Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Maruichi, for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff claimed that Maruichi discharged him for engaging in concerted activity relating to unionizing efforts. The trial court granted summary judgment for Maruichi, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff's claim was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., under San Diego Unions v. Garmon. The court concluded that the evidence presented on the motion for summary judgment does not show that plaintiff's discharge was arguably subject to section 7 or 8 of the NLRA. Therefore, there was no reasonable basis to find that plaintiff's discharge was arguably prohibited by the NLRA, and the trial court erred by finding preemption. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dang v. Maruichi American Corp." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Callaghan hired Dunn's Designer Pools (Dunn's), a landscape and pool contractor, to build a pool and spa at his home. Victor Regalado, a Dunn's employee, suffered injuries when he installed a propane fueled pool heater on Callaghan's property. Regalado sued Callaghan for negligence and premises liability. The jury found Callaghan was negligent; the trial court ultimately entered judgment against Callaghan in the amount of approximately $3 million. Callaghan appealed, arguing: (1) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a person who hires an independent contractor was not liable for injuries to the contractor's employee unless the hirer's negligent exercise of retained control "affirmatively contributed" to the employee's injury; (2) insufficient evidence supported the jury's verdicts on both premises liability and negligence; (3) Regalado's counsel committed misconduct by urging the jury to base its verdict on protecting the community; (4) the trial court erred by permitting Regalado to recover past wages because Dunn's had continued to pay his salary after the accident; and (5) the jury's award of future medical costs had to be reduced because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Rejecting all of Callaghan's arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "Regalado v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

Jorge sustained injuries when he was struck by a car driven by Da Fonseca, a chef instructor employed by the Culinary Institute. Despite that Da Fonseca had finished his shift at the Culinary Institute and was driving home in his own car at the time of the accident, a jury found the Institute liable for Jorge’s injuries on a theory of respondeat superior. The Culinary Institute unsuccessfully moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground there was no evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Da Fonseca was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that there was no evidence supporting application of the “required vehicle” exception to the “going and coming” rule. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Culinary Institute cannot be liable to Jorge for injuries caused by Da Fonseca’s negligence because there was no evidence that at the time of the accident Da Fonseca was acting within the scope of his employment. Da Fonseca was a professional chef-instructor who did not take work home with him. View "Jorge v. Culinary Inst. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Trigg seeking rescission of the settlement agreement in Suarez I based on Trigg’s fraudulent concealment of the prospects for sale of the company, and quantum meruit. Trigg filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Civil Procedure section 425.16, asserting that plaintiff's claims arise out of communications that occurred during the course of Suarez I. The trial court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that plaintiff's causes of action arose from litigation activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute - the right of free speech - and that he failed to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Suarez v. Trigg Labs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former COS administrator, filed suit for declaratory relief against COS, alleging that COS placed her in the wrong “step” on the faculty academic salary schedule because it should have given her full credit for her 15 years of administrative experience. The trial court agreed with plaintiff, finding that pursuant to a handbook for administrative employees, she was entitled to year-for-year credit for her total years of employment at COS. The court agreed with COS that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff was entitled to a salary greater than that provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. In this case, COS correctly concluded that the collective bargaining agreement applied to plaintiff and therefore she was entitled to a maximum of five years' experience in determining her step placement on the academic salary schedule. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded. View "Hott v. College of the Sequoias Cmty. Coll. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, DHE, alleging causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that, when DHE hired him to work as a truck driver in 2010, he told DHE he had a disabled son who required dialysis on a daily basis and he (plaintiff) was responsible for administering the dialysis. Plaintiff requested work schedule accommodations that his supervisor initially granted, permitting him to attend to his son in the evening. Plaintiff was terminated in 2013 when a new supervisor took over and fired plaintiff for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motion to tax costs. The court reversed the judgment and the order denying the motion to tax costs, concluding that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging causes of action for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At issue is whether an arbitration in her employee handbook is legally enforceable. In this case, the employee handbook containing the arbitration provision included a welcome letter as the first page, which stated, “[T]his handbook is not intended to be a contract (express or implied), nor is it intended to otherwise create any legally enforceable obligations on the part of the Company or its employees.” Plaintiff signed a form acknowledging she had received the handbook, which mentioned the arbitration provision as one of the “policies, practices, and procedures” of the company. The acknowledgement form did not state that plaintiff agreed to the arbitration provision, and expressly recognized that she had not read the handbook at the time she signed the form. The court found, under these circumstances, that the arbitration provision in the employee handbook did not create an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the employer's petition to compel arbitration. View "Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc." on Justia Law

To combat the practice known as “pension spiking,” by which public employees use various stratagems to inflate their income and retirement benefits, the County Employees Retirement Law, was amended, effective 2013, to exclude specified items from the calculation of retirement income. The trial court concluded application of the new formula to current employees did not amount to an unconstitutional impairment of the employees’ contracts. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not act impermissibly by amending Government Code section 31461. While a public employee does have a “vested right” to a pension, that right is only to a “reasonable” pension; it is not an immutable entitlement to the most optimal formula of calculating the pension. The Legislature may, prior to the employee’s retirement, alter the formula, thereby reducing the anticipated pension, as long as the modifications do not deprive the employee of a “reasonable” pension. The Legislature did not forbid the employer from providing the specified items to an employee as compensation, only the purely prospective inclusion of those items in the computation of the employee’s pension. View "Marin Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Marin Cnty. Employees Retirement Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a California Highway Patrol (CHP) sergeant, seeks to recover the full amount he should have received as paid leave-of-absence benefits under Labor Code section 4800.5, plus penalties for unreasonable delay under section 5814, subdivision (a), and interest. The WCJ agreed that petitioner was entitled to recover, but the Board rescinded the ruling. The court concluded that the Board has jurisdiction to enforce the CHP's liability for unpaid section 4800.5 benefits; res judicata does not bar petitioner's claim for unpaid section 4800.5 benefits; and whether to award penalties and interest must be redetermined on remand. Accordingly, the court annulled the Board's decision and remanded. View "Hernandez v. WCAB" on Justia Law