Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The trial court issued a permanent injunction in 2014 barring the union from conducting demonstrations inside stores owned by Walmart. The union argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the injunction because the matter was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, the high court established an analytical framework to determine San Diego Unions v. Garmon preemption issues, including the application of the local interest exception, in the context of a California trespass case. Sears indicates that at least with respect to trespass claims, the trespass issue may properly be seen as distinct from violations of federal labor law arising out of the same conduct, and therefore not preempted; the Sears analysis is premised on the idea that two different legal controversies may arise out of one set of facts or form of conduct; and Sears indicates peaceful trespass may be an issue deeply rooted in local feeling such that the local interest exception to preemption may apply. Determining that Sears governs this case, the court concluded that Walmart's trespass action is not preempted by the NLRA because the local interest exception applies. Here, the gravamen of Walmart’s claim in the trial court was that the union activities were unlawful because they were occurring inside Walmart stores. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Walmart v. UFCW" on Justia Law

Appellant Rogelio Ramos sued his former employers, Jose Robledo and Dora Garcia (nonparties in this appeal), seeking to recover unpaid overtime, minimum wages and other compensation, and to impose job-related penalties. Appellant obtained some of the monetary recovery he requested against the two employers. However, Appellant had also sued respondent Manuel Garcia, claiming he was an employer, but Appellant lost on all those claims as to Respondent, when the court found that Respondent was a manager and co-employee of the business, not an owner/employer. Following trial, the court awarded Respondent attorney fees, as the "prevailing party." Appellant argued on appeal that the award of attorney fees to Respondent should have been reversed because the statutory requirements of the applicable statutes allowed an award of attorney fees under these circumstances, in which Respondent was a prevailing employee defendant. The Court of Appeal agreed that the attorney fees award was not supported by the record and reversed with directions. View "Ramos v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joseph Tanner sought to overturn a decision of defendant California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) that significantly reduced his expected retirement benefit. The Court of Appeal found that Tanner’s argument appeared to be that under contract principles, he and the city made a mutual mistake in entering into a November 2006 agreement because they thought all of his compensation in that agreement could be used to calculate the amount of his retirement benefit, and when CalPERS informed them otherwise, they reformed the agreement to achieve their original intent by folding various miscellaneous items of compensation in the November 2006 agreement into his new, greater base salary in the March 2007 agreement. The Court concluded, however, that Tanner’s appeal was without merit regardless of these contract arguments, or any of the other arguments Tanner made. The Court agreed with the trial court that the greater base salary in the March 2007 agreement did not qualify as Tanner’s payrate for purposes of calculating the amount of his retirement benefit because that salary was not paid pursuant to a publicly available pay schedule. For this reason, Tanner had no right to have his retirement benefit calculated based on that greater base salary. View "Tanner v. CalPERS" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the appeals board's decision regarding the medical necessity of proposed treatment requested by a CHP employee (applicant). Labor Code section 4610.6 created a new procedure - independent medical review (IMR) - that an injured worker may use to challenge an employer’s timely denial, delay or modification of a request for authorization of proposed medical treatment. The court considered whether, as the appeals board concluded in this case, an IMR determination issued after the 30-day period is invalid and thereby vests jurisdiction in the appeals board to decide whether the proposed treatment is medically necessary and appropriate. The court concluded that the 30-day time limit in section 4610.6, subdivision (d), is directory and, accordingly, an untimely IMR determination is valid and binding upon the parties as the final determination of the director. The court's interpretation of the statute in this manner is consistent with long-standing case law regarding the mandatory-directory dichotomy, and implements the Legislature’s stated policy that decisions regarding the necessity and appropriateness of medical treatment should be made by doctors, not judges. Accordingly, the court annulled the decision of the appeals board and remanded for further proceedings. View "State Compensation Ins. Fund v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Weisner, a mechanic at Santa Cruz County’s Buena Vista Landfill, also operated a construction hauling business. Three times in 2008, Weisner used County employees and equipment to remove construction materials. Following investigations, in 2008, the County dismissed Weisner. The County Civil Service Commission upheld the termination. The superior court remanded; the court of appeal affirmed. Following a 2012 hearing, the Commission again upheld the firing. The superior court again remanded. In 2014, the Commission found violations of rules, but reinstated Weisner’s employment, without back pay and without credit toward seniority or other benefits. Weisner appealed and returned to his county employment. Weeks later, Weisner stated that the terms of his reinstatement had been violated, and that his attorney had advised him to leave and not return. About a week later, the county sent Weisner a letter, stating: “You have been absent from work for the past five working days, and have not contacted the County since our July 10, 2014 telephone conversation. Based upon your lack of contact, and your verbal resignation during our last conversation, it is apparent that you are not interested in continued employment.” The superior court then concluded that Weisner’s pending petition was moot. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that, even if Weisner resigned, the appeal concerning back pay and benefits was not moot. View "Weisner v. Santa Cruz County Civil Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Deborah Moore appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant The Regents of the University of California. Moore sued Defendant for claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Moore began working in UCSD's Marketing and Communications Department (the Department) in 2008. In early September 2010, Moore was diagnosed with idiopathic cardiomyopathy. On or around September 10, 2010, Moore was prescribed and began wearing a heart monitor called a "LifeVest," a monitor and external defibrillator. Moore had to wear the "LifeVest" for two to three weeks. Moore testified that her relationship with the Department's new Executive Director, Kimberly Kennedy changed after Kennedy became aware of Moore's heart condition. Based on this perceived change, Moore believed that Kennedy did not like the fact that Moore had a heart condition. In approximately mid-November 2010, Kennedy demoted Moore, through a Department restructuring, to a new classification. Moore's new title became "Director of Marketing and Brand Management." Moore's salary did not change, but certain other benefits were reduced. On February 2, 2011, Kennedy sent an e-mail to Courtney Morris, a Director of Compensation and Benefits in the Human Resources Department, indicating that she wanted to eliminate Moore's position, effectively terminating Moore's employment, as of February 15, 2011. According to Kennedy, the job functions that Moore was performing had decreased to such a point that Kennedy could assume them, and therefore, Kennedy decided to eliminate Moore's position. Kennedy did not ask Moore if she would accept a pay reduction, nor did Kennedy consider Moore for a freelance position. There is no evidence that Kennedy offered Moore any of the positions that were filled around the time of, or after, her termination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that summary judgment was improperly granted with respect to Moore's first, second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action. Summary adjudication in favor of Defendant was appropriate, however, with respect to Moore's fourth cause of action. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings in the trial court. View "Moore v. Regents of the University of Calif." on Justia Law

