Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Alaska, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the Alaska State Employees Association (ASEA), a public sector union representing thousands of State employees, including union members and nonmembers, deducted union members’ dues from their paychecks and deducted from nonmembers’ paychecks a mandatory “agency fee” and transmitted the funds to ASEA. In June 2018 the United States Supreme Court held in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Janus) that charging union agency fees to nonmember public employees violated their First Amendment rights by “compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.” The State and ASEA modified their collective bargaining agreement to comply with Janus, and the State halted collecting agency fees from nonmembers. In 2019, after a change in executive branch administrations following the November 2018 election, the State took the position that Janus also required the State to take steps to protect union member employees’ First Amendment rights. The State contended that Janus required it to obtain union members’ clear and affirmative consent to union dues deductions, or else they too might be compelled to fund objectionable speech on issues of substantial public concern. The governor issued an administrative order directing the State to bypass ASEA and deal directly with individual union members to determine whether they wanted their dues deductions to continue and to immediately cease collecting dues upon request. Some union members expressed a desire to leave the union and requested to stop dues deductions; the State ceased collecting their union dues. The State then sued ASEA, seeking declaratory judgment that Janus compelled the State’s actions. ASEA countersued seeking to enjoin the State’s actions and recover damages for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and violations of several statutes. The superior court ruled in favor of ASEA, and the State appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s declaratory judgment in favor of ASEA because neither Janus nor the First Amendment required the State to alter the union member dues deduction practices set out in the collective bargaining agreement. And because the State’s actions were not compelled by Janus or the First Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings that the State breached the collective bargaining agreement and violated relevant statutes. View "Alaska, et al. v. Alaska St. Emp. Ass'n, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in this case brought against three Maine government officials in their official capacities (collectively, the State) and several healthcare providers (the Providers) by Plaintiffs, seven healthcare workers whose employment was vaccinated after they refused to accept COVID-19 vaccination (collectively, the Providers), holding that the court erred in dismissing certain claims.In 2021, under the "Mandate," Maine required certain healthcare facilities to ensure that their non-remote workers were vaccinated against COVID-19. Plaintiffs alleged that their sincerely-held religious beliefs prevented them from receiving any of the available COVID-19 vaccines and requested that their employers, the Providers, exempt them from the vaccination requirement. The Providers refused and terminated Plaintiffs' employment. Plaintiffs brought this suit alleging several claims. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; but (2) erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for relief under the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses. View "Lowe v. Mills" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are flight attendants who sustained injuries in connection with their employment by United Airlines. They filed claims in the Northern District of Texas, but the district court dismissed them because the flight attendants failed to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that the parties agree that the flight attendants could have invoked the district court’s jurisdiction if they had included the proper allegations. The flight attendants appealed, and this court affirmed. They filed the instant case shortly after. The district court dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal presents two primary questions, both of which concern the interpretation of the jurisdiction savings statute.   The Fifth Circuit wrote that it cannot make a reliable Erie guess on these important matters of state law. Accordingly, the court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: 1) Does Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where Plaintiffs could have invoked the prior district court’s subject matter jurisdiction with proper pleading? 2) Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064(a)(2)? View "Sanders v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a $425,562 jury verdict in his favor on his claim that the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (the Department) retaliated against him for filing an internal complaint with its Equal Opportunity Office (EEO). The Department appealed, contending that four erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial court deprived it of a fair trial.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court agreed that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about activity that occurred before the filing of his EEO complaints. The court also concluded that admission of the first EEO complaint and supplement was prejudicial and prevented the Department from receiving a fair trial. The court explained that there is no doubt that the fact that Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint for age and race discrimination is highly relevant. It is the protected activity needed for his claim; more colloquially, it provides a motive for the retaliation. The details of the discrimination are not relevant. This was not a trial about whether Plaintiff’s co-worker engaged in race or age discrimination; Plaintiff waived those claims in the prior settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that it need not and does not reach the Department’s other claims of error. View "Kourounian v. Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration" on Justia Law

