Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

Gerry Serrano, a police officer for the City of Santa Ana, took a leave of absence to serve as president of the Santa Ana Police Officers Association. The Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that certain special pay additives Serrano received before and during his service as Association president could not be included in his pension. The Administrative Board of CalPERS and the Superior Court of Sacramento County affirmed the exclusion of most of these pay additives from Serrano’s pension. Serrano appealed, arguing that Government Code section 3558.8 mandates he cannot lose any compensation, including pensionable compensation, while serving as the Association president. He also challenged the specific exclusion of a confidential premium and holiday pay from his pensionable compensation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Serrano’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which sought to vacate the Board’s decision and include all pay additives in his retirement calculation. Serrano then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that section 3558.8 did not require the compensation Serrano earned as a police sergeant to be entirely pensionable while he served as Association president. The court concluded that the confidential premium was not pensionable because it constituted nonpensionable overtime and did not meet the regulatory definition for the confidentiality premium. Additionally, the court found that Serrano’s holiday pay was not pensionable because he was not required to work on holidays, as required by the relevant regulation. The court’s decision was based on the interpretation of the Retirement Law and the specific definitions and requirements for pensionable compensation under that law. View "Serrano v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

John Lowry, a harbor patrol officer, suffered physical and psychiatric injuries, including PTSD, from a workplace accident. His psychiatrist deemed him unfit to return to work, and the Port San Luis Harbor District (the District) indicated that his only option was retirement. Lowry applied for disability retirement, but the District denied his application, stating insufficient information to determine disability. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) also denied his application, and the District terminated his employment, claiming he voluntarily resigned, which was later admitted to be untrue.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Lowry was not eligible for relief under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because he could not perform his essential job duties with or without reasonable accommodations. The court found that disability retirement does not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment under FEHA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the denial of disability retirement payments is not an adverse employment action under FEHA. Disability retirement payments serve as income replacement for employees who can no longer work and do not facilitate continued employment, job performance, or advancement opportunities. The court concluded that an individual who is not a qualified employee cannot bring a disability discrimination claim under FEHA for the denial of disability retirement payments. The judgment in favor of the District was affirmed. View "Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist." on Justia Law

Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (Packers) employed Jose A. Parra Rodriguez (Parra) in California from April 2019 to July 2021. In February 2022, Parra filed a complaint against Packers under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), seeking civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code and California Code of Regulations. Packers moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Parra allegedly signed, which included a clause for binding individual arbitration. Parra opposed the motion, arguing he did not recall signing the agreement, his PAGA claims lacked an individual component, and the claims fell under exceptions to arbitration.The Superior Court of Imperial County held an evidentiary hearing and found Parra had signed the agreement. However, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, interpreting "current law" to mean the law as it stood in 2019, when Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC held PAGA claims were not subject to arbitration. The court concluded the parties had not agreed to arbitrate PAGA claims at all.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Packers argued that under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, Parra’s individual PAGA claim should be compelled to arbitration, and non-individual claims should be dismissed. Parra contended his complaint did not include individual PAGA claims, citing Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc., which held a plaintiff could forgo individual relief and bring a representative PAGA action.The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with Parra that his complaint did not assert individual PAGA claims. The court found that Parra had not sought individual PAGA relief and thus, there were no individual claims to compel to arbitration. The court did not address whether a PAGA action must include an individual claim, as this issue was not ripe for consideration in this appeal. View "Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services" on Justia Law

Angelica Ramirez sued her former employer, Charter Communications, Inc., under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Ramirez during her onboarding process. The trial court found the agreement contained unconscionable provisions and refused to enforce it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the arbitration agreement to be a contract of adhesion and identified several substantively unconscionable provisions, including shortened filing periods for claims, improper allocation of attorney fees, and lack of mutuality in claims subject to arbitration. The court denied Charter's motion to compel arbitration. Charter appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the agreement contained multiple unconscionable provisions.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and concurred that three provisions were substantively unconscionable but remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to reconsider whether the unconscionable provisions could be severed from the agreement. On remand, the Court of Appeal concluded that severing the unconscionable provisions would not further the interests of justice. The court found that the agreement's central purpose was tainted with illegality and that the multiple unconscionable provisions indicated a systematic effort by Charter to impose arbitration in a manner that favored the employer. Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's refusal to enforce the arbitration agreement. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

