Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller Anderson, former Amazon warehouse employees, alleged that Amazon violated federal and Illinois wage laws by not compensating them for time spent in mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 screenings. These screenings, which included temperature checks and symptom questions, took 10-15 minutes on average and were required before employees could clock in for their shifts. Johnson and Miller Anderson argued that this time should be compensable as it was necessary for their work and primarily benefited Amazon by ensuring a safe workplace during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). The court found that the FLSA claims were barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), which excludes certain pre-shift activities from compensable time. The district court also concluded that the IMWL claims failed because it assumed the IMWL incorporated the PPA’s exclusions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclusions for compensable time. The court noted the lack of Illinois state court decisions directly addressing this issue and found the arguments from both parties plausible. To resolve this important and unsettled question of state law, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking a definitive answer on whether the IMWL includes the PPA’s limitations on pre-shift compensation. The court stayed further proceedings pending the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. View "Johnson v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

James Reilly, a deputy in the Will County Sheriff's Office, alleged that his employer and Sheriff Michael Kelley retaliated against him for criticizing Kelley during a 2018 election campaign by not promoting him to sergeant. Reilly filed his complaint over two years after his eligibility for promotion expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was untimely. The district court agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Reilly then requested the district court to set aside its judgment and allow him to amend his complaint, but the court denied this request, applying a heightened standard and requiring extraordinary circumstances for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had mistakenly applied a heightened standard to Reilly's Rule 59(e) motion instead of the liberal standard for amending pleadings. The appellate court concluded that Reilly's proposed amended complaint stated a plausible claim for relief and that he had not pled himself out of court based on the statute of limitations. The court noted that Reilly's claim could not be conclusively determined as time-barred at this stage and that the defendants could raise the statute of limitations defense later in the case on a more complete factual record.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Reilly to proceed with his amended complaint. View "Reilly v Will County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Nancy Stark, as the legal guardian and mother of Jill Finley, an incapacitated person, filed a lawsuit against Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Finley, who suffered a hypoxic brain injury in 2007, was initially approved for long-term disability benefits by Reliance. However, in 2022, Reliance terminated her benefits, claiming recent testing did not support her total disability. Stark appealed, and Reliance reinstated the benefits in 2023. Stark then sued, seeking a surcharge for financial harm caused by the wrongful termination, claiming breach of fiduciary duty for not providing internal records, and contesting the deduction of social security payments from Finley's disability payments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted Reliance's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Stark did not plausibly allege a claim for equitable relief under ERISA, nor did she demonstrate that Reliance's actions violated the terms of the insurance policy or breached fiduciary duties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Stark was not entitled to attorney’s fees incurred during the administrative appeal under ERISA’s § 1132(a)(3) or § 1132(g). The court also found that Stark's claims regarding the SSD offset were time-barred and waived due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Additionally, the court concluded that Stark did not allege any concrete harm resulting from Reliance's alleged failure to provide requested records during the administrative appeal. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss all of Stark's claims. View "Stark v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An employee at an Apple retail store in New York City, Jordan Vasquez, was involved in union organizing efforts with the Communication Workers of America. During a conversation with his senior manager, Stephanie Gladden, Vasquez claimed that Gladden asked him about his union activities, which he denied being involved in. Gladden, however, testified that Vasquez himself brought up the topic of unions. Additionally, Apple managers removed union flyers from the breakroom table, citing general housekeeping and non-solicitation policies.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Apple violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by coercively interrogating Vasquez and by removing union literature from the breakroom. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) credited Vasquez's account over Gladden's and concluded that Apple had engaged in unfair labor practices. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's findings and ordered Apple to cease and desist from these violations and to post a remedial notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence did not support the NLRB's conclusions. The court determined that Gladden's conversation with Vasquez did not constitute coercive interrogation under the totality of the circumstances, noting the lack of employer hostility or threats of reprisal. The court also found that Apple consistently enforced its housekeeping and non-solicitation policies, removing various non-union materials from the breakroom, and thus did not discriminatorily target union literature.The Fifth Circuit granted Apple's petition for review and reversed the NLRB's findings, concluding that Apple did not violate the NLRA in either instance. View "Apple v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

