Harris v. Quinn
Illinois’ Home Services Rehabilitation Program allows Medicaid recipients who would normally need institutional care to hire a personal assistant (PA) to provide homecare. Under state law, homecare customers control hiring, firing, training, supervising, and disciplining of Pas and define the PA’s duties in a “Service Plan.” Other than compensating PAs, the state’s role is minimal. Its employer status was created by executive order, solely to permit PAs to join a labor union and engage in collective bargaining under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA). SEIU–HII was designated the exclusive union representative and entered into collective-bargaining agreements with the state that contained an agency-fee provision, which requires all bargaining unit members who do not wish to join the union to pay the cost of certain activities, including those tied to collective-bargaining. PAs brought a class action, claiming that the PLRA violated the First Amendment by authorizing the agency-fee provision. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the PAs were state employees. The Supreme Court reversed in part. Preventing nonmembers from free-riding on union efforts is generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections. Noting its “questionable foundations” and that Illinois PAs are quite different from full-fledged public employees, the Court refused to extend the 1977 holding, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., which was based on the assumption that the union possessed the full scope of powers and duties available under labor law. The PA union has few powers and duties. PAs are almost entirely answerable to customers, not to the state. They do not have most of the rights and benefits of state employees, and are not indemnified by the state for claims arising from actions taken in the course of employment. The scope of collective bargaining on their behalf is very limited. PAs receive the same rate of pay and the union has no authority with respect to grievances against a customer. Because Abood does not control, generally applicable First Amendment standards apply and the agency-fee provision must serve a “compelling state interes[t] ... that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” None of the cited interests in “labor peace” or effective advocacy are sufficient.
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