Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Plaintiff was hired as the chief of police for the City of McRae. The Mayor terminated Plaintiff's employment in 2009 for allegedly falsifying fire-department records and for insubordination. The city council voted not to overturn the Mayor's decision to terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2009 against the City, the Mayor, and City alderman, asserting (1) Defendants failed to comply with the provisions of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act because they did not give sufficient notice of the city council meeting; (2) Plaintiff's due process rights were violated; (3) the Mayor's termination of Plaintiff's employment violated her rights under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act; and (4) Plaintiff's termination without just cause violated her rights under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's claims, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion. The Mayor appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in not granting the Mayor qualified immunity on the claims brought by Plaintiff. Remanded. View "Sullivan v. Coney" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by Employer when he suffered a compensable work-related brain injury. Appellant, who was permanently and totally disabled, filed a workers' compensation claim seeking benefits and also requested benefits for the nursing care services his mother was providing. The workers' compensation commission (Commission) found Appellant's injury was compensable but denied the requested nursing service benefits. Appellant subsequently made a second request for additional benefits in the form of nursing services at Timber Ridge Ranch, an assisted living facility. The Commission denied Appellant benefits, finding that the services at Timber Ridge were not nursing services as defined by the law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission's findings and conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence and that the services provided at Timber Ridge qualified as nursing services under the applicable statutes. Remanded. View "Pack v. Little Rock Convention Ctr. & Visitors Bureau" on Justia Law

Appellee contracted with the Arkansas Department of Career Education, Division of Rehabilitation Services (ARS) to provide psychological and other services. Appellee contacted the United States Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to report his belief that federal funds were being illegally used. A few days later, ARS terminated Appellee's services. Thereafter, Appellee filed the instant action pursuant to the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, alleging that he was terminated as a result of his report to the OIG. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Appellee, awarding damages of $110,452. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) in ruling Appellee was a "public employee" as a matter of law; (2) in denying ARS's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Appellee failed to report his allegations to an "appropriate authority"; (3) in instructing the jury on mitigation of damages; and (4) in denying ARS's motion for new trial or, alternatively, remittitur. View "State Dep't of Career Educ. v. Means" on Justia Law

Booker T. Washington, Jr. filed a claim against Porocel Corporation with the Workers' Compensation Commission, alleging exposure to asbestos and silica dust resulting in lung disease and silicosis. An ALJ found Washington's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Washington subsequently filed suit against Porocel, alleging, inter alia, negligence and breach of implied warranty. Porocel moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction of the claims alleged and that the Arkansas Workers Compensation Act (Act) was Washington's exclusive remedy. The circuit court denied Porocel's motion to dismiss, concluding that Washington's occupational disease was not one for which the Act provided coverage. Porocel then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over Washington's complaint. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that Washington's claim was covered by the Act. View "Porocel Corp. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellants, state police officers, brought this suit individually and on behalf of a class consisting of members of the Arkansas State Police Retirement System (ASPRS), contending that various state defendants had violated the law by failing to properly fund the ASPRS between 1992 and 2003 and that the improper funding violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court dismissed some of Appellants' claims and remanded. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. On appeal, Appellants asserted that the circuit court erred in finding that a uniform and travel-expense allowance provided for in Ark. Code Ann. 12-8-209 was not reportable to the ASPRS as a portion of payroll pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 24-6-209(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 24-6-209(a) does not include a uniform and travel-expense allowance such that it is reportable to ASPRS for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. View "McLemore v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against his employer (Employer), alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for asserting his rights under the Arkansas workers' compensation statutes. After the case was removed to federal court, Employer filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the claim for retaliation had been abolished under Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-107, and therefore, Petitioner failed to state a claim. Petitioner argued that he was seeking relief allowed under Ark. Code Ann. 16-118-107, the crime victims' civil-liability statute for felonious conduct. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of law and held that, by enacting section 16-118-107 under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Arkansas General Assembly did not intend to revive the individual cause of action for common-law remedies for retaliation under Arkansas' workers' compensation law that it expressly annulled at section 11-9-107, and therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act precluded recovery under section 16-118-107. View "Lambert v. LQ Mgmt. LLC" on Justia Law

After the Garland County elected treasurer, Jo West Taylor, had received monthly retirement checks for over a year from the Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System (APERS), the APERS executive director terminated Taylor's benefits. The APERS Board of Trustees upheld the decision, determining (1) Taylor had not terminated her employment and her benefits were thus forfeited, and (2) Taylor was ineligible to receive additional service credits after the time she began receiving benefits. The circuit court (1) affirmed the Board's determination that Taylor had failed to terminate her employment, but (2) reversed the Board's finding that Taylor was ineligible to receive additional service credit. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the Board's decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusions. View "Ark. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a medical helicopter accident in Arkansas. Employer was the owner and operator of the helicopter and provided air-ambulance services to the area. Nurse and EMT (collectively, Appellants) and Pilot (Appellee) were all employees of Employer. On the day of the accident, Appellants picked up the victim of an automobile accident in Arkansas, and Pilot piloted the helicopter toward the hospital. However, the helicopter crashed. Nurse and EMT brought a negligence suit against Pilot, alleging their injuries were caused by Pilot's negligent operation of the helicopter. The circuit court dismissed the suit based on the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellants appealed, and the case was transferred to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission concluded that, at the time of the accident, Pilot was performing his employer's duty to provide a safe work place for Appellants and was therefore entitled to immunity under the workers' compensation statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Miller v. Enders" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, Employee filed a claim for benefits after receiving an injury to his left great toe. An ALJ found that Employee had sustained a compensable injury to his left great toe, either as an accidental "specific incident" injury or as an injury caused by rapid-repetitive motion. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed and denied Employee's claim for benefits because he failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury to his left great toe. The court of appeals reversed the Commission's decision on the ground that Employee had established a claim for rapid-repetitive injury. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the Commission, holding that the injury Employee suffered at work was caused by a specific incident, and therefore, his injury was compensable as a specific-incident injury. View "Pearson v. Worksource" on Justia Law

Following her resignation as a dental assistant in the dental office of Appellee, Appellant sued Appellee for sexual harassment and outrage. On remand, the circuit court granted Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Appellant's state-law claim for sexual harassment failed because the material facts established that Appellee did not have enough employees for a cause of action to exist against him pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA). On interlocutory appeal, Appellant claimed the numerosity requirement of the ACRA violated the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court dismissed without prejudice Appellant's appeal, holding that the circuit court's order was not final and appealable because it did not satisfy the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Pepper v. Garrett" on Justia Law