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The union petitioned the district court to vacate an arbitration award under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and Mirage filed a cross-petition seeking confirmation of the award. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming the award, holding that the arbitrator's conclusion that the grievance was not arbitrable simply misunderstood the arbitrability inquiry. In this case, the arbitrator concluded that the union's exclusive remedy to recover the claimed benefits was against BB King's. Whatever the soundness of that conclusion, the panel reasoned that it plainly had nothing to do with substantive arbitrability, which, concerned only whether the dispute falls within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the union's assent could not be inferred from its failure to call a halt to the arbitration proceedings and seek judicial resolution of the arbitrability. View "Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, Inc." on Justia Law

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Current and former flight attendants challenged a SkyWest Airlines compensation policy of paying for their work in the air but not on the ground, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA), and various state and local wage laws. The sought to certify a class of similarly situated SkyWest employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claim. The flight attendants plausibly allege they were not paid for certain hours of work but under the FLSA the relevant unit for determining a pay violation is the average hourly wage across a workweek. The flight attendants failed to allege even a single workweek in which one of them received less than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The dormant Commerce Clause, however, does not bar the other claims.. States possess authority to regulate the labor of their own citizens and companies; the dormant Commerce Clause does not preclude state regulation of flight attendant wages in this case, particularly when the FLSA itself reserves that authority to states and localities. View "Hirst v. Skywest, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs appealed the district court's holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted a two-tiered security bond provision contained in New York City Local Law 62 for the Year 2015, entitled the Car Wash Accountability Law. The law reduced the required bond amount when an applicant seeking a license to operate a car wash in New York City was a party to a collective bargaining agreement providing certain protections. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on federal preemption prior to the completion of discovery. Accordingly, the court remanded the case so that the parties could take discovery. View "Association of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that the service provided by Seaton Corporation to Kal Kan Foods, Inc. was not a taxable “employment service” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(B)(3)(k) and 5739.01(JJ) was reasonable and lawful. Seaton agreed to furnish, manage and supervise supplemental staffing to assist in production operations at Kal Kan’s manufacturing plant in Columbus, Ohio. The tax commission levied a sales-tax assessment against Seaton and a use-tax assessment against Kal Kan. The BTA found that the service at issue was not taxable because Seaton, not Kal Kan, supervised and controlled the workers that Seaton supplied to Kal Kan’s plant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA properly analyzed which entity exercised supervision or control over the work performed by Seaton’s workers at Kal Kan’s plant, and those factual findings were supported by the record; and (2) therefore, the BTA’s decision was reasonable and lawful. View "Seaton Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board that Claimant was entitled to 275 weeks of additional compensation due to an arm he received during the course of his employment under Workers’ Compensation Law WCL 15(3)(v) (paragraph v), holding that awards for additional compensation are not subject to the durational limits contained in WCL 15(3)(w) (paragraph w). Paragraph v permits certain permanently partially disabled workers who have exhausted their schedule awards to apply for additional compensation. Claimant did just that and was awarded additional compensation. On appeal, Claimant argued that paragraph v incorporates only paragraph w’s formula for calculating the weekly payment amount and not paragraph w’s durational component setting forth the number of weeks that sum is paid. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed, holding that under the plain language of paragraph v, additional compensation awards are calculated pursuant to the formula and durational provisions of paragraph w. View "Mancini v. Services" on Justia Law

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Moustafa applied for a license to be a registered nurse and disclosed she had been convicted of four misdemeanors that were subsequently dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. The Board of Registered Nursing her a probationary license as a result of three of those convictions—two for petty theft and one for vandalism--and the conduct underlying the convictions. Moustafa opposed the restriction. The trial court, relying on Business and Professions Code section 480(c), which bars a licensing board from denying a license “solely on the basis of a conviction that has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4,” ruled in favor of Moustafa. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that until July 2020, when legislation amending section 480 takes effect, the Board may deny or restrict a license based on the conduct underlying a dismissed conviction, but only when the conduct independently qualifies as a basis for denying a license. Conduct does not necessarily so qualify merely because it involves some act of theft, dishonesty, fraud, or deceit. Conduct qualifies only if it substantially relates to the applicant’s fitness to practice nursing. Applying this standard, the Board could restrict Moustafa’s license based on the conduct underlying the petty thefts, but not on the conduct underlying the vandalism. View "Moustafa v. Board of Registered Nursing" on Justia Law

