Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Dawn Simonson was employed by Douglas County as a histologist and suffered a lower back injury in 1996 while performing her job duties. The injury left her permanently and totally disabled, and she received workers' compensation benefits. When Simonson turned 67 in 2023, her employer stopped paying her permanent total disability (PTD) benefits based on a statutory retirement presumption. Simonson claimed she would have worked past age 67 and sought to rebut the presumption.A compensation judge initially found that Simonson had not rebutted the retirement presumption, applying factors from a previous case, Davidson v. Thermo King. The judge concluded that Simonson's intent to retire weighed in favor of the employer, while her financial need weighed in her favor, and other factors were neutral or irrelevant. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed this decision, concluding that the proper standard of proof to rebut the presumption was a preponderance of the evidence and that Simonson had met this burden based on her financial need.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the WCCA's determination that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employee seeks to rebut the retirement presumption. However, the Supreme Court found that the WCCA erred in emphasizing financial need as the primary factor. Instead, the court held that the relevant question is whether the employee would have retired anyway, even if not disabled, considering various factors such as the availability of work, retirement arrangements, age, work history, and willingness to forgo social security benefits. The case was remanded to the compensation judge for further findings consistent with this opinion. View "Simonson v. Douglas County" on Justia Law

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Kassandra Memmer sued her former employer, United Wholesale Mortgage (UWM), alleging discrimination and sexual harassment during her employment. UWM moved to dismiss the lawsuit and compel arbitration based on the employment agreement. Memmer argued that the arbitration agreement was invalid and that she had the right to go to court under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted UWM's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, concluding that the parties had a valid arbitration agreement. The court did not address Memmer's argument regarding the applicability of EFAA. Memmer appealed the decision, asserting that EFAA should apply to her case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that EFAA applies to claims that accrue after its enactment date and to disputes that arise after that date. The court determined that the district court had not applied the correct interpretation of EFAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the dispute between Memmer and UWM arose and whether EFAA applies to her claims. View "Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

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Dr. Blake Vanderlan, a physician at a hospital operated by Jackson HMA, LLC, alleged that the hospital systematically violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). He reported these violations to the Department of Health and Human Services, prompting an investigation by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS confirmed the violations and referred the matter to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for potential civil monetary penalties. Vanderlan then filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Jackson HMA, alleging five FCA violations, including a retaliation claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi handled the case initially. The government investigated Vanderlan’s claims but declined to intervene. The case continued for six and a half years, during which the district court severed Vanderlan’s retaliation claims. The government eventually moved to dismiss the qui tam claims, arguing that the lawsuit interfered with administrative settlement negotiations and lacked merit. The district court granted the dismissal based on written filings and reaffirmed its decision after reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying Vanderlan an evidentiary hearing, as the FCA only requires a hearing on the briefs. The court also determined that the government’s motion to dismiss fell under Rule 41(a)(1), which allows for dismissal without a court order, and thus, the district court had no discretion to deny the dismissal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the government’s decision to dismiss the case was justified and that the district court applied the correct standard. View "Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA" on Justia Law

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Samuel Shanks and Taylor Lambert, former employees of the International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, filed pro se lawsuits against the Union alleging discrimination. Shanks, who worked in accounting for over twenty years, claimed discrimination based on disability, race, color, and sexual orientation, as well as a hostile work environment and retaliation. Lambert, his niece, alleged wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination based on race, religion, and gender. Both claimed violations of various civil rights laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Union removed the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Shanks and Lambert appealed the dismissals. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals in part but appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in favor of claims that were not suited for summary dismissal.The D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and concluded that the allegations of racial discrimination related to the Union’s COVID-19 vaccination policy were plausible. The court found that the Union’s two-stage roll-out of the policy disproportionately affected Black employees, who were given less time and fewer resources to comply with the vaccination mandate. The court held that the disparate impact and discriminatory treatment claims based on race were sufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including those based on sexual orientation, gender, and religion, as well as Shanks’ hostile work environment claim. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the racial discrimination claims. View "Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law

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Petitioners, representing a class of current and former Cornell University employees, participated in two defined-contribution retirement plans from 2010 to 2016. They sued Cornell and other plan fiduciaries in 2017, alleging that the plans engaged in prohibited transactions by paying excessive fees for recordkeeping services to Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund and Fidelity Investments Inc., in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §1106(a)(1)(C).The District Court dismissed the prohibited-transaction claim, requiring plaintiffs to allege self-dealing or disloyal conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds, holding that plaintiffs must plead that the transaction was unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation, incorporating §1108(b)(2)(A) exemptions into §1106(a) claims.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the case. The Court held that to state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without addressing potential §1108 exemptions. The Court determined that §1108 sets out affirmative defenses, which must be pleaded and proved by defendants. The Court emphasized that the statutory text and structure do not impose additional pleading requirements for §1106(a)(1) claims and that the burden of proving exemptions rests on the defendants. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

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In September 2015, Josh Brewer suffered a work-related injury while employed by Tectum Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Truxedo. Brewer filed a workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, which was denied by his employer and their insurer, Berkshire Hathaway. Brewer's claim was initially denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ) and subsequently by the Department of Labor (Department), which found that Brewer did not prove his work-related injury was a major contributing cause of his current condition and ongoing need for treatment. Brewer appealed the Department's decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the Department's ruling. Brewer then appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the documentary evidence and expert testimonies. The court found that Brewer's treating physician, Dr. Rothrock, provided a more credible causation opinion than the employer's expert, Dr. Jensen. Dr. Rothrock opined that Brewer's work injury was a major contributing cause of his current condition and need for treatment, based on his personal treatment of Brewer and the results of various diagnostic tests. The court concluded that Brewer met his burden of proving causation and reversed the Department's determination on this issue.Regarding Brewer's claim for PTD benefits, the court reviewed the ALJ's findings for clear error. The court found that Brewer did not establish obvious unemployability due to his physical condition, age, training, and experience. Additionally, Brewer's job search efforts were deemed unreasonable, as he did not follow application instructions and highlighted his physical limitations on his résumé. The court also noted that the employer presented sufficient evidence of suitable employment opportunities available to Brewer within his limitations. Consequently, the court affirmed the Department's denial of PTD benefits.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Brewer v. Tectum Holdings" on Justia Law

