Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former on-air radio personality for Univision, filed suit alleging disability discrimination, wrongful termination and related employment claims. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., claim for discrimination where plaintiff was not entitled to raise a medical condition as an alleged basis for discrimination for the first time in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; trial issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff had a disability under FEHA; and trial issues of fact exist as to whether Univision acted with discriminatory intent. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to engage in interactive process; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA), Gov. Code 12945.1 et seq., claims; and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's common law claim for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1972, Dinslage was employed by the San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department. As part of a large-scale restructuring, Dinslage‘s employment classification was eliminated in 2010. He was one of many employees who were laid off. Although he applied to be rehired in a newly created classification, he was not offered a position. He then retired from city employment. Dinslage sued, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12940(a), (h), (j).) The defendants claimed, with supporting evidence, that their actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Dinslage had refused to cooperate in the implementation of a new Department policy, moving away from separate recreational events for the disabled and toward inclusion in general events. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed rejection of Dinslage‘s age discrimination and retaliation claims. Dinslage‘s opposition to Department policies and practices he viewed as discriminating against disabled members of the general public is not protected activity because his opposition was not directed at an unlawful employment practice. View "Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Brian Perez, an officer with the Westminster Police Department, was given notice of intent to terminate his employment, based on an alleged lack of honesty and cooperation in the investigation of a claim of police brutality. Perez appealed the decision, and the chief of police concluded the allegations against Perez could not be sustained. Perez’s employment was not terminated, but he was removed from the SWAT team and the honor guard, and although he remained a field training officer, he was not assigned any trainees. Perez sued for violation of his rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. The trial court found the removal of Perez from the SWAT team and the honor guard, and the failure to assign trainees to him as a field training officer did not violate the Act. Perez appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding substantial evidence amply supported the trial court’s decision. View "Perez v. City of Westminster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's fifth amended complaint alleged claims against defendants for wrongful termination, violations of the Labor Code, and related causes of action, including breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her leave to amend, arguing that her proposed sixth amended complaint states claims against defendants. The court concluded that the proposed complaint states claims against defendants only for breach of contract predicated on a third party beneficiary theory, negligent misrepresentation predicated on allegations that plaintiff's earning statements were inaccurate and omitted statutorily required information, and professional negligence predicated on allegations that ADP breached a duty of care owed to plaintiff that resulted in underpayment of her compensation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Paul Cameron submitted his application for disability retirement on May 22, 2009, after the second of two injuries he sustained during his tenure as a Sacramento County employee. The SCERS staff referred this matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings where it was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In 2013, the ALJ found that the application was untimely and denied the application for service-related retirement. Based on the ALJ’s findings, SCERS denied plaintiff’s application for service-connected retirement. Cameron appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff failed to show he was continuously disabled within the meaning of Government Code sections 31722 and 31641, subdivision (a), between the discontinuance of his service and the time he filed his application for service-connected disability retirement. Consequently, his application was not timely under section 31722. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that plaintiff did not show that SCERS failed to inform him of his rights regarding disability retirement, misled him concerning those rights, otherwise breached its fiduciary duty to him, or caused plaintiff’s delay in making his application. View "Cameron v. Sacramento Co. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this putative class action case, Stacey and Tyler Walker, appealed the trial court's order disqualifying their counsel, Hogue & Belong (the Firm), in this putative class action suit against their former employer, Apple, Inc. The trial court found automatic disqualification was required on the basis the Firm had a conflict of interest arising from its concurrent representation of the putative class in this case and the certified class in another wage-and-hour class action pending against Apple. Specifically, based on the parties' litigation strategies and evidence Apple submitted in support of its disqualification motion, the trial court concluded that to advance the interests of its clients in this case, the Firm would need to cross-examine a client in the Felczer class (the Walkers' store manager) in a manner adverse to that client. After review of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in finding the Firm represented the store manager and that a disqualifying conflict existed between her interests and the Walkers' interests. View "Walker v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) imposed a $179,329.60 penalty, pursuant to Labor Code section 3722(b) against Taylor for failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance as required by section 3700. Taylor requested an administrative hearing and then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus under section 3725. The petition was dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s statutory construction and equal protection challenges to the penalty and section 3722(b). The court held that “calendar year,” as used in section 3722(b), means the 12-month period immediately preceding a determination that an employer has been uninsured for the requisite period. View "Taylor v. Department of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

Lidia Soto sued her former employer, Motel 6 Operating, L.P., alleging Motel 6 violated Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a) by failing to include the monetary amount of accrued vacation pay in its employees' wage statements. Soto filed the action in her individual capacity and on behalf of all aggrieved workers under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court sustained Motel's demurrer without leave to amend. Finding no error, the Court of Appeals affirmed: section 226(a) did not require employers to include the monetary value of accrued paid vacation time in employee wage statements unless and until a payment was due at the termination of the employment relationship. View "Soto v. Motel 6 Operating" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Da Loc Nguyen appealed a trial court's order granting the motion of his former employer, defendant Applied Medical Resources Corporation, to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in his employment application. The court ordered plaintiff to submit his individual claims to arbitration and struck all class and representative claims except for the representative Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) cause of action. Plaintiff argued the order was immediately appealable based on the "death knell doctrine." As to the merits of the appeal, plaintiff argued the court erred in finding the arbitration clause was not unconscionable, severing the cost provision, and dismissing the class claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rejected all but the last argument, finding that the trial court erred in dismissing the class claims because whether the arbitration provision contemplated class arbitration was a question for the arbitrator to decide. The Court of Appeals issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate that portion of its order dismissing the class claims to allow the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration clause permitted arbitration on a class-wide basis. In all other respects, the peremptory writ challenging the order compelling arbitration was denied. View "Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp." on Justia Law

After the trial court issued a permanent injunction barring the union from conducting demonstrations inside stores owned by Walmart, the union appealed. The union asserts that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., “arguably prohibits” the union’s challenged conduct, triggering preemption. The court concluded that the trespass action here is not preempted because the "local interest" exception applies. The court also concluded that Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters governs this case. The court rejected the union’s contention that the local interest exception only applies to violent trespass and concluded that a trespass claim may fit within the local interest exception to preemption. In this case, the court concluded that the controversies are not identical. The court explained that adjudicating the trespass claim was entirely unconnected to any balancing of employee rights under the NLRA, or a policy decision about the best way to avoid or minimize industrial strife. This trespass case, like Sears, turned on the location of the union’s conduct, rather than its objective, purpose, or effect. Moreover, shared factual allegations in the unfair labor practice charge and the complaint do not require the court to conclude the controversies are identical. Finally, the authorities the union relies upon to support its preemption argument do not mandate a contrary result. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wal Mart Stores v. United Food & Commercial Workers" on Justia Law