Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A company operating stevedoring services at the Port of Mobile, Alabama, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union representing longshore workers. The agreement included a no-strike provision and outlined procedures for resolving disputes, including arbitration. After an alleged strike by union members, the company filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a temporary restraining order and later damages for breach of the no-strike provision. The state court issued a restraining order, ending the strike within days. The union subsequently removed the case to federal court, where the company amended its complaint to seek damages, asserting that all conditions precedent for judicial action had been met.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, the union moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the dispute should be resolved through the arbitration process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement permitted the company to seek monetary damages in court for violations of the no-strike provision. The union then filed an interlocutory appeal of the order denying arbitration, while the underlying damages action remained pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the Federal Arbitration Act’s provision for interlocutory appeals does not apply to collective bargaining agreements covering workers engaged in interstate commerce, such as longshoremen. The court also found no basis for jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act or the collateral-order doctrine. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the district court’s order in place and expressing no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. View "APM Terminals Mobile, LLC v. International Longshoremen's Association" on Justia Law

Several individuals, representing a class, challenged a health insurance company’s refusal to cover gender-affirming care for transgender individuals diagnosed with gender dysphoria. The company, acting as a third-party administrator for employer-sponsored, self-funded health plans, denied coverage for such treatments based on explicit plan exclusions requested by the employer sponsors. Some plaintiffs also alleged that they were denied coverage for treatments that would have been covered for other diagnoses, such as precocious puberty, but were denied solely because of the concurrent diagnosis of gender dysphoria.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified the class and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court rejected the company’s arguments that it was not subject to Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act because its third-party administrator activities were not federally funded, that it was merely following employer instructions under ERISA, and that it was shielded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court also found that the exclusions constituted sex-based discrimination under Section 1557.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the company is subject to Section 1557, that ERISA does not require administrators to enforce unlawful plan terms, and that RFRA does not provide a defense in this context. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s analysis of sex-based discrimination was undermined by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United States v. Skrmetti, which clarified the application of sex discrimination standards to exclusions for gender dysphoria treatment. The Ninth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether, under Skrmetti, the exclusions at issue may still constitute unlawful discrimination, particularly in cases involving pretext or proxy discrimination or where plaintiffs had other qualifying diagnoses. View "PRITCHARD V. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the City of Boise suffered injuries during a traffic stop in 2019, including a right hip injury, which the employer accepted and compensated. Later, the officer developed left hip pain, and her physician initially stated it was unrelated to the work accident, but later opined it was likely related. Disputes arose over medical records and scheduling independent medical examinations (IMEs). The employer, relying on prior Idaho Supreme Court precedent, sent a letter purporting to suspend compensation when the officer did not attend an IME, though the Idaho Industrial Commission later found that no actual suspension occurred. The officer continued to receive salary and some benefits, while her left hip surgery was covered by private insurance.After the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc., which held only the Commission could order suspension of benefits for failure to attend an IME, the officer sought a declaratory ruling from the Commission regarding retroactive application of Arreola. While that petition was pending, the employer filed a complaint with the Commission to adjudicate issues about the officer’s entitlement to benefits and IME compliance. The officer then filed a second petition, arguing that only employees, not employers, could file such complaints under Idaho’s worker’s compensation law.The Idaho Industrial Commission denied both petitions. It found the first petition was moot because the officer’s benefits were never actually suspended and Arreola applied only prospectively. The Commission denied the second petition on the merits, holding it had jurisdiction to accept complaints from employers under Idaho Code section 72-707 and its own rules.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the Commission’s denial of the first petition, finding no justiciable controversy. However, it set aside the denial of the second petition, holding that only employees may file complaints to request hearings on claims for compensation or income benefits under Idaho Code section 72-706, and the Commission exceeded its powers by allowing employer-initiated complaints in such matters. View "Coronado v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Two police associations negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas to designate certain dates—specifically Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth—as paid holidays in addition to those recognized by Nevada statute. These agreements provided for increased holiday pay on those days. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which is responsible for collecting retirement contributions based on employees’ regular compensation, refused to collect contributions on the additional holiday pay for these negotiated holidays, arguing that only holidays listed in Nevada’s statutory list qualified.The associations filed an action for declaratory relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court, seeking to compel PERS to collect retirement contributions on the negotiated holiday pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the associations, ordering PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for holiday pay on Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. PERS appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case de novo, as it involved questions of statutory interpretation and no disputed facts. The court held that, under the plain language of NRS 288.150(2)(d) and NRS 286.025, PERS is required to collect retirement contributions on all holiday pay negotiated in collective bargaining agreements, not just those for statutory holidays. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following the federal declaration, and contributions for that holiday are required retroactively to 2022, when it was included in the agreements. The court rejected PERS’s arguments regarding its authority and potential conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law