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Lindh, a law enforcement officer, took blows to the head during training. He subsequently had severe headaches lasting between several hours and two days. A month later, Lindh suddenly lost most of the vision in his left eye. Two treating physicians did not believe the vision loss was related to the blows. Dr. Kaye, a neuro-ophthalmologist, the Qualified Medical Examiner (QME), agreed with the other physicians, that Lindh’s “blood circulation to his left eye was defective,” absent the injury,” Lindh likely would have retained a lot of his vision. He agreed that even had Lindh not suffered the blows, he could have lost his vision due to this underlying condition; it was “unlikely” Lindh would have suffered a vision loss if he had not had the underlying “vascular spasticity,” a rare condition. His professional opinion was that: 85% of the permanent disability was due to his old condition and 15% was due to the work injury. The ALJ rejected that analysis and found Lindh had 40 percent permanent disability without apportionment between his underlying condition and the work-related injury. The Board affirmed, concluding that the preexisting conditions were mere risk factors for an injury entirely caused by industrial factors; the QME had “confused causation of injury with causation of disability.” The court of appeal ordered an apportioned award. Dr. Kaye’s opinion was consistent with the other physicians' opinions, that it was unlikely the trauma caused the loss of vision. Whether an asymptomatic preexisting condition that contributed to the disability would, alone, have inevitably resulted in disability, is immaterial. View "City of Petaluma v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

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The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment brought by defendant AMN Services, LLC (AMN), and denied motions for summary adjudication of one cause of action and one affirmative defense brought by plaintiff Kennedy Donohue, individually and on behalf of five certified plaintiff classes she represented (together Plaintiffs). AMN, a healthcare services and staffing company, recruits nurses for temporary contract assignments. AMN employed Donohue as a nurse recruiter in its San Diego office between September 2012 and February 2014. During the first few weeks of Donohue's employment in September 2012, for any noncompliant meal period, Team Time, AMN's timekeeping system, assumed a Labor Code violation, and the recruiter automatically received the full statutory meal period penalty payment. At all relevant times after mid-September 2012, if a recruiter's meal period was missed, shortened, or delayed, Team Time automatically provided a drop-down menu that required the recruiter's response: if the recruiter indicated that she chose not to take a timely 30-minute meal period, AMN did not pay a meal period penalty; however, if the recruiter indicated that she was not provided the opportunity to take a timely 30-minute meal period, then AMN paid the full statutory meal period penalty. The operative second amended complaint, filed on behalf of Donohue individually and a class of similarly situated AMN employees and former employees, alleged: (1) failure to provide meal and rest periods; (2) failure to pay overtime and minimum wage; (3) improper wage statements; (4) unreimbursed business expenses; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) unfair business practices; and (7) civil penalties authorized by the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). In her appeal, Donohue challenged the grant of AMN's motion for summary judgment and the denial of her motion for summary adjudication of one of the causes of action. On appeal, Donohue also challenged what she characterized as the trial court's "fail[ure] to hear a proper motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment and summary adjudication rulings. After review, the Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the rejection of Donohue's motion for reconsideration; the Court found no issues of material facts and affirmed summary judgment in favor of AMN. View "Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal that a wage order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) permitting Plaintiffs to waive a second meal period for shifts greater than twelve hours does not violate the Labor Code. The Labor Code provides that employees who work more than five hours must be provided with a meal period and employees who work more than ten hours must be provided with a second meal period. Under the Labor Code, an employee who works no more than six hours may waive the first meal period, and an employee who works no more than twelve hours may waive the second meal period. At issue was a IWC wage order permitting health care employees to waive the second meal per even if they have worked more than twelve hours. Plaintiffs were employees of a hospital who worked shifts longer than twelve hours and waived their second meal periods. After analyzing the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions the Supreme Court held that the IWC order does not violate the Labor Code. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Fund's claims against the DOE for delinquent withdrawal liability payments under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Agreements Act (MPPAA). The court held that the DOE had no obligation to contribute to the Fund under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) nor its transportation contracts that would render it an employer for the purposes of the MPPAA. Furthermore, the Fund did not adequately plead that the DOE and each of the Contractors were a single employer, and thus the DOE was not bound by the contractors' CBAs as a single employer. Finally, the DOE had no obligation to contribute under 29 U.S.C. 1392(a)(1) and (a)(2). View "Division 1181 A.T.U -- New York Employees Pension Fund v. City of New York Department of Education" on Justia Law