Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on an employee, who was hired by a company operating customer service call centers, and who signed an arbitration agreement and a confidentiality agreement as part of her onboarding process. The arbitration agreement was included in a lengthy new hire packet, and the employee understood she was required to sign it to accept the job. The agreement mandated arbitration for nearly all claims between the parties, including those that could arise after employment ended and claims unrelated to employment. The confidentiality agreement included provisions restricting the employee from soliciting colleagues and granted the company the ability to seek injunctive relief for breaches without proving actual damages.After the employee left her position, she filed a class action lawsuit against the company asserting several employment-related claims. The company responded by seeking to compel arbitration based on the previously signed agreement. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion. It found the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and determined it was a contract of adhesion with a low degree of procedural unconscionability. However, the court found the agreement substantively unconscionable due to its overly broad scope, unlimited duration, and lack of mutuality, following precedent such as Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312. The court also concluded the confidentiality agreement’s injunctive relief and nonsolicitation clauses were unconscionable. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the unconscionable terms could not be severed without rewriting the contract.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement, read together with the confidentiality agreement, was permeated with unconscionability that could not be cured by severance, and thus was unenforceable. View "Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions" on Justia Law

A regional clinical-trial director employed by a research group contracted to conduct clinical trials for a major COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer raised concerns about protocol deviations and regulatory violations at the trial sites. She repeatedly reported these concerns to her supervisors and ultimately informed the FDA. The day she contacted the FDA, her employer terminated her, citing poor fit. Her tenure at the company lasted approximately two weeks, during which she advocated for pausing trial enrollment to address her concerns. After her termination, the trial enrollment resumed and the vaccine manufacturer later announced favorable trial results.The plaintiff filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging fraudulent claims against the vaccine manufacturer, the research group, and another contractor. She also asserted a retaliation claim against her employer. The government initially declined to intervene during the statutory seal period but reserved the right to do so later. The district court unsealed the complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The government, while not intervening, filed a statement supporting dismissal. The district court granted the motions. The plaintiff requested reconsideration and filed an amended complaint, adding a fraud-in-the-inducement theory. Defendants again moved to dismiss. The government then moved to intervene and dismiss, citing lack of merit, public-health concerns, and anticipated litigation burdens. The district court granted the government’s motion, dismissing the FCA claims with prejudice as to the plaintiff and without prejudice as to the government, and dismissed the retaliation claim for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. The court held that the FCA’s “good cause” standard for government intervention is flexible and satisfied by articulated governmental interests, without the need for Rule 24(b) requirements. The government’s motion to dismiss was proper under Rule 41, and the plaintiff received adequate notice and hearing. The retaliation claim failed because the plaintiff did not plausibly allege protected activity or employer knowledge. View "Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, who worked as an hourly employee for an automobile dealership, signed a binding arbitration agreement as part of his hiring process. The agreement required arbitration for nearly all disputes with the employer and a broadly defined set of “affiliates,” including entities not directly related to the employment relationship. It also mandated specific procedures for initiating arbitration, which were more restrictive for the employee than for the employer. The plaintiff later filed a class action in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging various wage and hour violations and unfair competition claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. Although it found the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the court concluded the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to moderate-to-high procedural unconscionability—primarily because of pressure to sign, the agreement’s presentation in English to a Spanish-speaking employee, and its format. The court also found substantive unconscionability in the agreement’s overbroad scope, lack of mutuality regarding parties and procedures, and infinite duration. It declined to sever the offending terms, instead refusing to enforce the agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court’s order. It held that while the agreement was adhesive, there was only a low degree of procedural unconscionability. However, it found high substantive unconscionability due to the overbreadth and lack of mutuality in the agreement. The appellate court concluded the unconscionable terms were severable and the trial court erred by not severing them. It reversed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to sever the offending terms, enforce arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual employment claims, and address the issue of the class action waiver. View "Salazar v. CN Motor Co." on Justia Law

