Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In this California case, Gary Garner, the plaintiff, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against BNSF Railway Company, alleging that his father's exposure to toxic levels of diesel exhaust during his four-decade employment with BNSF caused his father's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and subsequent death. Garner retained several experts to opine on whether diesel exhaust and its constituents are capable of causing cancer, including non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and whether the father's workplace exposure to diesel exhaust was a cause of his cancer. However, the trial court granted BNSF's motions in limine to exclude Garner's three causation experts from trial. The trial court found that the science the experts relied on was inadequate and there was too great an analytical gap between the data and their opinions. As a result, Garner's wrongful death lawsuit was dismissed before trial.Garner appealed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Garner's experts. The court held that the trial court's gatekeeping role is not to choose between competing expert opinions, and it does not involve weighing the persuasiveness of an expert's opinion, substituting its own opinion for the expert’s opinion, or resolving scientific controversies. The court found that Garner's experts used their scientific judgment and expertise to evaluate the available data and determine whether to draw an inference of causation, which is a matter of informed judgment, not scientific methodology. The court reversed the orders and judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter new orders denying BNSF's motions in limine. View "Garner v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between Gregory Garrabrants, the CEO of BofI Federal Bank (BofI), and Charles Matthew Erhart, a former internal auditor at BofI who acted as a whistleblower. Erhart copied, transmitted, and retained various documents he believed evidenced possible wrongdoing, some of which contained Garrabrants' personal and confidential information. Garrabrants sued Erhart for accessing, taking, and subsequently retaining his personal information. A jury awarded Garrabrants $1,502 on claims for invasion of privacy, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized access to computer data.However, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court found that the trial court made prejudicial errors in its jury instructions. Specifically, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that bank customers have an unqualified reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents disclosed to banks. The trial court also erred in instructing the jury that Erhart's whistleblower justification defense depended on proving at least one legally unsupported element. The instructions given for Penal Code section 496 misstated the law by defining “theft” in a manner that essentially renders receiving stolen property a strict liability offense. Furthermore, the special instruction on Penal Code section 502 erroneously removed from the jury’s consideration the foundational issue of whether Garrabrants “owned” the data about him residing in BofI’s computer systems such that he could pursue a civil action under the statute. The court concluded that, in light of the record evidence, there is a reasonable possibility a jury could have found in Erhart’s favor on each of Garrabrants’ claims absent the erroneous instructions, making them prejudicial. View "Garrabrants v. Erhart" on Justia Law

The Zurich American Insurance Company sought a writ of mandate against the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) and the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), in the Court of Appeal of the State of California. The issue at hand involved the interpretation of Labor Code section 5909, which states that if the WCAB does not act on a party’s petition for reconsideration of a decision by the workers’ compensation judge within 60 days, the petition is “deemed to have been denied.” CIGA filed a petition for reconsideration more than nine months past the filing date. The WCAB justified its late decision on the basis of an “administrative irregularity” that delayed CIGA’s petition. Zurich argued that the petition had already been denied by operation of law under section 5909. The Court of Appeal agreed with Zurich and held that the language and purpose of section 5909 showed a clear legislative intent to terminate the WCAB’s jurisdiction to consider a petition for reconsideration after the 60 days have passed. As a result, decisions on the petition made after that date are void as they exceed the agency’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate, directing the WCAB to rescind its order granting CIGA’s petition for reconsideration and dismissing Zurich as a party defendant from the proceeding. View "Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

This case is a labor dispute between Palomar Health, a public healthcare district, and unions representing nurses and healthcare workers employed by Palomar Health. In 2021, during negotiations to renew their collective bargaining agreements, union organizers began a leafletting campaign outside Palomar Health’s main hospital and sought to meet with employees inside the hospital. Palomar Health responded by filing a complaint for trespass and unlawful picketing in San Diego Superior Court, seeking to ban the organizers from their facilities. The unions filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), asserting Palomar Health’s attempts to ban their representatives and the civil lawsuit violated the unions’ rights under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The trial court overruled the unions’ demurrer and denied their motion to strike, maintaining jurisdiction of the state law claims. On appeal, the unions argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute as their activities were arguably protected by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and that jurisdiction fell exclusively under PERB. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, agreed with the unions, finding that Palomar Health’s claims were preempted and therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The trial court’s order overruling the demurrer was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to enter an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and to dismiss the case on the grounds that it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of PERB. View "Palomar Health v. Nat. Nurses United" on Justia Law