A long-term employee of a county government began experiencing workplace difficulties after a new supervisor was assigned. The employee alleged that the supervisor engaged in repeated, unwelcome comments about her appearance and closely monitored her, behavior corroborated by coworkers. After reporting the supervisor’s conduct to union representatives, who then informed higher management, the employee was subjected to increased scrutiny, including a performance improvement plan, a written warning, and public criticism of her work. The employee filed internal and external complaints alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Following these events, her health deteriorated, leading her to take medical leave and ultimately retire early.The Utah Labor Commission’s Antidiscrimination and Labor Division initially found no reasonable cause for her claims. On appeal, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing but was replaced by another ALJ, who dismissed her claims. The Labor Commission Appeals Board reviewed the case, reinstated her retaliation claim using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and remanded for a damages determination. The Board and ALJ denied her request for attorney fees, citing a Utah Supreme Court decision, Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, as precluding such awards. Both parties appealed aspects of the Board’s decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, which adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Burlington Northern standard for “adverse action” in retaliation claims, upheld the retaliation finding, and ruled that attorney fees could be awarded but not assessed for reasonableness.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case. It held that the Burlington Northern standard—defining adverse action as conduct likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge—applies to retaliation claims under the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. However, the court found the Board had not applied this standard or made sufficient factual findings, so it remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also clarified that the McDonnell Douglas framework is a procedural device, not a set of claim elements, and that the Labor Commission may award and assess the reasonableness of attorney fees. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Christensen v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

Alexander Zajac was employed by Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP from August 2016 to March 2020, first as a Student Associate and later as an Associate Attorney. His initial offer letter outlined salary, eligibility for bonuses, and tuition reimbursement conditions, but stated it was not a contract. Zajac alleged that, despite billing over 2200 hours in 2019, he did not receive a productivity bonus, and that his tuition reimbursement was not paid in full as promised. He claimed oral assurances were made regarding mandatory bonuses and post-tax tuition reimbursement, and that these benefits were standard practice at the firm.After unsuccessful administrative efforts, Zajac filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in March 2023, alleging wage theft under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (DCWPCL) for both the productivity bonus and tuition reimbursement. Finnegan moved to dismiss, arguing the payments were discretionary and not “wages” under the DCWPCL. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the bonus discretionary and the tuition reimbursement an expense, not a wage. The court allowed Zajac to seek leave to amend his complaint. Zajac filed a motion for leave to amend, asserting additional facts about oral promises and customary practices. The trial court denied leave, reasoning the amended complaint contradicted the original and did not cure its defects.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the original complaint, as Zajac conceded its vagueness. However, the appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend based solely on alleged contradictions, without considering all relevant factors. Applying de novo review, the appellate court found the amended complaint stated plausible claims of wage theft for both the productivity bonus and tuition reimbursement. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zajac v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP" on Justia Law

Eckington House Mental Health Services, LLC provides supportive living and personal care services for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities, employing a pool of Direct Support Professionals (DSPs). Regina Kennedy worked as a DSP for Eckington from August 2020 to May 2021. She filed a complaint with the Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) alleging that she worked more than forty hours per week from November 2020 through May 2021 but was not paid overtime wages.The Office of Wage-Hour issued a Revised Initial Determination finding that Eckington violated the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act (DCMWA) by failing to pay Kennedy overtime wages. OWH determined that Eckington owed Kennedy $3,011.75 in unpaid overtime wages and $9,035.25 in liquidated damages, and assessed a $22,850 penalty to be paid to the District. Eckington appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), where an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the findings regarding unpaid wages and damages but reversed the penalty assessment due to insufficient evidence supporting the penalty. Eckington then petitioned for review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the ALJ’s findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the ALJ properly applied the “economic reality” test to determine employee status under the DCMWA, considering factors such as control, opportunity for profit or loss, investment in equipment, skill required, duration of relationship, and the integral nature of the work. The court found substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Kennedy was an employee, not an independent contractor, and affirmed the award of unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages. The court also declined to consider Eckington’s argument regarding the professional services exemption, as it was not raised before OAH. The OAH’s order was affirmed. View "Eckington House Mental Health Services, LLC v. Office of Wage Hour" on Justia Law

