Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class-action implant against the Arkansas State Police Retirement System (ASPRS) and its Trustees, in their official capacity, on behalf of certain members of the Arkansas State Police Retirement System Deferred Option Plan (DROP). Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Act 404 of 2007, which amended Ark. Code Ann. 24-6-304(b) to provide that that the ASPRS Board of Trustees shall set the interest rate and that the interest rate “shall not be greater than the actuarially assumed investment rate of return for that time,” was unconstitutional as applied to those officers who had elected to enter the DROP prior to the effective date of the Act. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, concluding that retroactive application of Act 404 would impair and disturb contractual vested rights of the officers regarding the interest rate on their DROP contributions. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity. View "Arkansas State Police Retirement System v. Sligh" on Justia Law

Teresa Jones filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Jones’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Act did not provide coverage for Jones’s claims because her alleged injuries amounted to “mental injury or illness,” which is not compensable under workers’ compensation. The TAC subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the issue of jurisdiction resided exclusively with the Workers’ Compensation Commission because the facts, as presented in the complaint, could not be determined to fall outside the Act as a matter of law. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Patricia Adams filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Adams’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied TAC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations fell outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction. TAC then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to preclude the circuit court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Adams’s claims against TAC. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the writ was warranted for the reasons stated in Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court, handed down this same date. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

A class of police officers and firefighters employed by the City of Conway brought a class-action complaint alleging that the City breached its employment contract with them when it failed to allocate sales tax revenues to fund salary increases. The circuit court certified the class action, finding that there were overarching, common questions that could efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s class-certification order, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when if found the prerequisites of a class action. View "City of Conway v. Shumate" on Justia Law

Guy Hendrix, the decedent in this case, worked for Alcoa Inc. for nearly thirty years. After he retired, Hendrix filed a claim against Alcoa for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos during the course of his employment, leading to his diagnosis of an asbestos-related cancer. An administrative law judge found that the claim was time-barred because it was not filed within three years of his last date of the injurious exposure. After Hendrix died, his estate initiated this wrongful-death and survival action against Alcoa. Alcoa moved to dismiss the claims, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the claims fell within the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the claims against Alcoa with prejudice. The estate appealed, arguing that because the statute of repose extinguished Hendrix’s remedy under the Act before it accrued, the exclusive-remedy provision no longer applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claim falls within the coverage formula of the Act, even though Hendrix was ultimately denied recovery on the ground that the claim was time-barred. View "Hendrix v. Alcoa Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants in this case included a Union, a subsidiary of the Union, and John Does (collectively, Defendants) who conducted demonstrations to help current and former Walmart employees on issues related to their employment. Walmart filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging trespass and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The circuit court found that Walmart had met the requirements for a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment. The injunction prohibited any non-employee defendant from engaging in any non-shopping activities on Walmart’s private property in Arkansas, and the circuit court declared that Defendants’ entrance onto Walmart private property for non-shopping purposes constituted a trespass. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the National Labor Relations Act does not preempt Walmart’s trespass lawsuit; (2) the circuit court did not err in enjoining Defendants from entering parking lots and sidewalks that Walmart does not hold the right to exclusively possess; and (3) the injunction and declaration are overly broad as to their scope in that they prohibit “all non-shopping activity,” and the circuit court’s order is modified to limit the scope of the order to those activities that were proven by Walmart to cause irreparable harm. View "United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc." on Justia Law

Eugene Butler brought this suit against the Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas, alleging that the University violated the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA) upon terminating Appellant from his job as a police officer at the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff. The University filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Butler’s complaint failed to state a cause of action that was not barred by sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the University was entitled to sovereign immunity because the complaint failed to state a factual basis for Butler’s claim under the AWBA. View "Johnson v. Butler" on Justia Law

Appellant Gerber Products Company d/b/a Nestle Infant Nutrition d/b/a Nestle Nutrition USA d/b/a Nestle Nutrition USA-Infant Nutrition d/b/a Nestle Nutrition USA-Performance Nutrition (“Gerber”) appealed a circuit court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of appellees in their case alleging Gerber’s liability for failure to pay certain overtime wages in violation of the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”). Appellees were employed by Gerber at its baby food processing and manufacturing facility located in Fort Smith. Specifically, the employees alleged that Gerber failed to compensate the employees for their time spent donning and doffing clothing and protective gear, sanitizing clothing and equipment, washing their hands, and walking to and from their work stations. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The employees argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Gerber did not pay the employees for their time spent donning, doffing, washing, walking, and waiting. Both parties’ motions for summary judgment were initially denied. However, a hearing was held on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court orally announced from the bench that it was changing its earlier order in favor of the employees, finding that the AMWA required Gerber to “treat the time required by employees to complete the mandatory donning and doffing activities at issue in this lawsuit as compensable work time, notwithstanding any contrary custom or practice under a collective bargaining agreement applicable to those employees or any express agreement.” On appeal, Gerber argued that the circuit court erred in granting the employees’ motion for partial summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment. View "Gerber Prods. Co. v. Hewitt" on Justia Law

Marilyn Worsham worked for a nonprofit agency and was later transferred to a host agency, at which time her pay was reduced. Worsham filed for unemployment benefits, but the Department of Workforce Services denied the claim. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed. The Board of Review affirmed and adopted the Appeal Tribunals ruling, finding that Worsham did not meet the wage requirements under Ark. Code Ann. 11-10-507(5)(A) for establishing a claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in refusing to accept additional evidence at another hearing; and (2) the Board did not err in ruling that Worsham did not meet the wage requirements for establishing an unemployment-benefit claim. View "Worsham v. Bassett" on Justia Law

Appellees in this case were hourly, non-nursing employees of Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs d/b/a Arkansas Veterans Home and Fayetteville Veterans Home (ADVA). Appellees sought class certification alleging that ADVA violated the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act by failing to pay Appellees for overtime hours worked. The circuit court found that class certification was appropriate as to claims alleging that ADVA automatically deducted thirty minutes daily from Appellees’ hours worked to account for meal breaks even though they were regularly required to work during their meal breaks. ADVA appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellees’ claims were highly individualized, the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class action. Remanded with instructions to decertify the class. View "Ark. Dep't of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett" on Justia Law