Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiff, a resident of Missoula, Montana, alleged wrongful discharge from employment by a geological consulting company that had originally been organized under Montana law but later domesticated in Wyoming and terminated its Montana registration. The plaintiff worked for the company both in Montana and Wyoming, including specific projects in Montana, and his employment documents reflected Montana tax withholding. In June 2024, the company terminated his employment, citing a failed drug test conducted at a drilling rig in Wyoming. The plaintiff filed a wrongful discharge complaint under Montana law, seeking lost wages and other relief.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, reviewed the complaint and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court found that the company’s Montana contacts—such as previous organization under Montana law, Montana employment, and tax withholding—did not establish general personal jurisdiction, as the company was not “at home” in Montana at the time of the discharge. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument for specific jurisdiction under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1)(F), concluding that the company was neither organized under Montana law nor had its principal place of business in Montana when the discharge occurred. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied requests for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the District Court’s ruling that personal jurisdiction was lacking, based solely on the grounds developed by the plaintiff on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction should not have been with prejudice, as such a ruling is not a determination on the merits, and remanded for entry of a dismissal without prejudice. The Court also denied the defendant’s request for appellate sanctions. View "Witmer v. Mojo Geological Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

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A former guest reception manager at a luxury hotel in Beverly Hills alleged that, after disclosing her pregnancies, she experienced a pattern of workplace harassment based on her sex, gender, and pregnancy. She described being subjected to comments about her ability to work as a mother, being denied advancement opportunities, and ultimately being falsely accused of inappropriate sexual conduct before her termination. The complaint also alleged that women at the hotel were generally treated less favorably than men and were undercompensated.Following her termination, the plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, raising claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination. The hotel operator sought to compel arbitration based on a preexisting arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her claims arose from a “sexual harassment dispute” covered by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which renders predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable at the plaintiff’s election in such cases. The Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration, holding that her allegations met the definition of sexual harassment under California law and thus fell within the EFAA’s exception.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that the EFAA’s exception for “sexual harassment disputes” is not limited to lewd or lascivious conduct, but extends to gender- and pregnancy-based harassment as recognized under FEHA. The court concluded that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a hostile work environment based on gender and pregnancy, and thus the EFAA precluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The order denying arbitration was affirmed. View "Doe v. The Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC" on Justia Law

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A teacher employed by the Philadelphia School District refused to comply with the District’s weekly COVID-19 testing policy during the spring of 2021. The school principal recommended termination, and a hearing officer from the District’s Office of Employee and Labor Relations conducted a hearing, ultimately agreeing with the recommendation. The District’s Board of Education subsequently sent the teacher a statement of charges, informing him of his right to a termination hearing before the Board, which was initially scheduled as an in-person meeting but later switched to a virtual format. The teacher objected to the virtual hearing. The hearing proceeded via Zoom, presided over by an appointed hearing officer, and no elected school board members attended. Following the hearing, the Board voted unanimously to terminate the teacher’s employment.The teacher appealed to the Commonwealth’s Secretary of Education, arguing that the School Code required elected school board directors to attend his termination hearing. The Secretary upheld the Board’s decision, reasoning that the Board could appoint a hearing officer so long as it reviewed the officer’s findings and made an independent ruling. The teacher then sought review in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed the Secretary’s decision. The Commonwealth Court concluded that Sections 1127 and 1129 of the School Code require the presence of elected school board directors at professional employee termination hearings, and ordered the teacher’s reinstatement with back pay unless the District properly terminates his employment in compliance with the Code.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling. The Court held that Section 1127 of the School Code grants professional employees facing termination the right to a hearing before at least some elected school board directors, and that a hearing conducted with no directors present does not satisfy this requirement. The District’s arguments based on statutory context and purpose were rejected. View "Follman v. School District of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