Several employees of the City and County of San Francisco who joined the city’s retirement system at age 40 or older and later retired due to disability challenged the method used to calculate their disability retirement benefits. The city’s retirement system uses two formulas: Formula 1, which provides a higher benefit if certain thresholds are met, and Formula 2, which imputes service years until age 60 but caps the benefit at a percentage of final compensation. Plaintiffs argued that Formula 2 discriminates against employees who enter the system at age 40 or above, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).Initially, the San Francisco City and County Superior Court sustained the city’s demurrer, finding the plaintiffs had not timely filed an administrative charge. The California Court of Appeal reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. After class certification and cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found triable issues and held a bench trial. At trial, plaintiffs presented expert testimony based on hypothetical calculations, while the city’s expert criticized the lack of actual data analysis and highlighted factors such as breaks in service and purchased credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s post-trial decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove intentional age discrimination or disparate impact under FEHA. The court found substantial evidence that Formula 2 was motivated by pension status and credited years of service, not age. The plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient because it relied on hypotheticals rather than actual data showing a disproportionate adverse effect on the protected group. The appellate court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend the complaint, finding no reversible error. The judgment in favor of the city was affirmed. View "Carroll v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

Thomas Cole brought suit against his former employer, Foxmar, Inc., alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of the Vermont Occupational Safety and Health Act (VOSHA) and the Vermont Earned Sick Time Act (VESTA). At trial, a jury found in Cole’s favor on both claims, initially awarding him over $3 million in damages, including punitive damages. However, after the District Court determined the punitive damages were excessive and ordered a new trial on damages, the second jury awarded Cole $55,000 in compensatory damages and no punitive damages. Cole then sought attorney’s fees under the relevant Vermont statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found Cole entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees but imposed two across-the-board reductions: a twenty-five percent reduction for what it deemed excessive hours billed by Cole’s attorney, and a further thirty percent reduction based on the perceived disproportionality between the attorney’s fees requested and the damages ultimately awarded. This resulted in a total fee award significantly lower than Cole’s request. Cole appealed, arguing that both reductions were improper and that the overall award was unreasonably low.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the twenty-five percent reduction for excessive hours was within the District Court’s discretion and consistent with Vermont law. However, the court concluded that the thirty percent reduction based on proportionality between fees and damages was not permitted under Vermont law, which does not require fee awards to be proportional to damages in cases involving fee-shifting statutes like VOSHA and VESTA. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the District Court’s fee award and remanded the case for recalculation of a reasonable fee consistent with Vermont law. View "Cole v. Foxmar, Inc." on Justia Law

Orlando Rodriguez, while employed as a mechanic, suffered significant head and brain injuries in November 2016. His employer’s insurer, administered by Illinois Midwest Insurance Agency, accepted the injuries as work-related. Beginning in September 2018, Rodriguez’s treating physician repeatedly requested home health care services in six-week increments, which Illinois Midwest generally approved, sometimes after utilization review. In September 2019, a new request for home health care was denied by a utilization review physician, and the denial was communicated to all relevant parties.Rodriguez challenged the denial by seeking an expedited hearing before a workers’ compensation judge. The judge found Rodriguez was entitled to ongoing home health care, reasoning that Illinois Midwest could not terminate the treatment without substantive medical evidence of a change in condition. The judge concluded the utilization review decision was “moot” due to Rodriguez’s ongoing need and relied on Patterson v. The Oaks Farm (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 910. Illinois Midwest petitioned for reconsideration, but the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) affirmed the judge’s decision, again relying on Patterson and finding no evidence of changed circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, following legislative reforms in 2004 and 2013, disputes over medical necessity for requested treatments must be resolved through the statutory utilization review and independent medical review processes, not by the WCAB or courts, even for ongoing or continual treatment. The court rejected Patterson’s contrary rule for post-2013 injuries, finding no statutory exception for ongoing treatment. The court annulled the Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Illinois Midwest Insurance Agency, LLC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law