Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A registered nurse employed by a hospital system in Oregon requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. She objected on two grounds: concerns about vaccine safety for pregnant women and a religious objection to the use of fetal cells derived from abortions in vaccine development, citing her Christian beliefs and relevant biblical passages. After submitting her exemption request, the employer placed her on indefinite unpaid leave, leaving her without health insurance or income during her third trimester of pregnancy.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed her complaint, which referenced but did not attach the exemption letter. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to plausibly allege a conflict between the vaccination policy and the nurse’s bona fide religious beliefs. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding the allegations sufficient at the pleading stage, but the district court disagreed. It dismissed the complaint as too conclusory, without leave to amend and without considering the exemption letter attached to the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. Judgment was entered, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the exemption letter was central to the plaintiff’s claim and should have been considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Upon review of the letter, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a prima facie Title VII religious discrimination claim. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RIDINGS V. PEACEHEALTH" on Justia Law

Donnell Perry worked as a traffic control flagger for Safe Zone. On March 8, 2023, after working at three different sites that day, Perry was struck by a car while crossing Dixie Highway to return to his job after being permitted by his supervisor to go to a convenience store for a phone charger and cigarettes. Perry’s duties required him to keep his cellphone charged for work communications. At the time of the accident, Perry was wearing his required safety gear. He suffered serious injuries, including fractures and internal injuries, and was later found to have alcohol in his system, though below the legal driving limit.Following the incident, Perry sought workers’ compensation benefits. Safe Zone denied his claim, contending Perry was barred from recovery due to voluntary intoxication and a violation of pedestrian safety statutes. The Administrative Law Judge found that Perry’s injuries were compensable, rejected Safe Zone’s arguments regarding intoxication and safety violations, and awarded him various benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings but remanded for clarification on benefit calculations. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the current statute did not bar recovery for alcohol intoxication.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the current version of KRS 342.610(4) does not exclude workers’ compensation benefits for employees injured while under the influence of alcohol, as the statute only refers to illegal or nonprescribed substances and prescribed substances taken in excess—not alcohol. The Court also held that Safe Zone did not provide compelling evidence to require a reduction of Perry’s benefits due to a safety violation under KRS 342.165(1), as the ALJ’s findings on Perry’s conduct and intoxication were supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the benefits award in Perry’s favor. View "SAFE ZONE V. PERRY" on Justia Law

Two individuals applied for employment with a public school district in Los Angeles. One applicant had a prior misdemeanor conviction for battery, and the other for misdemeanor grand theft; both convictions had been expunged under California’s statutory procedure. Despite the expungements, the school district rejected both applicants, asserting that its duty to protect students required it to consider nearly any criminal conviction, regardless of expungement.Each applicant brought a separate lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial courts, after considering motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of the applicants. The courts found that the district had violated California Labor Code section 432.7 (the “Nondisclosure Statute”) by inquiring into and utilizing the expunged misdemeanor convictions as a basis for denying employment. The district appealed, and the cases were consolidated before the reviewing court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, undertook an independent review of the relevant statutes. The court determined that the basic prohibition of Labor Code section 432.7 barred the district from asking about or using expunged convictions, and that none of the statutory exceptions relied on by the district applied. Specifically, the court found that no law required the district to seek or act upon the types of expunged misdemeanor convictions at issue. The court rejected the district’s arguments that it was entitled to broader exceptions, explaining that the statutory text and legislative history supported a narrow reading of the exceptions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments in favor of the applicants, holding that the district’s actions violated the Nondisclosure Statute and awarding costs to the respondents. View "A.S. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A federal employee serving as a Presidential Innovation Fellow at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was assigned to work on an artificial intelligence tool intended to reduce the processing time for veterans’ disability benefits claims. After reviewing the performance of the tool (CAAPI), the employee determined and communicated to agency leadership that, contrary to the agency’s public claims, the tool was producing inaccurate predictions and actually increasing the average processing time for claims. These findings were shared internally in March 2021, discussed in a blog post in April 2021 (approved and published by the VA), and elevated to higher-level management in May 2021. Despite the disclosures, the agency continued to use the tool with minor modifications, and eventually, the employee’s contract was not renewed, and he was terminated from his position.After filing a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, the employee brought an individual right of action appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), alleging that his removal was in retaliation for whistleblowing. The VA moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Board’s administrative judge, and later the full Board, concluded that the employee had not made nonfrivolous allegations that his disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act, finding he lacked a reasonable belief that his disclosures evidenced gross mismanagement or waste.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the employee had sufficiently raised nonfrivolous allegations that his communications constituted protected disclosures of gross mismanagement under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The court found the employee’s allegations plausible and sufficiently specific to establish jurisdiction for his claim before the Board. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the petitioner. View "OGUNTADE v. MSPB " on Justia Law

