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A Louisiana charter school did not qualify for the "political subdivision" exemption of the National Labor Relations Act and was therefore subject to the Act. In this case, petitioners challenged the NLRB's finding that petitioners, Louisiana charter school operators, committed an unfair labor practice and ordered it to recognize and bargain with the union. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that petitioners, like most other privately controlled employers, was subject to the Act because Louisiana chose to insulate its charters from the political process. View "Voices for International Business and Education, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a California statute, Cal. Lab. Code 1720.9, that amended the prevailing wage laws to ensure that delivery drivers of ready-mix concrete are paid a minimum wage. The district court denied IBT's motion to intervene and granted the State's motion to dismiss the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) claim. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the equal protection claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs and held that the district court wrongly disregarded as irrelevant certain differences between ready-mix drivers and other drivers that the legislature could have relied on in extending the prevailing wage law. The panel reversed the district court's denial of IBT's motion for leave to intervene and held that IBT had a significantly protectable interest in the case. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FAAAA claim, holding that the prevailing wage law was not related to prices, routes, and services within the meaning of the FAAAA's preemption clause. View "Allied Concrete and Supply Co. v. Baker" on Justia Law

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The dispute in this case concerned the correct characterization of Xerox's payment play under Washington law. Xerox had compensation formula fo call center employees based on "production minutes" - a unit of time during which an employee services incoming calls. If the production minute formed the basis for a bona fide piecework system, then one set of minimum wage rules and regulations applied. If the minute formed the basis for an hourly payment system, then a different set of hourly minimum wage protections applied. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question regarding Washington's labor law with respect to Xerox's compensation under "production minutes," and whether they qualified as piecework under the Washington Administrative Code. The Washington Supreme Court responded with a "no," "an employer's payment plan that includes as a metric an employee's 'production minutes' does not qualify as piecework under WAC 296-126-021. View "Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Beavercreek Township Trustees and its members (collectively, the Board) to rescind two resolutions setting the annual salaries for two assistants to the Beavercreek Township Fiscal Officer and to consider a new compensation proposal submitted by the Fiscal Officer. The Supreme Court held (1) Ohio Rev. Code 507.021(A) authorized the Fiscal Officer to hire two assistants and to set compensation for those positions, subject to prior approval by the Board; (2) the Fiscal Officer’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to approve and fund the two assistant positions at the specific salaries proposed is denied because the Fiscal Officer did not demonstrate that the Board abused its discretion in denying her specific salary requests; but (3) the Board exceeded its authority when it adopted the resolutions setting the annual salaries for the two assistants. View "State ex rel. Beavercreek Township Fiscal Officer v. Graff" on Justia Law

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This appeal related to a purported agreement resolving a lawsuit between Kevin Seward and Musick Auction, LLC (“Musick”). Seward claimed that the parties entered into a binding oral settlement agreement and he moved to enforce the agreement. The district court granted Seward’s motion. Musick contended on appeal the district court erred in several respects when it held that the parties had entered into a binding settlement agreement. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC" on Justia Law

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Palardy, a Millburn police officer, was involved in union leadership, participating in contract negotiations and disciplinary hearings for fellow officers. Gordon was responsible for Millburn's personnel matters. Palardy testified that other officers told him Gordon repeatedly disparaged Palardy’s union activity. In 2010, when Millburn was without a chief, Palardy was the department’s senior lieutenant, next in line to become a captain. During Gordon’s tenure, Millburn always selected its chief from among its captains. Palardy believed that he could be promoted to captain for a short time and then promoted to chief. Gordon stated that he did not believe any of the lieutenants had enough experience to become chief. Captain Weber became chief in 2011. Palardy stepped down as union president because he “knew" Gordon "had a problem with [his] union affiliation.” Gordon retained a consultant to study the department’s structure and vacancies and promoted Palardy to captain in 2012. Weber was scheduled to retire in 2015. In 2013, Palardy was offered a part-time position with the Board of Education. He says he believed that he would never become chief, so he retired and accepted that job offer. Palardy then sued the Township and Gordon. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit reversed in part. The court should have analyzed Palardy’s speech and association claims separately; his union association deserves constitutional protection. Palardy’s speech claim must fail; he claims that Gordon retaliated against him because of his union membership, not because of his advocacy on any particular issue. View "Palardy v. Township of Millburn" on Justia Law

