Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Miller Plastic Products Inc. fired Ronald Vincer in March 2020, during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Vincer had expressed concerns about the company's pandemic protocols and its operating status, believing it was not an essential business. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that Vincer’s termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it was motivated, at least in part, by his protected concerted activity.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and that his termination was motivated by his protected activity. The ALJ also disallowed testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage of the proceeding. Miller Plastic petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and was a motivating factor for his termination. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s decision to disallow testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage, noting that such evidence is typically considered during compliance proceedings.However, the court found that the NLRB failed to adequately address certain evidence related to Miller Plastic’s affirmative defense that it would have fired Vincer even absent his protected conduct. The court remanded the case to the Board to address the significance of that evidence. The court denied Miller Plastic’s petition for review in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part, affirming the finding that Vincer was terminated because of his concerted activity. View "Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Pamela Edwards, owner of Allure Salon in Starkville, Mississippi, was diagnosed with cancer in 2019 and passed away in 2022. After her death, her husband, Jimmy Edwards, sought payment from her life insurance policy with Guardian Life Insurance. Guardian denied the claim, stating the policy had been canceled because the number of insured employees at Allure dropped to one, triggering their right to cancel the policy. Jimmy Edwards was unaware of the policy until informed by the insurance agent, Debbie Jaudon, who also did not receive a cancellation notice from Guardian.Jimmy Edwards sued Guardian in the Northern District of Mississippi, bringing claims under Mississippi common law and arguing that ERISA entitled him to recover benefits. Guardian moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that ERISA governed the plan and preempted the common-law claims. The district court granted Guardian’s motion, and Jimmy Edwards appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that ERISA applied to the Allure policy, as the salon technicians were considered employees under federal common law. The court found that Guardian had waived its right to cancel the policy by continuing to accept premium payments for 26 months after the right to cancel vested. The court held that Guardian could not avoid its obligation to pay the claim after accepting premiums for such an extended period. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of James Edwards. View "Edwards v. Guardian Life Insurance" on Justia Law

Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

Christopher Morrow, a sergeant with the Lexington Police Department and a member of the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #4 (the Lodge), was accused of sexual assault by Kellie Jo Bell in 2017. Bell filed a civil complaint against Morrow and the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG), alleging that Morrow assaulted her while on duty. Morrow requested LFUCG to provide legal defense under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which LFUCG did under a reservation of rights.The Lodge and Morrow filed a grievance in 2020, claiming LFUCG intended to withdraw its defense, which LFUCG denied as premature. They then filed a complaint to compel arbitration, and LFUCG counterclaimed for a declaration of its rights under the CBA, asserting no duty to defend Morrow as he was off duty during the alleged assault. The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of LFUCG, ruling that Morrow's actions were outside the scope of his employment and not covered by the CBA or LFUCG’s self-insurance policy. The court also awarded LFUCG attorney’s fees.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, agreeing that the dispute was not arbitrable under the CBA as Morrow was off duty. The Court of Appeals did not address whether LFUCG’s refusal to arbitrate the initial grievance constituted a breach of the CBA.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred by ruling on the merits of the dispute without first determining if the parties agreed to arbitrate it. The court directed that the issue of whether Morrow’s actions were within the scope of his employment under the CBA should be submitted to arbitration, as the CBA required arbitration for any controversy concerning its meaning and application. The court vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment and attorney’s fees award, instructing the lower court to order arbitration on the issue. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #4 v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government" on Justia Law

The case involves The Boeing Company and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA). Boeing introduced the 737 MAX in 2011, which was marketed as more fuel-efficient and similar to previous models, requiring no additional pilot training. However, two crashes in 2018 and 2019 led to the grounding of the MAX. SWAPA, representing Southwest pilots, had agreed to fly the MAX but later sued Boeing, claiming Boeing interfered with their business relationship with Southwest and fraudulently induced them to fly the MAX without proper training.The trial court dismissed SWAPA's claims with prejudice, agreeing with Boeing that the Railway Labor Act preempted the claims and that SWAPA lacked standing. SWAPA appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas held that the Act did not preempt the claims, SWAPA lacked associational standing, but had standing to assert claims on its own behalf. The court also ruled that the assignments of claims from individual pilots to SWAPA were valid but did not retroactively grant standing in the original suit, leading to a partial dismissal without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA’s claims because their resolution does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The court also held that the assignments of claims from pilots to SWAPA are not void against public policy, allowing SWAPA to pursue these claims as an assignee. The court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the claims SWAPA asserts on its own behalf. View "The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association" on Justia Law

