Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Albert Matthews settled his workers’ compensation claim against his employer and others in a structured settlement approved by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Matthews obtained an award in his workers’ compensation proceeding, based on a compromise and release containing the terms of the structured settlement agreement, then obtained a court judgment based on the workers’ compensation award. In this appeal, WC challenged the denial of its motion for a qualified order approving the assignment to it of a judgment providing for structured settlement payments otherwise payable to Mathews. Consistent with federal law, the Massachusetts statute providing for approval of the transfer of payments under a structured settlement agreement requires that the court or administrative authority asked to approve the transfer expressly find that the transfer “will not contravene other applicable law.” The trial court, in determining whether to issue a qualified order for the transfer of the structured settlement payments, concluded that the transaction would contravene California law, because Labor Code section 4900 prohibits the assignment. The court concluded that the trial court properly denied WC’s motion, because the assignment of Matthews’ structured settlement payments contravened section 4900. Furthermore, the transaction contravened the order of the responsible administrative authority. The court rejected WC's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Matthews v. Liberty Assignment Corp." on Justia Law

Carlos Ivan Rodas, who worked as a dishwasher at Guido’s, died from a pulmonary hemorrhage while taking out the garbage at work. Rodas’s arteries were prone to bleed because of lesions caused by tuberculosis. Dr. Zlotolow, board certified in internal medicine, was retained by Rodas’s family to opine on the cause of Rodas’s death. Dr. Zlotolow opined that either coughing, brought about by refuse odors, or lifting the garbage caused the bleeding. The WCAB rejected Dr. Zlotolow’s opinion as speculative and ruled that it had not been shown that Rodas’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court granted Rodas’s petition for a writ of review because the inferences Dr. Zlotolow drew were reasonable and therefore probative circumstantial evidence. The court annuled the appeals board’s decision, concluded that the death arose out of and in the course of employment, and remanded the case with directions to conduct further proceedings View "Guerra v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against E.M.E. for violations of state labor laws. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for class certification and then granted summary judgment for E.M.E. on plaintiff's claims, which relied on Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court. The court concluded, however, that summary judgment was incorrectly granted with respect to plaintiffs claims relating to rest breaks, as Brinker explained that under the applicable wage order provision, rest breaks in an eight-hour shift should fall on either side of the meal break, absent factors rendering such scheduling impracticable. In this case, section 12(A) of Wage Order 1-2001 obliged E.M.E. to provide a 10-minute rest break in the middle of the work periods occurring before and after the 30-minute meal break “insofar as practicable.” Therefore, there are triable issues regarding whether the rest break schedule stated in the wage order was not practicable. Because summary adjudication was improperly granted with respect to plaintiff’s rest break claim, it was also improperly granted with respect to the derivative claims. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to those claims. The court affirmed with respect to plaintiff's first cause of action. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. E.M.E., Inc." on Justia Law

Dreher had been a maintenance supervisor at an Alliance apartment complex for 74 days when he slipped and fell on concrete walkway in the complex in the rain. Dreher sustained a fractured pelvis and injuries to his neck, shoulder, leg, and knee. He suffered gait derangement, a sleep disorder, and headaches. Dreher required surgery to repair pelvic fractures, another surgery to repair a torn meniscus, and another surgery to address issues with his foot and ankle. Dreher sought compensation for a psychiatric injury. An evaluation concluded that Dreher suffered a psychiatric disability as a result of the accident, including depression, difficulty sleeping, and panic attacks. The ALJ found that Dreher sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment but denied his claim as barred by section 3208.3(d) because Dreher was employed by Alliance for less than six months and his psychiatric injury did not result from a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. On reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board found that the injury was not barred. The court of appeal annulled the decision. Dreher’s testimony that he was surprised by the slick surface because the other walkways had a rough surface, and that the walkway was later resurfaced, did not demonstrate that his injury was caused by an uncommon, unusual, or totally unexpected event. View "Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) employed plaintiff Corey Baughn as a firefighter at its Mendocino Unit. In 2009, Cal Fire terminated him for sexually harassing a female subordinate employee. Baughn appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board. Before the Board considered the matter, the parties settled the dispute by written stipulation. Baughn agreed to withdraw his appeal; resign from Cal Fire; and not apply for, seek, or accept employment with Cal Fire again. In exchange, Cal Fire agreed to remove any reference to its disciplinary action from Baughn’s personnel file and to accept Baughn’s resignation. The Personnel Board approved the stipulation. Baughn then worked for the Ukiah Valley Fire District, first as a volunteer firefighter and then as a temporary employee. Ukiah Valley had an agreement with Cal Fire to assign Ukiah Valley personnel to a Cal Fire facility during the winter months. The unit chief of Cal Fire’s Mendocino Unit, Christopher Rowney, became aware that Baughn was working for Ukiah Valley. Rowney knew that as result of Baughn’s employment duties, Baughn would likely be present in Cal Fire facilities when the victim of Baughn’s earlier harassment would also be present. Concerned about this possibility, Rowney wrote a letter to Ukiah Valley’s fire chief ordering Baughn not to be present in any Cal Fire facility. Baughn sought permanent employment with Ukiah Valley. However, when Ukiah Valley’s governing board members learned of Rowney’s action, they pressured the chief to terminate Baughn, which the chief ultimately did. Baughn and his union, plaintiff CDF Firefighters (the Union), sued Cal Fire for breach of the written settlement stipulation between it and Baughn, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Cal Fire filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint as to the Union, but not as to Baughn. It contended the complaint arose from speech by Rowney that was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. It also asserted the Union was not likely to succeed on the merits. The trial court denied the motion. Cal Fire appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that defendant failed to demonstrate plaintiffs’ action arose from conduct taken by defendant in furtherance of its right of speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The Court reversed and remanded an award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court relied on an improper basis for awarding fees to plaintiff. View "Baughn v. Dept. of Forestry" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis, plaintiff filed suit against DHE alleging claims for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. For several years, plaintiff’s supervisors scheduled him so that he could be home at night for his son’s dialysis. That schedule accommodation changed when a new supervisor took over. The court concluded that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment and denial of plaintiff's motion to tax costs. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

