Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

Bradley Hirdman filed a complaint against his former employer, Charter Communications, LLC, alleging violations of various Labor Code sections under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Hirdman claimed that Charter improperly classified him as an "exempt employee" for calculating paid sick leave, arguing he should have been classified as a "nonexempt employee" and thus entitled to a different calculation method. Charter contended that Hirdman was correctly classified as an exempt outside salesperson, exempt from overtime compensation requirements.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted Charter's motion for summary adjudication, agreeing that the statutory language was unambiguous and that section 246, subdivision (l)(3) applied to exempt outside salespersons like Hirdman. The court found that Charter properly calculated and paid sick leave in the same manner as other forms of paid leave.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory language of section 246, subdivision (l)(3) was clear and unambiguous, applying to all exempt employees, including outside salespersons. The court rejected Hirdman's argument that the term "exempt employees" should be limited to those exempt under administrative, executive, or professional exemptions. The court also found that the legislative history and a Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement (DLSE) opinion letter did not support Hirdman's interpretation. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Charter correctly calculated paid sick leave for Hirdman and other outside salespersons. View "Hirdman v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Jonathan Egelston, a youth correctional officer, was dismissed from his position by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation after he allegedly assaulted and harassed his girlfriend, J.G., and subsequently lied about the incident. The State Personnel Board (SPB) upheld his dismissal following an evidentiary hearing. Egelston then petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the SPB's decision, but the trial court denied his petition.The family law court had previously dismissed J.G.'s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Egelston without prejudice. Egelston argued that this dismissal should bar the findings of assault and dishonesty under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. However, the trial court found that the SPB's credibility determinations, which favored J.G.'s testimony over Egelston's, were entitled to great weight.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Egelston's contention regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel was forfeited because it was not raised in the lower court. Additionally, the court found that the claim lacked merit. The family law court's dismissal of the DVRO without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits, and thus had no preclusive effect. The causes of action in the DVRO proceeding and the SPB proceedings were different, and the parties were not in privity.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding Egelston's dismissal from his position. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Egelston v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Oakland Education Association (OEA) represents certain employees of the Oakland Unified School District (District). Following a dispute over school closures approved by the District, OEA members conducted a one-day strike. OEA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), claiming the District committed unfair practices under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). The District filed a competing charge, claiming OEA’s strike was an unfair practice under EERA.PERB issued separate complaints for the competing charges and bifurcated the hearings. In its first decision, PERB found the District violated EERA. In its second decision, PERB held that OEA’s strike was legal because it was provoked by the District’s unfair practices and OEA had negotiated in good faith. The District did not challenge the first decision but contested the second, arguing that OEA’s strike was illegal and violated constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that public school employees may engage in unfair practice strikes under EERA. It concluded that PERB did not clearly err in finding that such strikes are allowed and that OEA’s one-day strike did not violate the rights to education, due process, or equal protection. The court also found that neither EERA nor the due process clause prohibits pre-impasse unfair practice strikes conducted before PERB determines an unfair practice has occurred. However, the court noted that PERB erred by excluding evidence of educational harm but deemed this error harmless. The court affirmed PERB’s decision. View "Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

A Hobby Lobby manager called law enforcement because Kristopher Birtcher appeared to be suffering from a mental health crisis at the store. Birtcher, who was unarmed and had committed no crime, tried to flee when sheriff’s deputies arrived. The deputies subdued him by double-cuffing his hands behind his back, securing his ankles, tying his ankles to a cord around his waist, and applying bodyweight pressure to his back while he was lying face down. Birtcher gasped that he couldn’t breathe and called for help. He stopped moving after several minutes, and the deputies kept him in a prone position for another 50 seconds before turning him on his side, then later returned him to a prone position. Birtcher died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest within 25 minutes of the deputies’ arrival.Birtcher’s minor daughter, A.B., brought state claims in state court after unsuccessfully litigating federal claims. She asserted claims for wrongful death, battery, negligence, and negligent training, and a survival action for violation of the Bane Act. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim and ruling that the restraint was “by the book.” The court also ruled that A.B. failed to identify a legal basis for her negligent training theory against Sheriff Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that there were triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim, noting that the deputies’ use of forceful prone restraint with bodyweight compression could be seen as excessive. The court also found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as A.B. had identified a statutory basis for the claim, and Sheriff Gore failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of material fact. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Joanne Allison, a former registered nurse, filed a class action lawsuit against her former employer, Dignity Health, alleging unpaid work, meal period, and rest break violations. She sought class certification for registered nurses at three Dignity hospitals since June 1, 2014. Allison's expert claimed that time records showed over 70% of shifts had noncompliant meal periods. She also argued that work-issued communication devices interrupted rest breaks, violating labor laws.The trial court initially granted partial class certification, finding common questions suitable for class treatment, including the legality of Dignity's premium request requirement and the impact of communication devices on breaks. However, Dignity later moved to decertify the class, citing post-certification discovery that revealed significant variations in nurses' experiences and practices, undermining the manageability of class-wide adjudication.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering new evidence from post-certification depositions, which showed varied reasons for noncompliant meal periods, such as personal preferences and mistakes. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to disregard the Steiner survey due to methodological flaws and potential biases, which rendered it unreliable for proving class-wide liability.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decertification order, agreeing that individualized inquiries predominated over common questions, making class treatment unmanageable. The court also noted that the evidence did not support a uniform practice of requiring nurses to carry work phones during breaks, further complicating the rest break claims. Thus, the order decertifying the class was affirmed. View "Allison v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law