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Seven members of the South Dakota Air National Guard, who also work as federal civilian employees of the Department of the Air Force, alleged that the South Dakota Adjutant General wrongfully denied them military leave while they were serving on active duty, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to 15 days of paid military leave each year in their civilian roles, which they were denied while on active duty.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, dismissed the USERRA claims sua sponte after a court trial, concluding that the plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of an antimilitary animus to prevail. The court did not reach the merits of the parties’ arguments and found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove such animus. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to military leave. The court held that the plaintiffs did not need to show antimilitary animus because the benefit in question, military leave, is only available to members of the military. The court found that the plaintiffs' active duty under Title 10 orders was not "active Guard and Reserve duty" as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(6), and therefore, the exception in 32 U.S.C. § 709(g)(2) did not apply. Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to accrue military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1) while serving on active duty under Title 10. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christiansen v. Morrell" on Justia Law

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Jobie Howard, an electrician for Arch Coal, Inc., suffered severe injuries from an electrical explosion in May 2010, resulting in multiple burns, visual impairment, and other physical issues. He received a total of 57% in permanent partial disability (PPD) awards and applied for a permanent total disability (PTD) award in 2015. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review determined in November 2022 that Howard met the 50% whole person impairment (WPI) threshold required for a PTD award, combining impairment ratings from two physicians using the Combined Values Chart from the AMA Guides.The claim administrator initially denied Howard’s PTD application in October 2020, but Howard protested, leading to a review by the Board of Review. The Board found the reports of Dr. Michael A. Krasnow and Dr. Jitander S. Dudee reliable for visual impairment and Dr. David L. Soulsby reliable for orthopedic and dermatological impairment. The Board combined Dr. Dudee’s 27% WPI rating for the eye and Dr. Soulsby’s 39% WPI rating for other injuries, resulting in a total WPI of 55%.Arch Coal appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the Board improperly combined impairment ratings from different physicians. The ICA affirmed the Board’s decision, reasoning that it was reasonable to combine the ratings since no single physician could rate all of Howard’s impairments.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the ICA’s decision. The court held that the Board acted within its discretion by combining valid impairment ratings from different physicians and using the Combined Values Chart to determine Howard’s total WPI. The court found no error in the Board’s decision to grant Howard a PTD award based on a combined WPI of 55%. View "Arch Coal, Inc., v. Howard" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Charles and Grant Adler, through their business entity CM Adler LLC, distributed tortillas and other food products of Defendant Gruma Corporation to grocery stores in central New Jersey under a "Store Door Distributor Agreement" (SDDA). When Defendant terminated the relationship, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging retaliatory termination due to their organizing efforts with other distributors. Plaintiffs claimed violations of state and federal labor laws, including failure to pay minimum wages and unlawful deductions, and argued that the SDDA was a franchise agreement subject to New Jersey's Franchise Practices Act, which forbids termination without cause.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the case, concluding that Texas law governed under the SDDA and the case should proceed to arbitration. The District Court did not address the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or Plaintiffs' exemption argument under 9 U.S.C. § 1. It found the parties had contracted for Texas law, under which the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and rejected Plaintiffs' bid to apply New Jersey law instead. The District Court also decided that Charles and Grant Adler, who did not sign the contract, were estopped from challenging its arbitration provision because they acted as parties to the contract when they performed the LLC’s work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the FAA does not apply to the SDDA because Plaintiffs are transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals found that the District Court erred in its choice-of-law analysis by failing to consider the impact of New Jersey public policies on its arbitrability ruling. The Court of Appeals vacated the order compelling arbitration and remanded for the District Court to complete the choice-of-law analysis under the correct framework and to reevaluate whether the individual Plaintiffs, who did not sign the arbitration agreement, are bound by its terms. View "Adler v. Gruma Corporation" on Justia Law

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Jeff Stacy, a lineman for Unitil Corporation, continued working during the COVID-19 pandemic as his job was classified as an essential service. Despite the Governor's orders to shut down nonessential businesses, Stacy worked closely with colleagues, which led to his exposure to the virus. In February 2021, after working overtime during snowstorms, Stacy contracted COVID-19 from a coworker, resulting in severe illness and total disability. He applied for workers' compensation benefits, which were initially denied by his employer's insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut.An administrative judge from the Department of Industrial Accidents held an evidentiary hearing and ruled in favor of Stacy, finding that the risk of contracting COVID-19 was inherent in his employment during the pandemic. The judge noted that Stacy's job required close physical proximity to coworkers, increasing his risk of infection. The Industrial Accident Reviewing Board affirmed the judge's decision, adopting the factual findings and concluding that the decision was supported by adequate evidence and reasoned decision-making.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the board's decision. The court held that the board's determination that the risk of contracting COVID-19 was inherent in Stacy's employment was not arbitrary or capricious. The court emphasized that Stacy's role as an essential worker, who continued to work closely with others during a time when most businesses were closed and social distancing was mandated, justified the finding that his employment posed a unique risk of infection. Thus, Stacy's claim for workers' compensation benefits was upheld. View "Stacy's Case" on Justia Law