A police officer in Somerville, Massachusetts was terminated from his position following alleged misconduct connected to his use of an informant, which ultimately resulted in the informant attacking a third party. The officer did not initially disclose all relevant information during the investigation of the attack. After further internal investigation and public accusations, including statements made by city officials to the press, the officer was officially terminated. He challenged his termination by both pursuing arbitration under the police union’s collective bargaining agreement and by filing a civil suit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and violated his constitutional rights, as well as state law regarding interference with advantageous relations. While the lawsuit was pending, an arbitrator ordered his reinstatement but denied him back pay. Following this, the mayor placed the officer on paid administrative leave, which affected his ability to earn overtime and additional compensation.The case was first filed in Middlesex Superior Court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district judge allowed the officer to seek damages at trial not only for the termination but also for being placed on paid leave after reinstatement, even though the officer never amended his complaint to include this post-arbitration event as a basis for liability. The district court permitted the jury to award damages for both the termination and the paid-leave decision, over the defendants’ repeated objections.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on the paid-leave decision. The appellate court held that, absent an amended complaint or the defendants’ consent, new factual bases for liability such as the paid-leave decision could not be considered at trial. The First Circuit reversed the damages awarded for the paid-leave decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DiFronzo v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

An attorney who began working for a luxury goods company in 2015 alleged that, soon after she was hired, a male colleague subjected her to repeated sexual harassment and, on one occasion, sexual assault. She reported the conduct internally but claimed that company officials failed to respond appropriately and, instead, retaliated against her. Over the years, she experienced alleged ongoing retaliation, including negative performance reviews, exclusion from work opportunities, and other adverse actions. In 2019, she filed a lawsuit in New York State Supreme Court alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under state and city law. The state trial court denied the employer’s request to compel arbitration, but the Appellate Division, First Department reversed and ordered the case to arbitration based on an arbitration agreement the plaintiff had signed before starting her employment.Following her termination in December 2022, the plaintiff filed a new federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against her former employer and a supervisor, asserting claims of retaliation in violation of federal, state, and local law. She also sought leave to amend her complaint to consolidate her federal claims with the earlier claims that were pending in arbitration, arguing that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable. The district court dismissed her federal retaliation claims under Rule 12(b)(6), finding she had not plausibly alleged protected activity linked to her termination, and denied her motion to amend, concluding the additional claims remained subject to the arbitration agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff’s initial complaint plausibly alleged retaliation: refusing to meet with her supervisor to discuss settling her discrimination claims pending in arbitration constituted protected activity, and the circumstances of her termination supported an inference of retaliation. However, the court affirmed the denial of leave to amend, explaining that the additional claims accrued before the EFAA’s effective date and thus remained subject to arbitration. The appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc." on Justia Law

Employees at a truck dealership in Summit, Illinois, worked under a collective bargaining agreement through Laborforce and M&K Employee Services. In 2023, a union steward in the Parts Department, dissatisfied with union representation, initiated a decertification petition. Nineteen out of thirty-one Parts Department employees signed, but no Service Department employees did. Laborforce, responding without encouraging or interfering in the process, announced its intention to withdraw union recognition for the Parts Department after the three-year bar in the collective bargaining agreement expired. Laborforce also filed a unit clarification petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was denied. Nevertheless, Laborforce withdrew recognition and improved wages and benefits for Parts Department employees. In 2024, a second, broader decertification petition was signed by a majority of both Parts and Service Departments, prompting Laborforce to withdraw union recognition for all affected employees and again change compensation and benefits.The union filed multiple unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, and the Board’s Regional Director issued an administrative complaint in June 2024. The complaint argued that the first withdrawal was unlawful due to lack of majority support and that the second withdrawal was tainted by the prior removal. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing in October 2024 and subsequently found Laborforce had committed unfair labor practices.Seeking immediate relief, the Director petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for a preliminary injunction under NLRA § 10(j), requesting reinstatement of union recognition and reversal of wage and benefit changes. The district court denied the injunction, finding insufficient evidence of irreparable harm, likelihood of success, or public interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the Director failed to show specific irreparable harm warranting the “extraordinary” § 10(j) remedy, especially given employee-initiated decertification and improved compensation. The delay in seeking an injunction further undermined the request. View "Hamada v Laborforce, LLC" on Justia Law