The case concerns a firefighter, Matthew Vann, who was injured when a bus driver, Louis Yu, drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, causing it to break off from a fire engine and strike Vann. Vann sued the City and County of San Francisco and Yu for negligence. The trial court dismissed the case, sustaining the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. The court ruled that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as Vann was receiving workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the incident.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court rejected Vann's argument that the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), which employed Vann and Yu respectively, were separate legal entities akin to separate businesses within a multi-unit corporate enterprise. The court reasoned that the SFFD and the SFMTA were not independent entities but were merely parts of the same entity, the City and County of San Francisco. Consequently, the City was the employer of both Vann and Yu. Therefore, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, workers' compensation was Vann's exclusive remedy against the City as his employer and against Yu as his coemployee. View "Vann v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Jose Velasquez, as a condition of probation, had entered a residential rehabilitation program sponsored by The Salvation Army and was injured while working in its warehouse. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) denied Velasquez's claim for workers’ compensation benefits, determining that Velasquez was not employed by either The Salvation Army or the County of Santa Barbara (the County). The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District held that The Salvation Army is statutorily excluded from being an employer for workers’ compensation purposes under section 3301 of the Labor Code, and affirmed the Board’s decision in that respect. However, the Court found that the record was inadequately developed during the administrative proceedings to determine whether the County was Velasquez’s employer. Therefore, the Court annulled the Board’s decision as to the County and remanded the matter for further consideration. View "Velasquez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff, Eunices Argueta, appealed against the judgment in favor of her former employer, Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. Argueta had sued Worldwide for sexual harassment and retaliation, alleging that she was sexually harassed by a certain Mr. Nguyen, an employee of Worldwide, and that the company had failed to prevent the harassment.The case arose when several employees working under Argueta lodged complaints against her for bullying, harassment, and other misconduct. Subsequently, Argueta filed a complaint against Nguyen, accusing him of sexual harassment. The company investigated the allegations and issued a "Letter of Concern" to Nguyen, imposing certain conditions on his continued employment.Argueta eventually resigned, citing a hostile work environment. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Worldwide, and Argueta's motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied by the trial court. Argueta appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the substance of the complaints made against her by other employees.The appellate court agreed with Argueta, finding that the admission of the substance of the complaints was prejudicial. The court ruled that such evidence had little relevance to Argueta's claims of sexual harassment and was highly prejudicial to her case, potentially causing the jury to view her as a bad person. The court thus reversed the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial. The court did not find it necessary to consider her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Rose Jones, an employee of the Regents of the University of California (the University), was injured while riding her bike on University grounds on her way home from work. She and her husband filed suit against the University. The University moved for summary judgment, arguing inter alia, that Jones was limited to workers’ compensation under that system’s “exclusivity” rule. Although an employee’s commute was generally outside the workers’ compensation scheme, the University argued Jones’s injuries were subject to the “premises line” rule, which extended the course of employment until the employee left the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for the University. Appellants challenged the trial court’s ruling, claiming that a triable issue remained as to whether the premises line rule applied to Jones’s accident based on a variety of factors. After review, the Court of appeal determined the factors appellants cited raised no question about the rule’s application. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "Jones v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a foreign worker hired by defendant Alco Harvesting LLC to work at farms owned by defendant and appellant Betteravia Farms. He later brought employment claims against appellants. Alco moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement presented to and signed by Plaintiff at his orientation. The trial court found the agreement void and denied the motion. It considered arbitration a “material term and condition” of Plaintiff’s employment and as such, a job requirement that Alco should have disclosed during the H-2A certification process.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Alco’s arbitration agreement required Plaintiff to forfeit his right to a jury trial in “any claim, dispute and/or controversy that [any] Employee may have against the Company . . . arising from, relating to or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with [or to the] Employee’s . . . employment by, or other association with the Company . . . .” The arbitration agreement also prohibited him from participating in any class action claims against Alco. Thus, the court considered the relinquishing of these rights as “material terms and conditions” of his employment. View "State of Cal. v. Alco Harvest" on Justia Law

California State University’s (CSU) hired Plaintiff as the director of university communications of California State University at Northridge’s Marketing and Communications Department (the Department). The VP testified that after speaking with employees while investigating complaints against Plaintiff, he determined that Plaintiff could not be an effective department leader because he disregarded CSU’s direction regarding professionalism; staff could not work with him; and subordinates were intimidated and threatened by him. Plaintiff filed a complaint against CSU alleging gender, race, color, and sexual orientation discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); race, gender, and sexual orientation harassment; and failure to prevent harassment and discrimination. CSU filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial court entered the order granting summary judgment to Defendants and Plaintiff appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The court explained that CSU established a legitimate reason for the termination. Moreover, the court held that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that creates a dispute of material fact as to pretext. Similarily, the court explained that Plaintiff has not established a dispute of fact regarding whether CSU’s internal investigation was pretextual. The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to produce substantial evidence of any bias in the E&D investigation, and his statistical evidence is not probative of discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff’s evidence of CSU’s commitment to diversity does not create a triable issue of discriminatory motive. View "Martin v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law