Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of a workplace accident in which Lee Calhoun, Jr., Plaintiff Lula Calhoun's husband, was fatally injured. Mrs. Calhoun filed a complaint against her husband's employer seeking worker's compensation death benefits. The circuit court eventually entered an order awarding Mrs. Calhoun 375 weeks in death benefits. The order also released one party, Linden, Inc., from further liability. The court did not certify this order as final. In the meantime, litigation involving a host of other parties proceeded. The parties exchanged correspondence regarding settlement of Mrs. Calhoun's claims. While the back-and-forth continued on settlement, Mrs. Calhoun filed suit against three parties, including Linden, alleging the torts of outrage, fraud and conspiracy. In this suit, she alleged that while attempting to negotiate settlement with Linden, a dispute arose over the terms of Linden's waiver, ending with Linden halting the workers' compensation death benefit payments. Linden and its two co-defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Mrs. Calhoun's last suit. The case was tried solely on outrage, ending with a jury awarding Mrs. Calhoun over $3.6 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Attenta, Inc., one of Linden's co-defendants, appealed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Attenta argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the outrage claim, contending that the controlling issue was at the center of the dispute in the wrongful death action. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, vacated the circuit court's judgment, and dismissed the case and appeal.

The State Director of Finance Marquita Davis and the State Comptroller Thomas L. White, Jr. appealed a preliminary injunction entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in response to a declaratory-judgment action brought by the Alabama Education Association (AEA); Alabama Voice of Teachers for Education (a political-action committee affiliated with the AEA (A-VOTE)); the Alabama State Employees Association (ASEA); and the State Employees Association Political Action Committee (a political-action committee affiliated with the ASEA (SEA-PAC). In 2010, the comptroller implemented a new policy regarding salary deductions. Under this new policy, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions designated for contributions to SEA-PAC; the comptroller continued making deductions designated for the payment of dues to the ASEA. Likewise, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions to a political-action committee affiliated with the Alabama State Troopers Association. Portions of an employee's salary no longer deducted as a result of this policy change were included in the employee's paychecks. The AEA and A-VOTE filed a complaint against the finance director and the comptroller in circuit court seeking a judgment declaring that deductions designated for the AEA that benefited A-VOTE were not prohibited by law and seeking a permanent injunction to force the comptroller to resume the previous practice of executing salary deductions designated for the AEA. The ASEA and SEA-PAC filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs in the action. The circuit court ruled that, without the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm through the actions of the finance director and the comptroller. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction and ordered the circuit court dismiss the complaint: the action before the Court was one that challenged the practices adopted by the finance director and the comptroller based on their interpretation of Alabama statutory law as it existed before the the statutory authority under which they acted became effective. The Court concluded the injunction was moot.

DuBose Construction Company, L.L.C., petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Civil Appeals to vacate its order reversing a Montgomery Circuit Court ruling in the case. On February 14, 2005, James Simmons, an employee of DuBose Construction, sustained a medial meniscus tear in his right knee when he slipped and fell in a hole while working at a construction site. Simmons ultimately sued DuBose Construction in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking workers' compensation benefits for his knee injury. The trial court entered a judgment in 2007, finding that Simmons had suffered a permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and a 15% permanent partial loss of his ability to earn and awarding benefits accordingly. However, the trial court dismissed Simmons' case, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. DuBose Construction subsequently appealed that judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in awarding Simmons benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court found DuBose Construction failed to establish that it had a clear legal right to the writ because the trial court's order dismissing Simmons's case was void as being outside the scope of the Court of Civil Appeals' remand order, and Simmons was accordingly entitled to a writ directing the trial court to enter a proper judgment in the case.

The Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association (AIGA) sued the Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery, seeking, among other things, to recover money it had paid on behalf of the Board on a workers' compensation claim filed by one of the Board's employees. AIGA and the Board each moved for a summary judgment. The circuit court granted the Board's motion and entered a judgment limiting AIGA's recovery to the payments it had made on the workers' compensation claim during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the action and denying AIGA's request for attorney fees. AIGA appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that AIGA's claims were subject to a six-year statute of limitations and that, therefore, the circuit court had erred in limiting AIGA's recovery to payments made within two years of the filing of the action. The Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case for the circuit court to reassess the damages award and to consider further AIGA's claim for attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, which statute of limitations -- the two-year or the six-year -- applied to AIGA's claims. Upon review, the Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment.

Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc. and GIBCO Construction petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer their case to another circuit court. In 2008, Rogers Whited was involved in a two-vehicle accident at a quarry located in Jefferson County. Both Whited and the driver of the other vehicle were employed by GIBCO, who, along with Wright Brothers, was engaged in a project at the quarry. In 2010 Whited filed a complaint against Wright Brothers, GIBCO, and Sharon Gilbert, the owner and president of GIBCO, in the Walker Circuit Court seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the accident. In May 2010 Wright Brothers moved to transfer the action to Jefferson County, stating that Whited alleged in his complaint that he was a resident of Blount County, that the accident occurred in Jefferson County, and that therefore Jefferson County, not Walker County, was the proper venue for Whited's action. In June, Whited filed his response in opposition to Wright Brothers' motion, stating that he was a resident of Walker County, not Blount County. Contemporaneously with that response in opposition, Whited also filed an amendment to his complaint stating that his statement that he was a resident of Blount County was a "clerical error." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the proper venue for this case was Jefferson County, and that the trial court had "an imperative duty to transfer the case and refused to do so." Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Wright Brothers' petition and issued the writ.