At Weatherford’s fracking operations, Hammons directed Ayres to drive a truck outside of his driving certification; Ayres refused, telling his district manager, Crabb, that employees were being asked to drive in violation of Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. At a subsequent employee meeting, Crabb said that anyone who complained to HR would be fired. Ayres spoke by phone with a regional HR manager. Subsequently, Ayers was taken off the schedule and eventually fired, due to a “Reduction in Force.” When Ayres applied for unemployment benefits, Weatherford claimed he had been discharged because he “failed to follow instructions.” The district court dismissed Ayres’s suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Ayres did not appeal.Ayres had also filed a Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) complaint. Ayres died; his estate’s administrator was substituted as the complainant. An ALJ found that: Ayres had engaged in STAA-protected activity; Weatherford knew about the protected activity; the protected activity contributed to Ayres’s discharge; and Weatherford failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent Ayres’s protected activities. The ALJ awarded Ayres $82,119 in back pay, $10,000 for emotional harm, $25,000 in punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The Board and the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision in part, vacating the award of punitive damages. Penal claims, including the STAA right to punitive damages, abate upon the death of the injured party. View "Weatherford U.S., L.P. v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a deaf man who can understand only about 30% of verbal communication through lipreading. He communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL). Plaintiff worked for O’Reilly Auto Parts (O’Reilly) as an inbound materials handler. He claims that the company discriminated against him in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because it did not provide him with the reasonable accommodations that he requested for his disability. He alleged that he requested but did not receive an ASL interpreter for various meetings, training, and a company picnic. He also alleged that he asked for text messages summarizing nightly pre-shift meetings but did not receive them either. The district court, acting by consent through a magistrate judge, granted O’Reilly’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of O’Reilly. The court remanded for further proceedings involving Plaintiff’s claim that O’Reilly violated the ADA by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations regarding the nightly pre-shift safety meetings and regarding his disciplinary proceedings involving attendance issues. The court concluded that genuine issues of material fact do exist about whether two of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations relate to his essential job functions and whether the failure to provide those two accommodations led to an “adverse employment decision.” If Plaintiff’s allegations turn out to be the actual facts, there was a violation of Title I of the ADA, and that means summary judgment against him was inappropriate. View "Teddy Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certification of a state law question submitted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that the holding in Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., 890 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1995), has not been superseded by the 1999 statutory amendments to Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-801.At issue was whether, in an action for wrongful discharge pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-904, an employer may defend an employee's termination solely for reasons given in a discharge letter, as held in Galbreath, or whether the 1999 statutory amendments, which allowed employers to use reasons other than the reason provided in the discharge letter to defend against a wrongful discharge action, superseded the Galbreath Rule. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that the Galbreath Rule was not superseded by the 1999 statutory amendments. View "Smith v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit against Defendants—each present or former employees of the California Department of Public Health—on the grounds that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs of certain rights secured by the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged a “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983 on the grounds that Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before publishing a purportedly erroneous investigative report on an unsuccessful cardiac surgery. They contend that the publication of this report caused Plaintiffs to be deprived of protected employment-related interests. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish several necessary elements of their claim and, thus, dismissed the action in its entirety; Plaintiffs challenged each of the district court’s negative elemental findings.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court’s negative causation finding was plausible in light of record evidence establishing; the timing and conclusions of the hospital’s internal investigations, the independent actions of a hospital employee to alert the family to potential malfeasance by Plaintiff, the family and estate’s pursuit of legal action; the accounts of key percipient witnesses to the surgery as part of the malpractice case; and the sizable malpractice judgment awarded against Plaintiff. The panel thus sustained the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants’ conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury and concluded that, at a minimum, Plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite causation element of their “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983. View "PERVAIZ CHAUDHRY, ET AL V. TOMAS ARAGON, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that this dispute over an exempt class employee's termination was not arbitrable, thus reversing the order of the appellate division and denying a petition to compel arbitration, and that the Town of Monroe was free to terminate the employee without cause.In 2012, the Town appointed Employee to an exempt class civil service position. Three years later, the Town entered a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a Union that defined the bargaining unit to include Employee's position, permitted the Town to "terminate employees for just cause," and supplied procedures culminating in binding arbitration. In 2017, the Town terminated Employee, and the Union filed a grievance. When the Town refused to address the grievance the Union brought this action to compel the Town to arbitrate the dispute. Supreme Court denied the Town's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable because granting the relief sought would violate a statute, decisional law, and public policy. View "Teamsters Local 445 v. Town of Monroe" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that tier three police officers in the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF) who might otherwise be eligible for retirement credit under certain statutory provisions may not use those provisions to apply prior non-police service toward their retirement eligibility.Plaintiff commenced an action seeking a declaration that the City of New York and other related parties (collectively, the City) violated sections of the Retirement and Social Security Law and the New York City Administrative Code by refusing to permit tier three officers to obtain credit toward retirement eligibility for prior non-police service. The appellate division concluded that the City was statutorily required to allow tier three officers to credit non-police service toward their retirement eligibility. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and dismissed the proceeding, holding that the plain language of N.Y. Ret. & Soc. Sec. Law 513(c)(2) limits eligible prior service for those officers to police service. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law