A police officer at a university was disciplined after corroborating a fellow officer’s allegations of sexual misconduct during a Title IX investigation. He had encouraged the officer to report the misconduct but did not report it himself. After participating in the investigation, he experienced several incidents he believed were retaliatory, including changes to his work routine and being denied promotion opportunities. He later recorded a conversation between his department chief and assistant chief, believing it would provide evidence of retaliation. The chief suspended him for the recording and initiated an investigation conducted by police chiefs from other schools, which resulted in a recommendation that he be fired and dishonorably discharged. Before the termination could take place, he resigned but was still given a dishonorable discharge. He filed a complaint with the EEOC, received a right to sue letter, and brought a Title VII retaliation claim.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case for retaliation. The court held that he did not suffer an adverse employment action and that there was no causal link between his participation in the Title IX investigation and any adverse action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation concerning his suspension and the investigation into the phone recording, but not for the dishonorable discharge, as that decision was made by an independent panel with no knowledge of his protected activity. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the rationale for the suspension and investigation was pretextual. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. West Texas A&M" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky initiated a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, asserting that these firms contributed to the opioid crisis in Kentucky by conspiring with drug manufacturers to increase opioid supply. Kentucky alleged the PBMs negotiated with drug companies to give opioids preferred placement on formularies in exchange for rebates and fees, thus violating state consumer protection laws and creating a public nuisance. The PBMs served both federal and commercial clients, including federal workers under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, TRICARE members, and Veterans Health Administration beneficiaries.Following removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky by the PBMs under the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), Kentucky sought to remand the case to state court, arguing its complaint disclaimed liability for conduct undertaken at the direction of federal officers. The district court granted Kentucky’s motion to remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Relying on its prior decision in Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC, and similar decisions from other circuits, the Sixth Circuit determined the PBMs acted under federal officers when administering federal health benefits and that Kentucky’s claims related to conduct performed under federal supervision. The court found the PBMs had raised colorable federal defenses, including immunity and preemption under federal statutes governing federal health plans, TRICARE, ERISA, and Medicare Part D. The court concluded that Kentucky’s complaint targeted indivisible conduct relating to federal duties, so the PBMs met the requirements for removal under § 1442. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Consumers Concrete Corp. participated in a multiemployer pension plan administered by Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. After making a partial withdrawal from the plan in 2017, Consumers fully withdrew in 2019, triggering statutory withdrawal liability for the complete withdrawal. The dispute focused on how to apply a credit for the prior partial withdrawal liability when determining the amount owed for the subsequent complete withdrawal. The parties agreed on the underlying figures for unfunded vested benefits and annual payments, but disagreed on whether the credit should be applied before or after the statutory cap limiting payments to twenty annual installments.Following Consumers’s challenge, an arbitrator adopted the Fund’s approach, applying the partial withdrawal credit at the second step of the statutory calculation process. Consumers appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The district court consolidated the competing actions and vacated the arbitration award, siding with Consumers. It held that the credit should be applied after completing all four statutory steps, including the twenty-year payment limitation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. It determined that the statutory language and structure favored Consumers’s interpretation, concluding that the partial withdrawal liability credit must be applied after the four-step process outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b), rather than at step two. The court’s holding was that the credit for prior partial withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) should reduce the fully-adjusted withdrawal liability amount determined after the application of all steps, including the twenty-year cap. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Consumers Concrete Corp. v Central States, SE and SW Areas Pension Fund" on Justia Law