Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A former employee, Corbin Williams, worked as an insurance adjuster for Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, from 2014 until January 2022. Williams typically worked 84-hour weeks but was not paid overtime, violating the Labor Code. In March 2023, over a year after his employment ended, Williams notified the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of his intent to pursue a PAGA action for these violations. He then filed a lawsuit seeking civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees but not on his own behalf.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained a demurrer to Williams's complaint without leave to amend, finding the action time-barred. The court noted that Williams had not suffered any Labor Code violations within the one-year statute of limitations period before notifying the Agency, as his employment ended in January 2022. Consequently, the court did not address the defendant's alternative argument regarding Williams's standing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that to be a PAGA plaintiff, an individual must have a timely individual claim for at least one Labor Code violation. Since Williams's individual claims were time-barred, he could not satisfy this requirement. The court rejected Williams's arguments that other aggrieved employees' timely claims could substitute for his own untimely claims and that the continuous accrual doctrine applied. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, as Williams's proposed amendments would not cure the timeliness defect. View "Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4-2001 and 5-2001. Vicar contended that the plaintiffs had signed valid written agreements prospectively waiving their meal periods for shifts between five and six hours, which could be revoked at any time. The plaintiffs argued that such prospective waivers allowed employers to circumvent statutory meal break requirements and denied employees a meaningful opportunity to exercise their right to meal breaks.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the plain language of the statute and wage orders permitted such waivers and distinguished the case from Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, which did not address the timing of meal break waivers. The court also concluded that a DLSE opinion letter cited by the plaintiffs was not applicable as it interpreted different wage order regulations.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the revocable, prospective waivers signed by the plaintiffs were enforceable in the absence of any evidence that the waivers were unconscionable or unduly coercive. The court concluded that the prospective written waiver of a 30-minute meal period for shifts between five and six hours was consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5. The court also determined that the legislative and administrative history confirmed that such waivers were consistent with the welfare of employees and that Brinker did not require a contrary result. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

Pablo Arredondo Padron was hired by Hugo Osoy to install two skylights in Osoy’s home. The project was expected to take 10 to 12 days, with Padron working eight hours each day. However, Padron fell from a ladder and was injured before completing 52 hours of work. Padron sued Osoy for negligence, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Osoy, finding that Padron’s claims were exclusively covered by workers’ compensation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that Padron’s employment was covered by workers’ compensation under Labor Code section 3351(d), which includes individuals employed by homeowners for duties incidental to the ownership, maintenance, or use of the dwelling. The court also found that Padron did not fall under the exclusion in section 3352(a)(8)(A), which excludes workers employed for less than 52 hours in the 90 days preceding the injury, because Padron had contracted to work for more than 52 hours.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the exclusion in section 3352(a)(8)(A) does not apply when the employment is contracted to be for more than 52 hours, regardless of the actual hours worked before the injury. The court also rejected Padron’s arguments that he was not subject to the workers’ compensation system and that Osoy should be estopped from asserting the exclusivity defense. The court concluded that Osoy had secured workers’ compensation coverage through his homeowners’ insurance policy, which included the required coverage by operation of law. Therefore, Padron’s exclusive remedy was under the workers’ compensation system, and the summary judgment in favor of Osoy was affirmed. View "Padron v. Osoy" on Justia Law