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Local Union 3-G represents employees at Kellogg’s Battle Creek plant and is affiliated with the International Union, which represents employees at additional Kellogg’s plants. “Regular” employees and “non-regular” employees, including casual employees, make up the 3-G bargaining unit. There is a Master Agreement between Kellogg, the International Union, and local unions at four plants, which have Supplemental Agreements. A Memorandum of Agreement, appended to the Battle Creek Supplemental Agreement, states that the Supplemental and Master Agreements will not apply to casual employees and the Company may terminate casual employees without being subject to the grievance procedure. A 2015 Master Agreement “established wage rates, a signing ratification bonus for all employees, the establishment of a transitional employee classification to replace casual employees, and other changes" for all Battle Creek bargaining unit employees. After the ratification vote, Kellogg refused to pay a ratification bonus to casual employees, seasonal employees, and some regular employees. The parties went through the grievance procedure, but Kellogg refused to arbitrate, arguing that the arbitration provisions do not apply to casual employees. The Sixth Circuit previously held that arbitration provisions in the “Memphis Supplemental Agreement” did not cover casual employees. The district court determined that judicial estoppel did not apply to the Battle Creek action and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, The Agreement has a broad arbitration clause, so the presumption of arbitrability is particularly applicable. View "Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union AFL-CIO v. Kellogg Co." on Justia Law

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Integrity provides thousands of hourly workers, like Plaintiffs, to fill orders, track merchandise, and process returns at Amazon facilities. Other Plaintiffs were directly employed by Amazon. Plaintiffs claim “Amazon.com exercises direct control over the hours and other working conditions,” and sued, concerning a policy that is enforced at all Amazon locations. Plaintiffs and other hourly employees must undergo a security clearance check at the end of each shift and before taking lunch breaks, to deter theft and reduce inventory shrinkage. Plaintiffs allege that the policy "was solely for the benefit of the employers and their customers” and that this process took approximately 25 minutes each day. Because employees were required to “clock out” before the screening, they were not compensated for time spent waiting in line and undergoing the screenings. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA) and state labor laws. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. While time spent undergoing mandatory security checks is not compensable under federal law, neither Nevada nor Arizona incorporates the federal Portal-to-Portal Act; the time is compensable under the states' laws, but the Arizona Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Arizona’s “workweek requirement,” by identifying a particular workweek in which, taking the average rate, they received less than the minimum wage per hour. View "Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Just Energy on plaintiffs' minimum wage and overtime claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law. The Second Circuit held that there was no genuine issue of fact to dispute that plaintiffs were outside salesmen—that is, to dispute that they were regularly employed away from Just Energy's office and that their primary duty was to make sales as well as to obtain orders or contracts for services. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the outside salesman exemption may not be applied because of the fact that Just Energy retained discretion to reject commitment contracts that plaintiffs secured from their door‐to‐door customers, and that the outside salesman exemption may not be applied because of the overall degree of supervision that Just Energy exercised over plaintiffs' activities. The court also held that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion when it declined to find that Just Energy should be collaterally estopped from invoking the outside salesman exemption in this case. View "Flood v. Just Energy Marketing Corp." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to DLC in an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), seeking overtime compensation for former DLC drivers. The court held that the FLSA's overtime requirement did not apply to DLC's drivers because DLC was engaged in the business of operating taxicabs. The court reasoned that a taxicab was (1) a chauffeured passenger vehicle; (2) available for hire by individual members of the general public; (3) that has no fixed schedule, fixed route, or fixed termini. In this case, there was no genuine dispute that DLC's vehicles met this description and thus DLC's drivers were employed by an employer engaged in the business of operating taxicabs. View "Munoz-Gonzalez v. D.L.C. Limousine Services" on Justia Law