Ronald L. Green, a revenue agent employed by the Internal Revenue Service in Las Vegas, was indefinitely suspended in August 2006 on suspicion of filing fraudulent tax returns. Shortly before the suspension took effect, he applied for immediate disability retirement, citing medical conditions and workplace stress. After his suspension, he initiated arbitration to challenge the agency’s action and alleged discrimination through an EEO complaint. The Office of Personnel Management approved his retirement in January 2007. In March 2007, an arbitrator reversed his suspension but denied his discrimination claims. The agency retroactively dated his retirement to his last day of pay and removed references to other adverse actions from his record.Mr. Green’s subsequent legal efforts included appeals to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and district court, both of which ruled against him, with the Ninth Circuit affirming. In May 2023, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, asserting that his 2006 retirement was involuntary due to agency actions and discrimination. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Mr. Green failed to nonfrivolously allege involuntariness. The decision became the Board’s final determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed Mr. Green’s petition. It first determined jurisdiction, concluding that Mr. Green’s explicit waiver of discrimination claims allowed the court to review the non-discrimination aspects. The court found that Mr. Green had forfeited arguments about agency failure to restore his employment after arbitration because these were not properly raised before the Board. On the remaining issue, the court held that Mr. Green failed to nonfrivolously allege that his retirement was involuntary, either through coercion or misinformation, and affirmed the Board’s decision. View "Green v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Transportation Specialist employed by the Department of the Army, was suspended for ten days based on alleged misconduct. On the same day the suspension was proposed, she filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. The agency implemented the suspension several months later. The Special Counsel subsequently notified her that its investigation was terminated and that it would not seek corrective action on her behalf.After receiving the Special Counsel’s notice, the petitioner filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) nearly three weeks after the statutory deadline. An administrative judge for the Board issued a timeliness order, to which the petitioner responded by arguing her appeal was timely under the relevant statute and that equitable tolling did not apply. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding it was filed 24 days after the 60-day deadline triggered by the Special Counsel’s notice. The petitioner sought review by the full Board, but due to a lack of quorum, the initial decision became the final decision of the Board.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when the Special Counsel issues notification terminating an investigation—even if this occurs more than 120 days after the initial complaint—the federal employee has 60 days from the date of notification to file an IRA appeal with the Board. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 60-day deadline did not apply if the Special Counsel’s notice came after the 120-day period. Concluding that the appeal was untimely, the court affirmed the Board’s dismissal. View "Walker v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Eight former employees of a space technology company were dismissed shortly after they circulated an open letter to management expressing concerns about workplace conduct they believed constituted sexual harassment. The letter specifically criticized the company founder’s posts on social media, which the plaintiffs alleged created a hostile work environment. After their termination, the plaintiffs filed suit asserting claims under California law, including hostile work environment sexual harassment, gender discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, and retaliatory termination for opposing alleged sexual harassment.The plaintiffs originally brought their case in state court. The defendant responded by filing an answer and then removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Once in federal court, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, citing arbitration agreements signed by each plaintiff as part of their employment contracts. The defendant argued that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) did not exempt the plaintiffs’ claims from arbitration, contending that the statute required “adequately alleged” sexual harassment—allegations sufficient to survive a federal motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the EFAA exempts the plaintiffs’ case from arbitration. The court ruled that the EFAA’s definition of a “sexual harassment dispute” is satisfied when the complaint asserts conduct alleged to amount to sexual harassment, without requiring allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the plaintiffs properly invoked the EFAA and that their case “relates to” a sexual harassment dispute. Thus, the arbitration agreements are not enforceable for this case. View "HOLLAND-THIELEN v. SPACEX" on Justia Law

Apria Healthcare provides home healthcare products and services, employing delivery drivers through third-party agencies and licensed vocational nurses directly. Travis Smith and Uriel Arauz, both former employees, commenced a class action against Apria in Sutter County Superior Court alleging wage and hour violations on behalf of similarly situated employees. Proposed interveners Angela Tisdale and Terrance Pratt are former delivery drivers and named plaintiffs in a separate, related federal action against Apria for similar wage and hour claims, covering delivery drivers hired after the class certification date in another Los Angeles County action.The Sutter County Superior Court preliminarily approved a settlement in the Smith action, which conditionally certified a class and found the settlement fair. Tisdale and Pratt, concerned about a collusive “reverse auction” settlement that might undermine the rights of putative class members in their federal action, filed an ex parte application to intervene in the Smith action after the court’s preliminary approval and class notice. Their application was supported by evidence of their early awareness and concern over the settlement process, but was filed several months after those concerns were first raised.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the intervention application. The appellate court held that Tisdale and Pratt’s application was untimely, noting that they knew or should have known of risks to their interests well before filing, and their delay prejudiced the settlement process and the original parties. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying intervention, concluding that the untimeliness of the application defeated both mandatory and permissive intervention. Respondents were awarded costs on appeal. View "Smith v. Apria Healthcare" on Justia Law

