Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

George Rodrique, II, a photographer for WCVB-TV, sued his employer, Hearst Stations, Inc. ("Hearst"), after it denied his request for a religious exemption from the company's COVID-19 vaccination requirement and subsequently terminated him for refusing to receive the vaccine. Rodrique claimed that Hearst's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits religious discrimination in employment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Hearst's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Rodrique's objections to the vaccine were not religious in nature. The court did not address whether accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on Hearst.Rodrique appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his objections were indeed religious and that granting the exemption would not have caused undue hardship. He contended that Hearst provided insufficient evidence that the COVID-19 vaccine reduces virus transmission.The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Rodrique's objections were religious. However, it affirmed the district court's summary judgment on different grounds, holding that Hearst reasonably relied on objective medical evidence, including public health guidance, to conclude that the vaccine reduces the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19. The court found that Hearst's reliance on such evidence was reasonable and that accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on the company. Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Hearst. View "Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Two workers' compensation claimants, represented by attorney David Graham, settled their claims with Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC) except for attorney's fees. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board awarded Graham significantly less than he requested. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed it, instructing the Commission to consider enhanced fees. On remand, the Commission did not change the fee award, leading to another appeal.The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission initially affirmed the Board's reduced fee award. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act allows for enhanced fees and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission again awarded $450 per hour, citing past awards and the factors in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but did not enhance the fee despite acknowledging the complexity and novelty of the issues.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission abused its discretion by not adequately considering the factors that supported an enhanced fee. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to apply the modified lodestar method, which involves calculating a baseline fee and then considering whether to adjust it based on various factors, including the complexity and novelty of the case and the contingent nature of the work. The Court vacated the Commission's fee award and remanded the case, directing the Commission to enhance the fees based on its findings. The Court also clarified that the Commission must consider all relevant factors and not rely solely on past awards. View "Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium" on Justia Law

Dr. Neena Biswas, a physician at the VA’s Dallas facility, alleged that the VA retaliated against her for whistleblowing by converting her appointment from permanent to temporary and subsequently terminating her employment. Dr. Biswas had made disclosures regarding the hiring process for the Chief of the Hospitalist Section, which she believed violated statutory requirements prioritizing U.S. citizens.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) found that Dr. Biswas’s disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act and contributed to the VA’s actions. However, the Board denied her request for corrective action, concluding that the VA would have taken the same actions regardless of her disclosures. The Board determined that the VA had strong evidence supporting its personnel actions, including Dr. Biswas’s unprofessional and disruptive conduct, and that other similarly situated employees were treated similarly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the VA had clear and convincing evidence to support its actions. The court noted that Dr. Biswas’s conduct, including refusing patient assignments and sending inflammatory emails, justified the VA’s actions. The court also found that the Board’s error in considering Dr. Biswas’s emails to the VA Secretary as insubordination was harmless, as the decision was supported by other substantial evidence of her misconduct. The court concluded that the VA met its burden of proving it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. View "BISWAS v. DVA " on Justia Law

Jesse Sutherland was employed as an oil service technician at Peterson's Oil Service, Inc. ("Peterson's"). Two months into his job, he injured his right knee, leading to a torn meniscus and damaged patella. Sutherland requested reduced work hours due to his injury and eventually took a 12-week leave for knee surgery. Upon attempting to return to work, he was informed of his termination, effective the date he was supposed to return, citing a lack of work during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sutherland sued Peterson's for disability discrimination and related claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Peterson's, leading Sutherland to appeal. The district court concluded that Sutherland did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, particularly questioning whether his knee injury qualified as a disability under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its analysis. The appellate court concluded that Sutherland provided sufficient evidence to show that his knee injury was a disability under the ADA, as it substantially limited his major life activities. The court also found that Sutherland's requests for reduced work hours were reasonable and that Peterson's failed to engage in the interactive process required by law. The appellate court vacated the district court's summary judgment on Sutherland's disability-related claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding Sutherland's wrongful termination claim based on alleged violation of Massachusetts public policy, as Sutherland did not provide sufficient evidence of a well-defined public policy supporting his views on biofuel. View "Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Regina M. Thornton was employed by Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. as Associate Director - Patient Safety. In September 2021, Ipsen required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Thornton requested a religious exemption, which Ipsen denied. After she did not comply with the vaccination requirement, Ipsen terminated her employment. Thornton sued Ipsen in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, alleging violations of Title VII, Massachusetts law (Chapter 151B), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (MDR). Ipsen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and moved to dismiss all counts. The Magistrate Judge granted Ipsen's motion, dismissing Thornton's complaint. Thornton appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Thornton's complaint, finding that she failed to state a plausible claim of religious discrimination under Title VII or Chapter 151B. The court concluded that Thornton did not adequately state her religious beliefs or how they related to vaccines. The court also found that Thornton's federal constitutional claims failed because Ipsen was not a state actor, and her MDR claims failed because the MDR does not provide a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of Thornton's religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, finding that she had plausibly alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccination requirement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of her federal constitutional claims, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actors like Ipsen. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her MDR claims, noting that Thornton had waived any argument that her claim should be reimagined under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. View "Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