David Bourke, a disabled employee of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), was granted a reserved parking space near his workplace to accommodate his disability. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the VA implemented new measures that required employees to enter through designated entrances for screening, which made Bourke's reserved parking spot unusable. The VA offered Bourke an alternate parking space near Building 1, which included a secluded storage area for his mobility scooter. Bourke declined this accommodation, fearing his scooter could be stolen, and sued the VA under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the VA. The court found that the alternate accommodation offered by the VA was reasonable and that there was no significant risk of Bourke's scooter being stolen. The court also rejected Bourke's argument that the VA could not alter his accommodation in response to changing circumstances, such as the pandemic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the VA's alternate accommodation was reasonable, as it allowed Bourke to perform his job functions while complying with COVID-19 prevention measures. The court noted that an employer is not required to provide the specific accommodation requested by an employee, but rather a reasonable one. The court also found that the VA's actions did not violate the Rehabilitation Act, as the alternate accommodation was sufficient to meet Bourke's needs during the pandemic. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA. View "Bourke v. Collins" on Justia Law

Wanda Brown, the elected treasurer of the City of Inglewood since 1987, raised concerns in late 2019 and early 2020 about the city's financial management, specifically alleging that the mayor had misappropriated public funds. Following these allegations, Brown claimed she faced retaliatory actions from the city and its officials, including a reduction in her salary and authority, exclusion from meetings and committees, and other punitive measures. Brown subsequently filed a lawsuit against the city, its mayor, and council members for retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5, which protects whistleblowers.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike Brown's retaliation claim on the grounds that she was not an "employee" under section 1102.5. The court reasoned that Brown's claim did not arise from protected speech activities but from alleged retaliatory actions. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, concluding that Brown's retaliation claim did arise from protected activities and that she was not an "employee" under section 1102.5, as the statute did not explicitly include elected officials within its protections.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment. The court held that elected officials, such as Brown, are not considered "employees" under Labor Code section 1106 and therefore cannot invoke the protections of section 1102.5. The court's decision was based on the statutory language, legislative history, and the context of related whistleblower statutes, which indicated that the Legislature did not intend to include elected officials within the scope of these protections. View "Brown v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

Sharon Andersen filed a complaint against the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleging hostile-work-environment disability discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). Andersen, who worked for DHHS from 2005 to 2019, claimed that from July 2018 to August 2019, she experienced increased stress and anxiety due to her workload and interactions with her supervisor. She reported panic attacks and was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Andersen requested reasonable accommodations, including reassignment, which were denied. She went on medical leave in January 2019 and resigned in August 2019, claiming constructive discharge.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, concluding that Andersen’s claim was time-barred. The court found that the only actions within the statutory limitations period were DHHS’s refusal to reassign Andersen and her resignation, neither of which were discriminatory in themselves or indicative of a continuing violation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that Andersen did not make a prima facie showing of a continuing violation. The Court determined that Andersen’s resignation, occurring more than seven months after she went on medical leave, was too disconnected from the alleged hostile work environment to qualify as a constructive discharge. Additionally, the Court noted that DHHS’s refusal to reassign Andersen was not a required reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the MHRA. Therefore, Andersen’s claim was deemed untimely, and the summary judgment in favor of DHHS was affirmed. View "Andersen v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Estefany Martinez, a former Amazon employee, worked as a Fulfillment Associate at the Baltimore Fulfillment Center from June 2017 to November 2021. She and other employees were required to clock out before undergoing a post-shift security screening process, for which they were not compensated. Martinez brought a backpack into the work area, which required her to use the bag scan lane during the security screening, often resulting in delays. Data showed that the time taken to exit the facility after clocking out varied, with some instances exceeding five minutes.Martinez filed a lawsuit against Amazon in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which was later removed to federal court. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified a question to the Supreme Court of Maryland regarding the applicability of the de minimis doctrine to claims under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law. The district court granted Martinez’s Motion for Class Certification and stayed the case pending the resolution of the certified question.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the de minimis doctrine, as described in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, applies to claims brought under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law. The court concluded that the doctrine, which disregards negligible periods of work time, is consistent with the legislative intent of the Maryland Wage Laws, which are patterned after the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court answered the certified question in the affirmative, confirming that the de minimis rule applies to the Maryland Wage Laws. View "Martinez v. Amazon" on Justia Law