In this wage-and-hour class action, the plaintiffs, employees of ACE American Insurance Company (ACE), alleged that ACE misclassified them as exempt employees and failed to provide benefits required for nonexempt employees under state law. The plaintiffs also added claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for the same alleged violations. The plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements as a condition of their employment, which required them to submit employment-related legal claims to arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted ACE's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the case pending arbitration. However, neither party initiated arbitration. The plaintiffs then moved to lift the stay, arguing that ACE was required to initiate arbitration and had waived its right to arbitrate by failing to do so. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that ACE's inaction was inconsistent with its right to arbitrate and lifted the stay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs, not ACE, were required to initiate arbitration under the terms of the arbitration agreements. The agreements specified that the party wanting to start the arbitration procedure should submit a demand, and in this context, it referred to the plaintiffs who had employment-related legal claims. The court concluded that ACE did not breach the arbitration agreements or waive its right to arbitration by failing to initiate the process. Consequently, the trial court's order lifting the stay was reversed, and ACE was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Arzate v. ACE American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves Tarlochan Sandhu, who worked for various public agencies as a finance and accounting professional and was a member of CalPERS, receiving retirement benefits upon his retirement in 2011. After retiring, Sandhu was hired by Regional Government Services (RGS) in 2015, which assigned him to work for several cities. RGS considered Sandhu its employee, providing him with benefits and paying him, while the cities paid RGS for his services. CalPERS determined Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities, violating postretirement employment rules, and the trial court upheld this determination.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case, where Sandhu challenged CalPERS’s decision, arguing he was not a common law employee and that the decision was based on underground regulations. The trial court applied its independent judgment, finding the evidence supported CalPERS’s determination that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court found the cities had the right to control Sandhu’s work, which is the principal test for an employment relationship, and that several secondary factors also supported this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the common law test for employment applies and that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court also found that Sandhu forfeited his argument regarding underground regulations by not properly raising it in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "Sandhu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS" on Justia Law

Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with Technology Credit Union (TCU) before starting his job in 2020. The agreement required both parties to submit any employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. Vo was later terminated and sued TCU for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination. TCU moved to compel arbitration, but Vo opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable because it did not allow for prehearing third-party discovery.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it did not permit third-party discovery, relying on Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. The court denied TCU's motion to compel arbitration, leading TCU to appeal the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court found that while the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively unconscionable. The court noted that the JAMS Rules incorporated into the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order additional discovery, including third-party discovery, if necessary. The court emphasized that the agreement should be interpreted to allow adequate discovery to vindicate statutory claims, as clarified in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with instructions to grant TCU's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and not unconscionable. View "Vo v. Technology Credit Union" on Justia Law

Kristin Casey, a former employee of D.R. Horton, Inc., filed a lawsuit against the company and one of its employees, Kris Hansen, alleging sexual harassment and other claims. D.R. Horton moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause governed by California law. Casey opposed the motion, citing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which allows plaintiffs to invalidate arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the EFAA was inapplicable due to the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and granted the motion to compel arbitration, accepting Hansen's joinder. The court concluded that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement meant that California law, not the EFAA, applied. Casey then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the EFAA preempts state law attempts to compel arbitration in cases related to sexual harassment disputes. The court determined that the EFAA applies to the parties' transaction because it sufficiently involved interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the EFAA's rule of unenforceability of arbitration agreements in sexual harassment cases preempts the state law and that parties cannot contract around the EFAA through a choice-of-law provision. Consequently, the court granted Casey's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Casey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. (Nabors) performed oil well plug and abandonment work for the City of Long Beach (the City) between 2012 and 2014. The City had contracted with Tidelands Oil Production Company (Tidelands) for services on the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement Project, and Tidelands subcontracted the work to Nabors. The City and Tidelands had concluded that the work was not subject to prevailing wage laws, and Nabors was not informed otherwise during the bid process. After completing the work, Nabors faced a class action from its employees for unpaid prevailing wages, which led to arbitration awards and federal court judgments against Nabors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained demurrers by the City and Tidelands, dismissing Nabors’s claims for indemnity under Labor Code sections 1781 and 1784. The court ruled that section 1784 could not be applied retroactively to Tidelands and that the arbitration awards confirmed by the federal court did not qualify as court decisions under section 1781.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1784 claim against Tidelands, agreeing that the statute could not be applied retroactively. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the section 1781 claim against the City, holding that the federal court’s confirmation of arbitration awards did qualify as court decisions classifying the work as public work. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a new order overruling the City’s demurrer to the section 1781 cause of action. Nabors was awarded costs on appeal against the City, while Tidelands was awarded costs on appeal against Nabors. View "Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law