The Boaz City Board of Education ("the Board") and its members Alan Perry, Fran Milwee, Roger Adams, Alan Davis, and Tony G. King (collectively "the Board members") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by Lisa and Donnie Tarvin and to enter an order dismissing the claims with prejudice. According to the complaint, Leland Dishman, the superintendent for the Board, struck kindergarden teacher Lisa Tarvin with a paddle. Dishman read a statement at a press conference, denying that the incident occurred. The Tarvins sued the Board, the Board members in their official capacities, and Dishman in his individual capacity, alleging claims of assault and/or battery, defamation, libel, and slander and sought monetary damages. The Board and the Board members moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that they were immune from suit under the State immunity doctrine. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board and its members demonstrated that under the Alabama Constitution, they had immunity from the claims asserted against them, and "a clear legal right to have the claims⦠dismissed with prejudice." The Court granted the petition and issued the writ.

Plaintiff Jerry Elliott sought workers' compensation benefits from his employer, International Paper Company, Inc. (IP). He petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to quash a Court of Civil Appeals' writ of mandamus directed to the Conecuh Circuit Court. Plaintiff lived in Conecuh County for over 15 years and for 21 years worked as a machine operator at the plywood-manufacturing plant owned by IP located in Butler County. In 2007, he allegedly sustained an injury to his shoulder while at work. He filed an action at the Conecuh Circuit Court seeking workers' compensation benefits. IP filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's action or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to Butler County. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss or to transfer. IP then filed a petition for the writ of mandamus at the Court of Civil Appeals to review the trial court's denial of its motion. The Court of Appeals granted the writ directing the Conecuh Court to transfer the case to Butler County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's decision was in error, and quashed the writ that was issued transferring venue to Butler County.

At issue in this case was the application of a six-year statute of limitations to a claim of "wantonness." Plaintiff William Walker filed suit against Capstone Building Corporation (Capstone) and several fictitiously named parties. Capstone had been the general contractor on a construction job on which he worked. While working at the construction site, Plaintiff stepped onto a manhole cover which flipped over, causing him to fall into the hole. Plaintiff asserted that Capstone had been responsible for providing a safe work environment at the site, but it failed to do so. Plaintiff alleged that Capstone's failure to secure the manhole cover constituted "negligence" or "wantonness." Alabama law provides that wanton conduct must be commenced within six years. Capstone moved to dismiss the claims, asking the Supreme Court to change Alabama case law in favor of a two-year limitation for this case. The Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the trial record and the applicable law. The Court overruled its previous holding in "McKenzie v. Killian" which mandated the six-year limitation on claims for wantonness, finding that if it "did not ... overrule 'McKenzie,' [the Court] would be enshrining in out law an erroneous decision." The Court found that "the law in Alabama concerning the proper legal analysis of wantonness was not settled and was in fact based on confusing and inconsistent discussions of causality rather than culpability." The Court applied its change prospectively to litigants as to whom the six-year limitations had begun but had not yet expired. To this end, the Court found that Plaintiff's case was timely filed under the McKenzie rule. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision that dismissed Plaintiff's wantonness claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Willard Ryals appealed a trial court's order enforcing a creditor's judgment against him in favor of Respondent Lathan Company, Inc. (Lathan). In 2004, Lathan sued Ryals Construction Company for breach of a construction sub-contract. The contract called for Ryals to obtain workers' compensation insurance for the project. Lathan claimed it made an advance payment for the insurance. When Ryals failed to get the insurance, Lathan sued. No one appeared on behalf of Ryals on the trial date. A default judgment was entered on behalf of Lathan. Two years later, Lathan tried to collect on its default judgment by serving a post-judgment discovery request on Ryals Construction. The request went unanswered. Lathan filed a motion for sanctions, naming "Ryals Real Estate," Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction Company. Through counsel, Willard Ryals moved to strike the motion for sanctions which the trial court granted. Lathan then amended its complaint to substitute Willard Ryals with fictitious parties. Rather than re-allege the allegations of its first complaint, Lathan sought to hold Ryals Real Estate and Willard Ryals liable as alter egos for the judgment it held against Ryals Construction Company. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Lathan's amended complaint did not technically substitute Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate for fictitiously named parties in the original complaint; it added them and asserted a new cause of action. The court found that Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction were liable for the creditor judgment. Willard Ryals appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lathan's amended complaint. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as void: "The trial court's attempt to treat Lathan's amended complaint as a new action was in words only and was not sufficient to commence a new action." Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment against Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate.