Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

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The California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (Division) debarred the following from acting as public works contractors: (1) GRFCO, Inc. (GRFCO), a contractor; (2) George Rogers Frost, the principal in GRFCO; (3) Garcia Juarez Construction (GJC), a contractor and apparent alter ego of GRFCO; and (4) James Craig Jackson, the principal in GJC and an employee of GRFCO. The Division found that, in six instances, the contractors violated apprenticeship requirements, and in two instances, Frost and Jackson had made false certifications under penalty of perjury. The trial court denied the contractors’ petition for administrative mandate. On appeal, the contractors contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the apprenticeship violations were knowing; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the false certification findings; (3) the contractors were debarred because they refused to join a union, in violation of the First Amendment; (5) the Division, hearing officer, and/or the investigator were biased; and (5) the hearing officer erred by denying the contractors' request to reopen, which was based on new evidence of bias. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "GRFCO, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a former driver for Defendant Lyft, Inc., filed suit against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). He alleged that Lyft misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Lyft moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Terms of Service” (TOS) that it required its drivers to accept. The trial court denied the motion, finding the PAGA waiver in the arbitration provision unenforceable under then-controlling California law. Lyft appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. Lyft petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted Lyft’s petition and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022).   The Second Appellate District reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s order. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to (1) enter an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim and (2) conduct further proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s non-individual claims. The court explained that it is not bound by the analysis of PAGA standing set forth in Viking River. PAGA standing is a matter of state law that must be decided by California courts. The court explained that until it has guidance from the California Supreme Court, its review of PAGA and relevant state decisional authority leads the court to conclude that a plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims simply because their individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration. View "Seifu v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued Uber under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), claiming Uber willfully misclassified him as an independent contractor rather than an employee, which led to numerous other Labor Code violations. In response, Uber moved to compel arbitration under the “Arbitration Provision” in the “Technology Services Agreement” (TSA).The trial court denied Uber's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. However, in June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision when it granted Uber's petition for certiorari in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213 L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River).Following this posture, the Second Appellate District held 1.) the TSA’s PAGA Waiver is invalid and must be severed from the Arbitration Provision; 2.) under the Arbitration Provision’s remaining terms, Plaintiff must resolve his claim for civil penalties based on Labor Code violations he allegedly suffered in arbitration, and his claims for penalties based on violations allegedly suffered by other current and former employees must be litigated in court; and 3.) under California law, Plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue his non-individual claims in court simply because his individual claim must be arbitrated. View "Gregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2014, Lopez became the manager at La Casa’s domestic violence shelter. In 2016, Lopez gave birth and experienced complications. She provided La Casa with certifications relating to her condition. Lopez alleged La Casa sent harassing communications, failed to engage in an interactive process to determine if Lopez’s disability could be accommodated, and refused to provide “modest” accommodations suggested by Lopez’s doctor. Lopez alleged that her efforts to return to work were “rebuffed,” so she was forced out of her job, and that she was denied a job elsewhere because La Casa misrepresented the reasons for her termination.The court of appeal affirmed a judgment in favor of La Casa. A claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code 12945(a)(3)(A), requires proof that the plaintiff had a condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition; the plaintiff requested accommodation of this condition, with the advice of her health care provider; the plaintiff’s employer refused to provide a reasonable accommodation; and with the reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of the job. The trial court correctly applied those elements, properly placing the burden on Lopez to prove that she had a condition related to pregnancy and that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. View "Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful constructive termination, discrimination, and retaliation actions against her former employer, Rite Aid Corporation and Thrifty Payless, Inc., dba Rite Aid. Plaintiff’s lawsuit stemmed from an offsite and after-hours text exchange she had with a Rite Aid district manager in which the latter sent lewd photographs to her. Plaintiff and the district manager knew each other and were friends from a time before Plaintiff started working at Rite Aid. The Rite Aid defendants brought a summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Rite Aid defendants as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to the required showing that her manager was acting in the capacity of a supervisor in the text exchange in which he sent the inappropriate texts. Rather, as the trial court found, Plaintiff and the manager had “an extensive texting relationship,” and their January 4, 2019, late-night text exchange, which “occurred outside the workplace and outside of work hours,” was “spawned from a personal exchange that arose from a friendship between [them].” Summary judgment is, therefore, proper as to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims. Further, the court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that “as opposed to a constructive termination, the evidence shows that Plaintiff resigned her position.” View "Atalla v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