EMD Sales, Inc. distributes food products in the Washington, D.C. area and employs sales representatives who manage inventory and take orders at grocery stores. Several sales representatives sued EMD, alleging that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime. EMD argued that the sales representatives were outside salesmen and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held a bench trial and found EMD liable for overtime pay because EMD did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that its sales representatives were outside salesmen. The court ordered EMD to pay overtime wages and liquidated damages. EMD appealed, arguing that the District Court should have used the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, adhering to Circuit precedent that required employers to prove FLSA exemptions by clear and convincing evidence.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA. The Court reasoned that the FLSA does not specify a standard of proof for exemptions, and in the absence of such specification, the default preponderance standard should apply. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera" on Justia Law

Marcus Todd, a state employee in Minnesota, alleged that a union violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deducting union dues from his paycheck without his consent. Todd joined the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees in 2014 and authorized dues deductions. In 2018, a new authorization card was allegedly signed electronically with Todd's name, which he claims was forged. After the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, Todd attempted to resign from the union and stop dues deductions, but the union continued until May 2021, citing an annual opt-out period.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Todd's federal claims, stating that he voluntarily agreed to the dues deductions before Janus and was contractually bound to the opt-out period. The court also found that the union did not act under color of state law regarding the alleged forgery and dismissed Todd's claims for prospective relief as moot. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Todd's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Todd's claims failed due to the lack of state action, as the union's actions were based on private agreements, not state statutes. The court referenced Hoekman v. Education Minnesota and Burns v. School Service Employees Union Local 284, which established that private agreements for dues deductions do not constitute state action. The court also found that the alleged forgery did not establish state action, as it was a private misuse of state law. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Todd v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

Marci Walkingstick Dixon, a Native American woman and member of the Cherokee Nation, worked at Northeastern State University (NSU) in the Information Technology Services Department. After being supervised by Dr. Richard Reif, she reported experiencing discriminatory comments and actions based on her race and sex. Following her complaint to NSU's Title IX officer, she faced increased hostility from Dr. Reif. In 2018, after a dispute over compensatory time and subsequent reprimand, she formally complained about a hostile work environment. NSU then began characterizing her time report as falsified and eventually terminated her employment, citing poor job performance and improper timekeeping.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of NSU and Dr. Reif on Dixon's claims of Title VII sex and race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and FMLA retaliation. The court found that Dixon failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and could not show that NSU's reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court also concluded that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Dixon's Title VII sex and race discrimination claims and her Title VII retaliation claim, finding that she had established a prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence of pretext. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Reif on the FMLA retaliation claim, agreeing with the lower court's application of the economic reality test to determine that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA. View "Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board" on Justia Law

An employee, Brandon Smith, was fired by Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR) in 2018. His union, the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers, Transportation Division (SMART-TD), challenged the dismissal under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The dispute went to arbitration, and in 2022, the National Railroad Adjustment Board (Board) overturned Smith's discharge, ordering his reinstatement with full benefits and back pay without deductions for outside earnings.The district court enforced the arbitration award, rejecting KCSR's argument that the award was ambiguous and required clarification. The court ordered KCSR to provide Smith with back pay without deductions and vacation benefits, and also awarded attorney fees to SMART-TD. KCSR appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction and should have remanded the case to the Board for interpretation of the ambiguous award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in enforcing the award without remanding it to the Board for clarification, particularly regarding the vacation benefits, which were not explicitly addressed in the award. The court noted that the district court overstepped by interpreting the CBA, which is outside its jurisdiction under the RLA. The court also acknowledged that the Board had since clarified the back pay issue, rendering that part of the dispute moot.The Eighth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's judgments, including the award of attorney fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the need for the Board to interpret any ambiguities in the arbitration award. View "Assoc.of Sheet Metal Workers v. K.C. Southern Railway" on Justia Law

Carmen Wannamaker-Amos, a Black woman, worked in quality management at Purem Novi, Inc. for over thirty years. Despite receiving positive reviews from her supervisors, she faced negative treatment from Javad Hosseini, Purem’s chief quality executive. Hosseini repeatedly urged her supervisors to fire her, and in January 2020, after a problem with an automobile part, he requested her termination. Purem terminated her two days later. Wannamaker-Amos sued Purem, alleging racial and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment to Purem, ruling that Wannamaker-Amos failed to produce sufficient evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason given for her firing was pretextual. The court found that she did not meet her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of her termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that numerous issues of material fact were in dispute. The court found that Wannamaker-Amos provided ample evidence to dispute Purem’s claims about her performance and that Hosseini’s criticisms were baseless. The court also noted that Purem’s shifting reasons for her termination and failure to follow its own disciplinary policies could indicate pretext for discrimination. The court emphasized that it is the role of the jury to decide which party’s evidence is more persuasive.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing a jury to determine whether Wannamaker-Amos was subjected to intentional discrimination. View "Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc." on Justia Law