A warehouse employee, Darrell McClure, claimed he was discriminated against by his employer, Corteva Agriscience, based on his disability and age. McClure, who had worked for the company for 36 years, suffered from heart attacks and had medical restrictions that limited his ability to work night shifts. Despite these restrictions, he was involved in several safety violations and incidents, leading to his termination in July 2020. McClure filed a lawsuit under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), alleging age and disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.The Iowa District Court for Keokuk County granted summary judgment in favor of Corteva, dismissing all of McClure's claims. McClure appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation and hostile work environment claims but reinstated the age and disability discrimination claims, finding that there were factual disputes that precluded summary judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with Corteva that McClure failed to present sufficient evidence of a qualifying disability or age discrimination. The court found that McClure did not demonstrate that his medical condition substantially limited his ability to work in a broad range of jobs, nor did he show that Corteva perceived him as disabled based on myths, fears, or stereotypes. Additionally, the court concluded that McClure did not provide adequate comparator evidence or discriminatory atmosphere evidence to support his age discrimination claim.The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the part of the Court of Appeals decision that reinstated McClure's age and disability discrimination claims and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Corteva. View "McClure v. Ei Du Pont Nemours and Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are foreign nationals participating in an au pair program, and Cultural Care, Inc., a Massachusetts company that places au pairs with host families in the U.S. The plaintiffs allege that Cultural Care violated their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and various state wage and hour laws by failing to pay them legal wages. They also claim violations of state deceptive trade practices laws.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Cultural Care's motion to dismiss the complaint, including its defense of derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Company. Cultural Care appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Cultural Care had not established entitlement to protection under Yearsley. After the case returned to the District Court, Cultural Care filed a motion to compel arbitration based on agreements in contracts signed by the au pairs with International Care Ltd. (ICL), a Swiss company. The District Court denied this motion, ruling that Cultural Care had waived its right to compel arbitration and that it could not enforce the arbitration agreement as a nonsignatory.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that Cultural Care, as a nonsignatory to the ICL Contract, could not enforce the arbitration agreement under either third-party beneficiary theory or equitable estoppel. The court emphasized that the arbitration agreement did not demonstrate with "special clarity" that the signatories intended to confer arbitration rights on Cultural Care. Additionally, the plaintiffs' statutory claims did not depend on the ICL Contract, making equitable estoppel inapplicable. View "Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a representative action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) filed by Mamadou Bah against Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC, and Enterprise Holdings, Inc. Bah alleged that the defendants failed to pay overtime wages to assistant branch managers before November 27, 2016. Bah sought conditional certification of a class of similarly situated employees and requested the issuance of notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The defendants moved to stay the issuance of notice pending a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. The district court later dismissed Bah's claims against Enterprise Holdings, Inc. for failure to state a claim, leading to further amendments to the complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially dismissed Bah's claims against Enterprise Holdings, Inc. without prejudice, leading to the filing of an amended complaint. The district court eventually denied a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, but by then, the statute of limitations had expired for potential opt-in plaintiffs. The district court conditionally certified a class and authorized notice, but the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs were dismissed as untimely. Bah requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the delay in issuing notice, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling. The court found that the delay in issuing notice was attributable to Bah's own pleading errors and that the opt-in plaintiffs did not demonstrate the requisite diligence. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny equitable tolling and dismiss the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs as untimely. View "Kwoka v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC" on Justia Law

Brian J. Murphy, a former employee of Caterpillar Inc., alleged that he was constructively discharged due to age discrimination and retaliation for previous legal actions against the company. Murphy, who began working for Caterpillar in 1979, had a long history of positive performance reviews and promotions. In 2000, he was placed on a performance action plan and subsequently fired after complaining about age discrimination. He sued Caterpillar, won a retaliation claim, and was reinstated in 2005. In 2018, after successfully leading a significant project, Murphy was placed on another performance action plan that he argued was designed for him to fail.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar on all claims. The court found that Murphy did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Murphy appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Murphy presented enough evidence to support a reasonable inference of pretext and unlawful intent regarding his age discrimination claim. The court noted that the performance action plan was flawed, as it included a deadline that had already passed and was signed off as failed before Murphy had a chance to comply. This, along with Murphy's consistent positive performance reviews, suggested that the plan was a pretext for discrimination. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on Murphy's retaliation claim, citing the long gap between his previous lawsuit and the adverse action, and the lack of evidence of retaliatory animus.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the age discrimination claim, allowing it to proceed to trial, but affirmed the decision on the retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Murphy v Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law