Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff was employed as a wealth advisor for a bank and alleged that a coworker, who was an investment strategist, sexually harassed and assaulted her during a business trip. The alleged harasser, though considered influential and holding a senior title, was not designated as a supervisor of the plaintiff and had no authority over her employment, such as hiring, firing, or evaluating performance. However, he did supervise support staff known as associates. After the incident, the plaintiff reported the alleged harassment and assault to the bank, her supervisor, and law enforcement. The bank conducted an internal investigation and concluded that her allegations regarding the sexual assault and harassment were unsubstantiated, but found that coworkers had used her phone without consent and violated other company policies.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the bank and several individuals, asserting a cause of action for sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The bank moved for summary judgment, arguing it could not be strictly liable because the alleged harasser was not the plaintiff’s supervisor and, alternatively, that it was not negligent because it had responded promptly and appropriately to her complaints. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank, finding strict liability did not apply and that the bank was not liable under the negligence standard.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The main holding was that, under FEHA, strict liability does not apply to an employer for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor who does not supervise the plaintiff, even if the alleged harasser supervises other employees. The court affirmed the judgment, declining to extend strict liability in such circumstances and also determined the plaintiff forfeited her negligence and ratification arguments on appeal. View "Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man was employed by a company and took parental leave in early 2023. Upon his return, he alleged that the company retaliated against him for taking leave, denied him a comparable position, interfered with his right to additional leave, and ultimately terminated him. He also claimed that a superior repeatedly questioned him about his remaining leave. In February 2024, he filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims related to parental leave rights, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, and unfair competition. Notably, he did not initially assert a claim for sex-based harassment, though he was aware of facts that could support such a claim.When the company moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement, the man opposed the motion, focusing solely on the validity of the arbitration agreement and not raising the possibility of a sexual harassment claim or the applicability of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The Superior Court compelled arbitration. Subsequently, the man added a sexual harassment claim in arbitration and then filed a second lawsuit in Superior Court, seeking to invalidate the arbitration agreement under the EFAA and consolidate the two suits.The Superior Court consolidated the actions, invalidated the arbitration agreement based on the EFAA, and denied the company’s renewed effort to compel arbitration. The company appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, held that the plaintiff waived the protections of the EFAA by knowingly withholding his sexual harassment claim and the EFAA argument during the initial litigation and opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. The court reversed the Superior Court’s orders, directed that arbitration be compelled, and awarded appellate costs to the company. View "Chin v. DoorDash, Inc." on Justia Law

A teacher was employed by a public school district for three consecutive years, beginning in August 2019. At the time of hiring, she was told her position was created due to increased enrollment and that she would initially be classified as a temporary employee, with the expectation of later becoming probationary and eventually permanent. Throughout her three years, she consistently received temporary contracts, with district administrators repeatedly explaining this was due to COVID-19-related uncertainties and that all similarly situated teachers were also classified as temporary. After her third year, the district informed her that her contract would not be renewed, citing budget constraints and low enrollment.She filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, seeking reinstatement as a permanent employee, claiming she had been misclassified as temporary. The district defended its actions by arguing she was temporarily filling a position made available by two other teachers who were job-sharing, which it contended qualified as "leave" under Education Code section 44920. The superior court credited testimony that the teacher was hired due to increased enrollment, not as a replacement for the job-sharing arrangement, but nonetheless concluded she could be classified as temporary because the total number of temporary teachers did not exceed the number of teachers on leave (including those in job-share). The court denied her petition, and also indicated that laches would bar her claim, though it deemed the issue moot based on its primary ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed. It held that a voluntary job-sharing arrangement does not constitute a "leave of absence" under Education Code section 44920 and therefore does not justify classifying a replacement teacher as temporary. Since the teacher was not properly classified as temporary, she became probationary by default and, after two years, a permanent employee by operation of law. The court ordered her reinstatement with the appropriate seniority date and remanded for determination of lost compensation, also rejecting the district’s laches defense. View "Washington v. Alta Loma School Dist." on Justia Law

