts of Appeal are uniform in holding that PAGA claims are not waivable and are not arbitrable. Furthermore, under that case law and in light of the very nature of a PAGA claim, a court – not an arbitrator – must decide all aspects of the claim. The court further explained that the only exception is when the state, as real party in interest, has consented to arbitration. However, the state did not consent here. The court concluded that the "preliminary" question of whether petitioners are "aggrieved employees" under PAGA may not be decided in private party arbitration. View "Contreras v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate as well as a complaint for due process violations against LAUSD and Defendant Sohn, seeking reinstatement and damages. Plaintiff contends that under Education Code section 44466, which governs tenure for university interns, he had acquired permanent status at the commencement of the 2018–2019 school year. Plaintiff argued that he had satisfied the requirements of section 44466 by completing his university coursework in advance of the 2017–2018 school year, serving that school year in a credentialed teaching position (first under his intern credential, and then his regular credential), then beginning the 2018–2019 school year under his regular credential.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment concluding that section 44466 contemplates that former university interns serve a complete year under a regular credential before acquiring tenure. The court explained that plaintiff did not acquire tenure under section 44466 because the post-internship year under section 44466 does not begin until the former intern is reemployed under a regular credential by the school district that employed him as an intern. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff did not acquire tenure at the commencement of the 2018–2019 school year. View "McGroarty v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that LAUSD discriminated against her based on her "electromagnetic hypersensitivity," failed to accommodate her condition, and retaliated against her—in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq. The trial court sustained LAUSD's demurrer to plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff adequately pled her cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation for her disability. The court explained that the FEHA protections against torts based on disability are independent of those under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The FAC alleges that plaintiff could not work because she experienced "the various symptoms of which LAUSD had been warned could occur, namely, chronic pain, headaches, nausea, itching, burning sensations on her skin, ear issues, shortness of breath, inflammation, heart palpitations, respiratory complications, foggy headedness, and fatigue, all symptoms of Microwave Sickness or EHS." In this case, plaintiff adequately pled physical disability within the four corners of the statute. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege adverse employment action taken against her with discriminatory or retaliatory motive; plaintiff adequately pled a cause of action for failure to prove reasonable accommodation for a physical disability; plaintiff failed to allege failure to engage in the interactive process; and the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Brown v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Anthony Hernandez was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence after choking his girlfriend. The California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (Department) terminated him from his position as a correctional officer, stating that because of his domestic violence conviction, federal law prohibited him from carrying a firearm, which he needed for the job. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the Department acted reasonably in terminating Hernandez. It was undisputed that federal law makes it a felony to possess a firearm after being convicted in any court of misdemeanor domestic violence, which was defined in part as the use of physical force by “a person similarly situated to a spouse” of a victim. Disputed here was whether Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his girlfriend, given that he had been dating her five or six months and did not share a permanent residence with her. In line with the federal case law, the Court found the evidence was sufficient to support the Department’s determination that Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his victim under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Department acted reasonably in terminating him. View "Hernandez v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law