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An employee, who worked as a union forklift operator, suffered a workplace injury resulting in the amputation of his lower left leg. The employer accepted liability, and the parties agreed on the nature of the injury and compensation amounts. Later, the employer sought to reduce the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits, claiming the employee had earning power based on jobs available in the general labor market, as shown by a labor market survey conducted by a vocational expert. The expert also claimed, based on a conversation with an employer representative, that the employer had no suitable job available for the employee within the company. However, the expert could not confirm the representative’s position or the specific entity she worked for.A Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) denied the employer’s modification petition, finding the employer failed to offer credible evidence that no suitable job was available at its workplace, as required under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) reversed, relying on Commonwealth Court precedent, and held that the employer was not obligated to prove the absence of available jobs unless the employee first provided evidence of a possible opening at the employer. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the WCAB, stating that the burden to show job availability at the employer rested initially with the employee.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the proper allocation of the burden of proof regarding the statutory mandate that employers offer available suitable jobs to injured employees before reducing benefits based on earning power. The Court held that the employer must affirmatively prove compliance with this mandate by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no suitable job is available at the employer before relying on a labor market survey. It overruled prior precedent to the contrary, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order, and directed reinstatement of the WCJ’s decision denying the modification petition. View "Thomas v. Sysco Foods" on Justia Law

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The dispute centers on an employee, who was hired by a company operating customer service call centers, and who signed an arbitration agreement and a confidentiality agreement as part of her onboarding process. The arbitration agreement was included in a lengthy new hire packet, and the employee understood she was required to sign it to accept the job. The agreement mandated arbitration for nearly all claims between the parties, including those that could arise after employment ended and claims unrelated to employment. The confidentiality agreement included provisions restricting the employee from soliciting colleagues and granted the company the ability to seek injunctive relief for breaches without proving actual damages.After the employee left her position, she filed a class action lawsuit against the company asserting several employment-related claims. The company responded by seeking to compel arbitration based on the previously signed agreement. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion. It found the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and determined it was a contract of adhesion with a low degree of procedural unconscionability. However, the court found the agreement substantively unconscionable due to its overly broad scope, unlimited duration, and lack of mutuality, following precedent such as Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312. The court also concluded the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive relief and nonsolicitation clauses were unconscionable. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the unconscionable terms could not be severed without rewriting the contract.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement, read together with the confidentiality agreement, was permeated with unconscionability that could not be cured by severance, and thus was unenforceable. View "Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions" on Justia Law

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A regional clinical-trial director employed by a research group contracted to conduct clinical trials for a major COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer raised concerns about protocol deviations and regulatory violations at the trial sites. She repeatedly reported these concerns to her supervisors and ultimately informed the FDA. The day she contacted the FDA, her employer terminated her, citing poor fit. Her tenure at the company lasted approximately two weeks, during which she advocated for pausing trial enrollment to address her concerns. After her termination, the trial enrollment resumed and the vaccine manufacturer later announced favorable trial results.The plaintiff filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging fraudulent claims against the vaccine manufacturer, the research group, and another contractor. She also asserted a retaliation claim against her employer. The government initially declined to intervene during the statutory seal period but reserved the right to do so later. The district court unsealed the complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The government, while not intervening, filed a statement supporting dismissal. The district court granted the motions. The plaintiff requested reconsideration and filed an amended complaint, adding a fraud-in-the-inducement theory. Defendants again moved to dismiss. The government then moved to intervene and dismiss, citing lack of merit, public-health concerns, and anticipated litigation burdens. The district court granted the government’s motion, dismissing the FCA claims with prejudice as to the plaintiff and without prejudice as to the government, and dismissed the retaliation claim for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. The court held that the FCA’s “good cause” standard for government intervention is flexible and satisfied by articulated governmental interests, without the need for Rule 24(b) requirements. The government’s motion to dismiss was proper under Rule 41, and the plaintiff received adequate notice and hearing. The retaliation claim failed because the plaintiff did not plausibly allege protected activity or employer knowledge. View "Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group" on Justia Law

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A plaintiff, who worked as an hourly employee for an automobile dealership, signed a binding arbitration agreement as part of his hiring process. The agreement required arbitration for nearly all disputes with the employer and a broadly defined set of “affiliates,” including entities not directly related to the employment relationship. It also mandated specific procedures for initiating arbitration, which were more restrictive for the employee than for the employer. The plaintiff later filed a class action in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging various wage and hour violations and unfair competition claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. Although it found the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the court concluded the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to moderate-to-high procedural unconscionability—primarily because of pressure to sign, the agreement’s presentation in English to a Spanish-speaking employee, and its format. The court also found substantive unconscionability in the agreement’s overbroad scope, lack of mutuality regarding parties and procedures, and infinite duration. It declined to sever the offending terms, instead refusing to enforce the agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court’s order. It held that while the agreement was adhesive, there was only a low degree of procedural unconscionability. However, it found high substantive unconscionability due to the overbreadth and lack of mutuality in the agreement. The appellate court concluded the unconscionable terms were severable and the trial court erred by not severing them. It reversed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to sever the offending terms, enforce arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual employment claims, and address the issue of the class action waiver. View "Salazar v. CN Motor Co." on Justia Law