A registered nurse working in a hospital’s Mother Baby Unit requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Her request, which cited Christian beliefs regarding the sanctity of life and objections to the use of abortion-derived cell lines in vaccine development and testing, was denied. The hospital had followed an executive order issued by the Oregon governor, requiring all healthcare workers to be vaccinated unless granted a medical or religious exemption. The nurse was subsequently terminated for failure to comply with the vaccination mandate.The nurse filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. She alleged a Free Exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual members of the hospital’s Board of Directors and Vaccine Exception Review Committee, and a Title VII claim against the hospital for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs. The district court granted the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss the Free Exercise claim on qualified immunity grounds, finding that the right to refuse a state-mandated vaccine on religious grounds was not clearly established in 2021. The court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claim but later granted summary judgment for the hospital, holding that accommodating the nurse’s request would have imposed undue hardship due to health, safety, operational, and financial risks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Free Exercise claim, holding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law in 2021 recognized a healthcare worker’s religious right to a vaccine exemption under those circumstances. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the hospital on the Title VII claim, concluding that the hospital demonstrated undue hardship in accommodating the nurse without substantial risk to patients and operations. View "MACDONALD V. OREGON HEALTH AND SCIENCE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this case began working for a law firm in 2017 and, in February 2018, signed an arbitration agreement covering most employment-related disputes. Over several years, she rose through the ranks and contributed to the creation of a legal tech company, earning a substantial award of stock options. By August 2023, those options had fully vested, and she communicated her intention to exercise them. Shortly thereafter, in February 2024, she was terminated without warning, despite prior positive performance reviews. In addition to her claims regarding unlawful termination and deprivation of stock options, she alleged that she experienced ongoing sexual harassment from her supervisors, including inappropriate comments and conduct.Prior to this case, the defendants filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas seeking confirmation of her termination for cause, and later attempted to compel arbitration. That Texas action was stayed after the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Her complaint included claims for sexual harassment under state and city law, as well as non-harassment claims, such as breach of contract and conversion. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, dismiss, or transfer the case. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, holding that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) allowed the entire lawsuit to proceed in court, not just the sexual harassment claims. Some claims and parties were dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the key harassment and conversion claims remained.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of arbitration de novo. It held that, when properly invoked, the EFAA permits a plaintiff to invalidate a predispute arbitration agreement for the entire lawsuit, not only for claims directly relating to sexual harassment or assault. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law" on Justia Law

A union representing graduate student workers at a university filed grievances after certain doctoral students working as research assistants in the psychology department were excluded from the weekly lists of union-represented employees. The union asserted that these students, who conducted lab-based research under faculty supervision and received funding, fit the definition of "Research Assistant" under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and should be included in the bargaining unit. The university argued that these students were not statutory "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore not eligible for union representation or inclusion in the bargaining unit.The grievances proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator found that the psychology doctoral students qualified as "Research Assistants" under the CBA based on its language, the parties’ history, and past practices, regardless of the funding source. The arbitrator ordered the university to include these students in the bargaining unit and provide lost benefits. The university challenged the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority and violated public policy. The district court denied the university’s motion to vacate and confirmed the arbitration award, granting costs but not attorney’s fees to the union.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award de novo. The First Circuit held that the dispute was substantively arbitrable, the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA was plausible and drew from its essence, and the award did not violate public policy. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, allowing the arbitration award to stand. View "President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Harvard Graduate Students Union - UAW, Local 5118" on Justia Law

A group of boilermakers, who were participants in a multi-employer pension plan, sought early retirement benefits after leaving their union jobs before reaching age 65. The plan provided for early retirement if the participant “withdrew completely” and refrained from employment in jobs classified under a collective bargaining agreement or supervising workers in those positions. Some boilermakers took other jobs after retiring, prompting the trustees of the pension plan to deny their early retirement benefits, claiming the participants were ineligible because they had not ceased all employment with companies contributing to the plan.In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the boilermakers on their benefit claims, finding the plan’s language did not require withdrawal from all jobs, only those specified. It also granted partial summary judgment to some boilermakers on fiduciary duty claims, while ruling others were time-barred due to a three-year limitations period. The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment on the benefits claims, and 66 boilermakers cross-appealed the denial of their fiduciary duty claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to the plan administrator’s decisions. The court held that the plan’s unambiguous language only required withdrawal from certain jobs, not all employment, and that the administrator’s broader interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. It further held that the defendants could not rely on the limitations period for benefit claims due to inadequate notice to participants. For fiduciary duty claims, the court found the limitations period did not begin until actual knowledge of the breach, reversing summary judgment against the 66 boilermakers. The court affirmed the benefit claims and remanded the fiduciary duty claims for further proceedings. View "Phillips v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust" on Justia Law