In 2010-2011, the San Francisco Unified School District employed 11 substitute teachers who worked on an as-needed basis and 15 paraprofessional classified employees. Each of the 26 employees received a letter during the spring of the 2010-2011 school year advising that they had a reasonable assurance of employment for the following 2011-2012 school year. The 26 sought unemployment benefits for the period between the last date of the regular session of the 2010-2011 school year, May 27, 2011, and the first day of instruction for the 2011-2012 school year, August 15, 2011. The Employment Development Department denied benefits. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reversed. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the District: “in effect what the claimants ... are requesting is … a full year‘s income … they have agreed to work and be paid for only 41 weeks of each year. … school employees can plan for those periods of unemployment and thus are not experiencing the suffering from unanticipated layoffs that the employment-security law was intended to alleviate.” View "United Educators of San Francisco. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

In 2008, a female tenth-grade student took a cookie pie to firefighters. Seibert gave her a tour of the station and took a picture of her next to a fire engine and obtained her e-mail address to send her the picture. An exchange of emails became risque. Her father saw the messages and went to the station. Faced with accusations, Seibert stated: “Well, it was mutual.” The then-chief assigned Seibert to the training center. Fellow firefighter Leah Fazio, also assigned to the center, later described incidents in which Seibert touched her in an unwelcome manner and made inappropriate remarks about their private lives. After an investigation, the Department terminated his employment. The San Jose Civil Service Commission denied an appeal. The trial court set aside the termination. The court of appeal reversed. The Commission was not deprived of jurisdiction by the belated filing of the notice of discipline on which the dismissal was based; the trial court properly concluded that the e-mail exchange as alleged in one charge, with no reference to the recipient’s age, could not be found to violate any rule or policy; the court permissibly found that Seibert lacked actual or constructive knowledge of her age; and the court erred by refusing to consider interview transcripts--the chief evidence of misconduct toward a female coworker. View "Seibert v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) gave notice it intended to discipline its employee, parole agent Shiekh Iqbal (real party in interest), for unauthorized use of government resources to access criminal history information concerning a third party. The State Personnel Board (SPB) revoked the discipline on statute of limitations grounds under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA). SPB ruled that statutory tolling of the limitations period for “criminal investigation” of misconduct did not apply because CDCR conducted the criminal investigation itself, rather than have it done by an independent agency. CDCR and its (former) Secretary Matthew Cate petitioned for administrative mandamus. The trial court granted the petition, ruling the discipline was timely because the limitations period was tolled during CDCR’s internal criminal investigation of the misconduct. Iqbal appealed, arguing the Court of Appeals should have deferred to SPB’s interpretation of the statute. SPB elected not to file a brief in this appeal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded tolling applied, and the disciplinary action was timely. Therefore the Court affirmed the judgment remanding the case for SPB decision on the merits. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehab. v. State Personnel Bd" on Justia Law

Lupe Garcia, an employee of Gerawan, requested the Board‘s permission to attend and peaceably observe the mandatory mediation and conciliation (MMC) process that had been ordered between Gerawan and United Farm Workers (UFW). The Board rejected Garcia‘s request and proceeded to issue a broad policy decision that members of the public have no right to attend MMC proceedings. Gerawan filed a declaratory relief action in the trial court, seeking a judicial declaration that the Board‘s ruling violated a right of public access protected under both the federal and state Constitutions. Garcia intervened in the same action and filed a similar pleading in the form of a complaint-in-intervention. The trial court agreed with the Board and sustained its demurrers without leave to amend. The court held, as to Labor Code section 1164.9, that its absolute preclusion of superior court jurisdiction, even in exceptional circumstances where (as with Garcia) the sole statutory mechanism for judicial review was unavailable and constitutional rights were assertedly at stake, impermissibly divested the superior court of its original jurisdiction without an adequate constitutional foundation for doing so. Therefore, the court concluded that section 1164.9 is unconstitutional, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law