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This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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In November 2020, the voters approved Proposition 22, Bus. & Prof. Code, 7448–7467. Proposition 22 concerns drivers that operate transportation or delivery services using an electronic application or platform to connect passengers seeking transportation or customers seeking delivery of goods to drivers or couriers willing to provide those services with their personal vehicles. The Attorney General titled it: “Exempts App-Based Transportation and Delivery Companies from Providing Employee Benefits to Certain Drivers.” The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Proposition 22 violated the California Constitution.The trial court granted the petition, ruling that the proposition is invalid in its entirety because it intrudes on the Legislature’s exclusive authority to create workers’ compensation laws; is invalid to the extent that it limits the Legislature’s authority to enact legislation that would not constitute an amendment to Proposition 22, and is invalid in its entirety because it violates the single-subject rule for initiative statutes.The court of appeal affirmed in part and found that the unconstitutional provisions are severable. Proposition 22 does not intrude on the Legislature’s workers’ compensation authority or violate the single-subject rule, but the initiative’s definition of what constitutes an amendment violates separation of powers principles. View "Castellanos v. State of California" on Justia Law

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During an investigation into possible violations of California overtime laws by appellant Nor-Cal Venture Group, Inc. (Nor-Cal), respondent Labor Commissioner for the State of California (Commissioner) subpoenaed Nor-Cal's business records. The Commissioner ultimately issued a wage citation to Nor-Cal, seeking over $900,000 in penalties and unpaid wages for alleged misclassification of about 40 restaurant managers. Nor-Cal challenged the wage citation in an “informal” adjudicatory hearing, and while that adjudication was pending, Commissioner issued a subpoena directing Nor-Cal’s “Person(s) Most Knowledgeable” on certain topics to testify at a deposition. When Nor-Cal refused, Commissioner filed a petition to a trial court to compel Nor-Cal to comply. The trial court agreed with Commissioner and ordered Nor-Cal to comply with the deposition subpoena. On appeal, Nor-Cal challenged the trial court’s order, arguing: (1) the California Government Code did not contemplate parties to adjudicatory informal hearings taking depositions for the purpose of discovery; and (2) because, under the trial court’s reasoning, only Commissioner could issue deposition subpoenas during the pendency of an informal adjudication, the trial court’s order permitting non-reciprocal discovery violated due process. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, finding that while Commissioner had broad power to issue investigative subpoenas to a company for suspected violations of the law, "that broad power ends upon initiation of adjudicative proceedings against the company." View "Garcia-Brower v. Nor-Cal Venture Group" on Justia Law

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Defendant In-N-Out Burgers appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the claims of plaintiffs Tom Piplack and Donovan Sherrod for penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Defendant argued Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022), rendered while defendant’s appeal was pending, required plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims to be arbitrated and all remaining representative claims dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiffs contended: (1) the agreement did not require arbitration of individual PAGA claims; (2) defendant waived its right to arbitration by participating in trial proceedings; (3) plaintiff Sherrod was not bound by the arbitration agreement because he entered it before reaching the age of majority and disaffirmed it after reaching that age; and (4) that plaintiffs had standing to pursue representative PAGA claims in court even if their individual claims were sent to arbitration. The Court of Appeal concluded the arbitration agreements required individual PAGA claims to be arbitrated and defendant did not waive its right to compel arbitration. Accordingly, as to plaintiff Piplack, the Court of Appeal reversed: his individual PAGA claim had to be arbitrated. As to plaintiff Sherrod, the Court remanded for the trial court to consider his arguments regarding disaffirmance in the first instance, as those arguments were not properly briefed or decided in the trial court because they were irrelevant under pre-Viking law. View "Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers" on Justia Law