An airline operating among the Hawaiian Islands faced severe financial difficulties over several years, leading to its abrupt shutdown in November 2017. The airline had previously been owned by a trust affiliated with a prominent individual, then partially sold to entities controlled by other businessmen. When the airline closed, employees received only one day's notice and did not receive their final paychecks. Following the closure, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was appointed. Together with two unions representing affected employees, the trustee initiated adversary proceedings against the airline’s former owners, directors, and lenders, alleging violations of Hawaii’s Dislocated Workers Act (DWA) and the federal WARN Act for failure to provide the required notice and compensation. Additional claims included breach of fiduciary duties and requests for equitable remedies such as veil piercing and equitable subordination.The proceedings began in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii, but the District Court for the District of Hawaii withdrew the reference, consolidated the cases, and conducted a jury trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for some claims and allowed others to proceed. The jury returned mixed verdicts, finding some defendants liable for statutory and fiduciary duty violations, but the court denied punitive damages and limited recovery to avoid double compensation. The court also ruled on equitable remedies, including piercing the corporate veil and equitably subordinating certain loans, and ordered contribution from a third-party defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. It held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The panel affirmed the trustee’s and unions’ Article III standing. It reversed in part on fiduciary duty claims, concluding that minority stakeholders and affiliated entities could owe fiduciary duties and be deemed “employers” under the DWA. The court clarified the statutory definition of “employer” and the scope of the DWA’s safe harbor defense, ruling it was unavailable absent a binding divestiture. The panel affirmed evidentiary rulings, vacated the nominal damages award due to erroneous jury instructions, affirmed the prohibition of punitive damages, and upheld the equitable remedies and contribution order. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a dental assistant employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleged she faced retaliation after raising workplace safety concerns and filing complaints with Cal-OSHA. Over several years, she experienced actions which included unwarranted criticism, suspension without pay, obstacles to job advancement, and ultimately formal terminations. She filed government claims describing these incidents, and was reinstated after her dismissal was overturned by the State Personnel Board (SPB), but alleged further retaliatory conduct and a constructive discharge upon her return.The Solano County Superior Court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State of California, CDCR, and three individual defendants. The court found the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Government Claims Act’s claims presentation requirement for her retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 and did not exhaust administrative remedies for her Whistleblower Protection Act cause of action. All claims were dismissed without leave to amend. The plaintiff appealed, contesting only the rulings related to her retaliation and whistleblower claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act for a constructive discharge theory under section 1102.5(b), allowing that claim to proceed against the State and CDCR. However, it found no facts showing exhaustion of administrative remedies for the Whistleblower Protection Act claim and denied leave to amend. The court also held, as a matter of first impression, that individual supervisors are not personally liable for retaliation under section 1102.5. The judgment was affirmed in favor of the individual defendants and partially reversed for the State and CDCR as to the section 1102.5 claim. View "Chaudhry v. State" on Justia Law

A white male employee of Seattle’s Human Services Department alleged that the City’s Race and Social Justice Initiative (RSJI) classified employees according to race, and that a series of workplace incidents—including racially aligned affinity groups, race-specific trainings, and racially offensive remarks from coworkers and supervisors—created a hostile work environment. He asserted that the RSJI and workplace conduct led to discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and violation of his equal protection rights. After resigning in September 2021, he filed suit alleging claims under Title VII, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed as time-barred certain Title VII and WLAD claims based on acts predating statutory limitations periods. It granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims, finding insufficient evidence of actionable discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, or equal protection violations. The court partially granted the City’s evidentiary objections to exhibits offered by the plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the City on the constructive discharge, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims, and also affirmed summary judgment on the Equal Protection Clause claim for lack of Article III standing. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims under Title VII and WLAD, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law