A group of nine tenured professors at a public Kansas university were terminated after the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) temporarily amended its policy, citing COVID-19-related financial pressures. The amendment permitted universities to suspend or terminate tenured faculty without the usual protections, including hearings or proof of financial exigency. ESU administrators drafted a framework for implementing these terminations, which KBOR approved. The professors received termination letters referencing general financial concerns, but allegedly lacking specific reasons. The professors claimed ESU was not facing financial exigency, and that their terminations were motivated by their political activities and beliefs. All nine appealed through the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH); six had their terminations reversed and three had them affirmed. Litigation ensued, with the professors asserting constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including due process, liberty, association, and equal protection claims.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss most claims, finding that qualified immunity did not bar them. It ruled the professors had adequately alleged deprivation of a property interest in continued employment without due process and allowed other constitutional claims to proceed. The court dismissed liberty interest claims against KBOR and some administrators where no statements were attributed to them, but denied dismissal for others allegedly involved in drafting termination letters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage, adopting facts as alleged. It held that the professors had a state-created property interest in tenure and that the process used to terminate their employment plausibly violated clearly established procedural due process rights. The court affirmed denial of dismissal for procedural due process and related conspiracy claims, but reversed as to substantive due process claims, finding no clearly established violation. It also reversed denial of dismissal for liberty, association, equal protection, and conspiracy claims against KBOR and certain administrators, instructing the district court to dismiss those claims, while leaving claims against the university president intact. View "Miracle v. Hush" on Justia Law

A Colorado-based retailer employed a sales associate who, after contracting a severe illness in March 2020 (suspected COVID-19), experienced ongoing and worsening symptoms including gastrointestinal pain, weakness, difficulty breathing, and intermittent inability to speak. She initially received twelve weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which was set to expire in June 2020. Before her leave expired, the employee communicated with the company’s human resources specialist about her persistent symptoms and medical procedures, including a scheduled endoscopy. She requested an extension of leave, explaining she needed more time to recover and receive results from her medical tests. The retailer declined to grant additional leave and terminated her employment shortly after the FMLA leave expired.After the termination, the employee filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which investigated and brought suit against the retailer in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The retailer moved for summary judgment, arguing the EEOC had not established the employee had a qualifying disability, had not provided sufficient notice of her disability and limitations, and had requested an unreasonable, indefinite leave. The district court granted summary judgment for the retailer on all claims, finding the employee had not put the company on notice of her disability and her request for an indefinite leave was not a reasonable accommodation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the employee provided sufficient notice of her disabling condition and that her request for a few weeks of additional leave constituted a plausibly reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. A & A Appliance" on Justia Law

The appellant worked as a maintenance worker and suffered a work-related back injury in March 2022. He ceased working, reported the injury, and began receiving medical treatment, including physical therapy and medication. The Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division recognized his injury as compensable and awarded him temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Over the following year, the appellant continued to experience back pain, but his doctor noted improvements, and by March 2023, multiple medical professionals—his treating physician and two independent medical examiners—agreed he had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). Based on these findings, the Division terminated his TTD benefits and awarded him permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits.The appellant contested the Division’s determination, arguing he had not yet reached MMI and that the TTD benefits should not have been terminated. He did not present additional medical evidence to support his claim but relied on his own testimony. The Medical Commission held a contested case hearing and found, based on the medical evidence, that he had reached MMI as of March 2023. Consequently, the Medical Commission upheld the Division’s termination of TTD benefits. The appellant appealed to the District Court of Laramie County, which affirmed the Medical Commission’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case as if it had come directly from the Medical Commission, without deference to the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the Medical Commission’s finding that the appellant had achieved MMI as of March 2023. Therefore, the termination of TTD benefits was proper under Wyoming law, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Medical Commission’s and district court’s decisions. View "Martinez v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law