The San Diego Housing Commission (Commission) was a local public agency subject to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Act). The Commission and Service Employees International Union, Local 721 (Union) reached an impasse in negotiations over the effects of the Commission's decision to lay off two employees represented by the Union. The Union made a written request to the Public Employment Relations Board for the dispute to be submitted to a factfinding panel. The Board granted the request over the Commission's objection, and the Commission then filed suit seeking a declaration and writ of mandate to prohibit the Board from using factfinding procedures in this case, and to restrain the parties from using factfinding on matters unlrelated to the negotiation of an MOU. This appeal presented to the Court of Appeal whether the Act's provisions for impasse resolution through advisory factfinding applied to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter or only to impasses arising during the negotiation of a comprehensive memorandum of understanding (MOU). The Court held that the factfinding provisions applied to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter. As the trial court determined otherwise, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "San Diego Housing Com. v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The County of Riverside (County) was a local public agency subject to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Act). The County implemented a new background check policy requiring information technology employees represented by the Service Employees International Union, Local 721 (Union) to pass a background check. An employee's failure to pass the background check provided grounds to discharge the employee. The County and Union entered negotiations over the effects of the policy, but were unable to reach an agreement. After the Union declared an impasse and the County declined the Union's offer to mediate the dispute, the Union submitted a request to the Board for factfinding. The Board granted the Union's request over the County's objection. The County filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, breach of contract, and statutory and constitutional violations. The County claimed the Act's factfinding provisions applied only to impasses arising from negotiations for a new or successor MOU, not to discrete bargainable issues. The County further claimed the Act's factfinding procedures violated the County's constitutional right to establish compensation for its employees. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the factfinding provisions were constitutional because they did not divest a county or a city of its final decisionmaking authority. Further, the Court concluded the factfinding provisions applied to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter. As the trial court reached a different decision on this point, the Court reversed the judgment and the related writ and orders and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Co. of Riverside v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his petition for writ of mandate which he sought to overturn the Commission's decision upholding his dismissal as the County’s labor relations manager. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had been given a fair hearing. In this case, the Commission's decision cannot be upheld because the Commission relied on information taken outside the hearing in reaching its decision sustaining plaintiff’s dismissal which plaintiff had no opportunity to refute. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. The court need not address plaintiff's remaining issues. View "Pinheiro v. Civil Service Comm. for the Cnty. of Fresno" on Justia Law

The "Olson I" opinion examined the extent to which the 1976 amendment to the then-existing Government Code section 68203 aimed at placing a limit on cost of living adjustments (COLA's) for the salaries payable to active jurists and (derivatively) also limiting the pensions payable to certain judicial pensioners, could constitutionally be applied to those active jurists and judicial pensioners. Since Olson I, numerous courts have addressed issues stemming from Olson I, including whether a constitutional amendment designed to supersede Olson I and deprive active jurists and certain judicial pensioners of the benefits provided by the uncapped COLA's was constitutional, and whether interest was due on the payments owed to active and retired judges under the judgment announced in Olson I. This case represented the latest progeny of Olson I. Petitioner Faye Staniforth (and others similarly situated) alleged, as its principal claim against respondent The Judges' Retirement System (JRS), that JRS had not adhered to its obligations to pensioners under their interpretation of Olson I and that, as a result, over three decades worth of pension payments had been underpaid to pensioners. The Olson I claims raised by pensioners sought to compel the JRS to adhere to pensioners' interpretation of Olson I and to recalculate the amount of judicial pensions owed to pensioners using the uncapped COLA's, and to pay arrearages and interest for the decades of underpaid pension payments. The Court of Appeal concluded, contrary to pensioners' Olson I claims, pensioners were not entitled under Olson I to perpetual uncapped COLA increases to their pensions. JRS demurred to an amended petition, arguing that all the stated claims, which sought recovery for payments to the retired jurists that allegedly should have been paid over two decades before the present action was filed, were barred by the statute of limitations under any possibly applicable statute. Petitioners appealed, but finding no error in the trial court's sustaining JRS' demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissal of the action, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Staniforth v. The Judges' Retirement System" on Justia Law