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Ronald L. Green, a revenue agent employed by the Internal Revenue Service in Las Vegas, was indefinitely suspended in August 2006 on suspicion of filing fraudulent tax returns. Shortly before the suspension took effect, he applied for immediate disability retirement, citing medical conditions and workplace stress. After his suspension, he initiated arbitration to challenge the agency’s action and alleged discrimination through an EEO complaint. The Office of Personnel Management approved his retirement in January 2007. In March 2007, an arbitrator reversed his suspension but denied his discrimination claims. The agency retroactively dated his retirement to his last day of pay and removed references to other adverse actions from his record.Mr. Green’s subsequent legal efforts included appeals to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and district court, both of which ruled against him, with the Ninth Circuit affirming. In May 2023, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, asserting that his 2006 retirement was involuntary due to agency actions and discrimination. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Mr. Green failed to nonfrivolously allege involuntariness. The decision became the Board’s final determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed Mr. Green’s petition. It first determined jurisdiction, concluding that Mr. Green’s explicit waiver of discrimination claims allowed the court to review the non-discrimination aspects. The court found that Mr. Green had forfeited arguments about agency failure to restore his employment after arbitration because these were not properly raised before the Board. On the remaining issue, the court held that Mr. Green failed to nonfrivolously allege that his retirement was involuntary, either through coercion or misinformation, and affirmed the Board’s decision. View "Green v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

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The petitioner, a Transportation Specialist employed by the Department of the Army, was suspended for ten days based on alleged misconduct. On the same day the suspension was proposed, she filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. The agency implemented the suspension several months later. The Special Counsel subsequently notified her that its investigation was terminated and that it would not seek corrective action on her behalf.After receiving the Special Counsel’s notice, the petitioner filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) nearly three weeks after the statutory deadline. An administrative judge for the Board issued a timeliness order, to which the petitioner responded by arguing her appeal was timely under the relevant statute and that equitable tolling did not apply. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding it was filed 24 days after the 60-day deadline triggered by the Special Counsel’s notice. The petitioner sought review by the full Board, but due to a lack of quorum, the initial decision became the final decision of the Board.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when the Special Counsel issues notification terminating an investigation—even if this occurs more than 120 days after the initial complaint—the federal employee has 60 days from the date of notification to file an IRA appeal with the Board. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 60-day deadline did not apply if the Special Counsel’s notice came after the 120-day period. Concluding that the appeal was untimely, the court affirmed the Board’s dismissal. View "Walker v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

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Eight former employees of a space technology company were dismissed shortly after they circulated an open letter to management expressing concerns about workplace conduct they believed constituted sexual harassment. The letter specifically criticized the company founder’s posts on social media, which the plaintiffs alleged created a hostile work environment. After their termination, the plaintiffs filed suit asserting claims under California law, including hostile work environment sexual harassment, gender discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, and retaliatory termination for opposing alleged sexual harassment.The plaintiffs originally brought their case in state court. The defendant responded by filing an answer and then removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Once in federal court, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, citing arbitration agreements signed by each plaintiff as part of their employment contracts. The defendant argued that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) did not exempt the plaintiffs’ claims from arbitration, contending that the statute required “adequately alleged” sexual harassment—allegations sufficient to survive a federal motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the EFAA exempts the plaintiffs’ case from arbitration. The court ruled that the EFAA’s definition of a “sexual harassment dispute” is satisfied when the complaint asserts conduct alleged to amount to sexual harassment, without requiring allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the plaintiffs properly invoked the EFAA and that their case “relates to” a sexual harassment dispute. Thus, the arbitration agreements are not enforceable for this case. View "HOLLAND-THIELEN v. SPACEX" on Justia Law