Billy Ford worked as a full-time security guard for Parkwest Casino Lotus from September 2018 to December 2021. Upon hiring, Ford signed an arbitration agreement that excluded claims for workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, certain administrative complaints, ERISA claims, and "representative claims under [PAGA]." In February 2022, Ford filed a complaint against Parkwest under PAGA, alleging Labor Code violations, including mandatory off-the-clock health screenings and inaccurate wage statements. Parkwest moved to compel arbitration of Ford's individual PAGA claims and to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Parkwest's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement specifically excluded all PAGA claims. Parkwest appealed, arguing that the agreement was ambiguous regarding the exclusion of individual PAGA claims and that such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement unambiguously excluded all PAGA claims, including individual claims. The court reasoned that the language of the agreement and the circumstances under which it was executed indicated that the parties intended to exclude all PAGA claims from arbitration. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying Parkwest's motion to compel arbitration. View "Ford v. The Silver F" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, a tenured professor at a community college, filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and related claims against the Los Angeles Community College District and a vice president of student services. The alleged harassment occurred over an eight-month period in 2017, during which the vice president made inappropriate comments and advances towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff also claimed retaliation when she did not comply with his demands, including attempts to move her program and firing her staff.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial, where a jury awarded the plaintiff $10 million in noneconomic damages. The defendants filed motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing prejudicial errors in the admission of evidence and excessive damages. These motions were denied by the trial judge, who made inappropriate and irrelevant comments during the post-trial hearing, leading to his disqualification for cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found significant errors in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The appellate court determined that the admission of 20-year-old newspaper articles and evidence of the vice president's misdemeanor convictions were prejudicial and irrelevant. Additionally, the testimony of a student who had filed a separate harassment complaint against a different administrator was improperly admitted, as it was not closely related to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case.The appellate court concluded that these errors, combined with the excessive damages awarded, warranted a new trial. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Odom v. L.A. Community College Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Melissa Mandell-Brown, filed a complaint against Novo Nordisk, Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian, asserting 16 causes of action, including claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, as well as common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate statement of 161 undisputed facts, attorney declarations, and witness declarations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after the plaintiff failed to file an opposition or a separate statement in response to the motion. The court granted two continuances to the plaintiff, but she still did not file the required documents or appear at the continued hearing. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her causes of action.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), by granting the motion based on the plaintiff’s failure to file the requisite separate statement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for summary judgment due to the plaintiff's non-compliance with the procedural requirements, especially given the complexity of the case and the multiple continuances already granted. View "Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), for claims related to his employment. During the litigation, Paul Brown, an attorney for Caltrans, sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson forwarded the email to his attorney, John Shepardson, who further disseminated it to several experts and individuals. Caltrans sought a protective order, claiming the email was covered by attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted the protective order and later disqualified Shepardson and three experts for non-compliance with the order.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County issued the protective order, finding the email privileged and prohibiting its further dissemination. Johnson and Shepardson were ordered to destroy all copies and identify all individuals who had received the email. Caltrans later filed a motion to enforce the order and subsequently a motion to disqualify Shepardson and the experts, which the trial court granted, citing Shepardson’s continued use and dissemination of the email despite the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Brown email was protected by attorney-client privilege. The court found that Shepardson breached his ethical obligations by using and disseminating the email after Caltrans asserted the privilege and the trial court issued the protective order. The court concluded that Shepardson’s actions created a substantial risk of undue prejudice and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, justifying disqualification. The court also rejected Johnson’s arguments regarding waiver of the privilege and undue delay by Caltrans in seeking the protective order and disqualification. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) mandated remote instruction. Patrick Krug, a biology professor at California State University Los Angeles, incurred expenses for necessary equipment to comply with this directive, which CSU refused to reimburse. Krug filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, claiming that Labor Code section 2802 required CSU to reimburse these work-related expenses. CSU argued that as a state department, it was exempt from such Labor Code provisions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that CSU, as a governmental agency, was exempt from section 2802 because the section did not explicitly apply to public employers. Krug appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that Labor Code section 2802 did not obligate CSU to reimburse employees for work-related expenses. The court found no express language or positive indicia in the statute or its legislative history indicating that it applied to public employers. The court also noted that applying section 2802 to CSU would infringe on its sovereign powers, as CSU has broad discretion under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stone v. Alameda Health System. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment, maintaining that section 2802 does not apply to public employers like CSU. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Apple Studios LLC offered Brent Sexton a film role on the condition that he get vaccinated. Sexton refused vaccination and sued Apple when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. Apple filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its casting decision was protected activity in furtherance of free speech on public issues, including the vaccination controversy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The trial court denied Apple’s motion, finding that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Apple’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that while Apple’s casting decision was protected activity, Sexton had demonstrated minimal merit in his claims. The court found that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had provided sufficient evidence to show he was qualified for the role with daily COVID-19 testing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that Apple’s casting decision was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it contributed to public discourse on vaccination policy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The court found that Sexton’s privacy claim failed because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and his discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the job due to his refusal to get vaccinated. The court granted Apple’s request for judicial notice and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Apple and for a determination of the fees and costs owed by Sexton to Apple. View "Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC" on Justia Law

Jon Woods, a workers' compensation attorney, was convicted of 37 felony counts of workers' compensation fraud. Woods had engaged in unlawful kickback and referral fee arrangements, referring copy and subpoena work to companies that provided financial benefits to him and his firm. This corruption affected the workers' compensation system, as the employer's insurance company had to cover the costs.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the case, where Woods was found guilty on all counts and received a four-year prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay $701,452 in restitution. Woods appealed, arguing that the Williamson rule precluded convictions on counts 5 through 37, and that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Woods that the Williamson rule applied, as his conduct fell under a more specific statute, Labor Code section 139.32, which criminalizes kickback schemes and is a misdemeanor. Therefore, the court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 5 through 37, the white-collar sentencing enhancement, and the restitution award based on these charges. However, the court found no error in the trial court's limitation of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "People v. Woods" on Justia Law