Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who had several drug-related convictions dating back more than a decade, applied for an office assistant position at a university. After a conditional job offer, the university initiated a background check, during which the plaintiff briefly worked part-time. The background check revealed the plaintiff's criminal history. The university sent a notice advising that his convictions might disqualify him, granting five business days to submit evidence of rehabilitation or challenge the findings. The plaintiff responded with hostile emails but did not provide evidence of rehabilitation. The university ultimately denied him the position, citing his failure to respond substantively and his unprofessional communications.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including discrimination under the Fair Chance Act (FCA), retaliation, and failure to prevent retaliation. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the university on the retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation claims, finding the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity and no causal nexus existed between his complaints and the adverse employment action. The court also found that while the university failed to provide the full five-day response period required by the FCA, the plaintiff had to prove this procedural error caused him harm. The issue of harm was tried before a jury, which found the university would have made the same decision even if the plaintiff had been given the full response period.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case for retaliation or failure to prevent retaliation, and that the university properly followed FCA procedures except for the response period, but the procedural violation did not cause harm. The Court clarified that courts are not to second-guess the employer’s individualized assessment under the FCA and that actual harm must be shown for recovery. View "McInerney v. Regents of the Univ. of California" on Justia Law

A group of former employees participated in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) established by a seafood company. In 2016, the plan used borrowed funds to purchase all outstanding shares from several company officers and directors. The employees alleged that the purchase price was grossly inflated due to false financial projections, resulting in significant financial harm to the plan and its participants. The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class, brought statutory claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), asserting breaches of fiduciary duty by the company’s officers, directors, trustee, and committee members.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent from Mason v. Continental Group, Inc. and its progeny, which required administrative exhaustion of statutory ERISA claims before filing suit. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request to stay the proceedings to pursue administrative remedies, reasoning that both it and the parties were bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s exhaustion requirement. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, citing the binding nature of Mason.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the case and overruled Mason and related decisions to the extent that they held ERISA itself requires exhaustion of statutory claims, including breach of fiduciary duty claims. The court determined that ERISA does not impose such an exhaustion requirement and found that the plan at issue did not mandate exhaustion either. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case to the panel for further proceedings. View "Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc." on Justia Law

A high school principal was terminated by his school district’s board after an internal investigation into allegations that he mistreated a female student over several years and attempted to dissuade staff from making a mandatory report of child abuse. The investigation included interviews with the student, a school counselor, the principal, and other witnesses. The board provided the principal with written notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond, after which it held a multi-day hearing where both sides presented evidence and witnesses. The board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the principal had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward the student and interfered with mandatory reporting obligations, and concluded that there was just and sufficient cause for termination.The principal appealed the dismissal to the Windham Southeast School District Board and, following the board’s decision, filed suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that the pre-termination and post-termination processes violated his constitutional rights, and asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The civil division dismissed some claims, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, and found that the board’s decision was supported by the record, that the principal was afforded adequate due process, and that no evidence supported claims of bias or other wrongdoing.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the civil division’s decision. The Court held that the principal received constitutionally adequate pre- and post-termination process, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery related to alleged bias, and that sufficient evidence supported the board’s findings and conclusion that just cause existed for dismissal. The Court also found that structural or actual bias claims were either unpreserved or unsupported. View "Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a store clerk and stocker at grocery stores operated by the defendant. She was scheduled for ten-hour opening shifts, four days a week, at an hourly wage. The employer required her and other similarly situated employees to report to work fifteen minutes before their listed start time. Frequently, when employees arrived at the prescribed time, the stores were locked and they had to wait outside until opening managers arrived to let them in. Managers often did not arrive until the scheduled start, preventing employees from clocking in and being paid for the waiting period, despite being required to be present. The plaintiff alleges that this unpaid waiting time occurred about once a week, sometimes resulting in overtime wages owed.The plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL), seeking to represent similarly situated employees. The defendant moved to dismiss, asserting that the Portal-to-Portal Act barred the claims because the waiting time was non-compensable as a preliminary activity. The district court agreed, holding that both the FLSA and NYLL claims were barred and dismissing them with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under Department of Labor regulations and Supreme Court precedents, waiting time is compensable under the FLSA when an employer requires an employee to report at a certain time and the employee is prevented from working for reasons beyond their control. The court concluded that the plaintiff stated a plausible claim for compensable waiting time and that the claim could not be dismissed as de minimis based on the pleadings. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Lidl" on Justia Law

Brian Blunt, a long-term employee of the Town of Gilbert, was promoted to Commander in 2021 and signed an at-will employment agreement as a condition of his promotion and pay raise. This agreement allowed either party to terminate the relationship at any time, with or without cause, and was consistent with the then-existing Peace Officers’ Bill of Rights (POBR), which permitted such contractual deviations. In 2023, following employee complaints and an external investigation, Blunt was terminated without a pre-termination hearing or appeal process. He requested these procedural protections but was denied.After his termination, Blunt brought an action in Arizona Superior Court seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Town to provide him procedural protections under POBR and due process. The Town removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion, holding that Blunt had no constitutionally protected employment interest because his contract was at-will and the 2022 amendment to POBR did not apply retroactively to his agreement. Blunt appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Arizona regarding the retroactive application of the 2022 POBR amendment.The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the presumption against retroactivity, codified in Arizona law, prohibits applying the 2022 amendment to at-will employment agreements executed before its effective date. The court found that the at-will employment term constituted a vested substantive right at the time of contract formation, and absent express legislative intent for retroactivity, the amendment cannot alter those pre-existing rights. The court answered only the first certified question, as its resolution was dispositive, and returned the matter to the Ninth Circuit. View "BLUNT v TOWN OF GILBERT" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously.After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law

A Black woman employed by Remington Ammunition in Arkansas alleged that she was subjected to race and gender discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. She claimed her white male coworkers sabotaged her workspace, destroyed a productivity tool she had created, and falsely reported her as absent. She attempted to complain to Human Resources by email but her email was not received. She later complained verbally to supervisors, who did not formally document her complaint. The supervisors investigated and found no evidence of discrimination. Reed subsequently received written reprimands for alleged workplace misconduct and, following an incident with a supervisor, was terminated.After her termination, Reed filed suit in July 2024 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Remington moved for summary judgment, arguing Reed could not establish a prima facie case for any of her claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Remington and dismissed all claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that Reed failed to establish an inference of discrimination, noting she did not show that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that the investigation into her complaints was biased. The court found that Reed could not demonstrate the legitimate reasons for her termination were pretextual. For her retaliation claim, the court concluded the six-month gap between protected activity and termination was insufficient to establish causation, especially given intervening disciplinary events. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court found Reed did not provide evidence of harassment severe or pervasive enough to alter her employment, nor did she link any mistreatment to her race or sex. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Remington. View "Reed v. The Kinetic Group" on Justia Law

A longtime high school teacher working for a public school district declined to comply with a COVID-19 vaccine mandate based on his sincerely held religious beliefs. After he requested a religious exemption, the district granted the exemption but placed him on an indefinite unpaid leave of absence, stating that no other accommodation would avoid an undue burden given his direct contact with students and staff. The district denied his requests for alternative accommodations, such as masking, weekly testing, or remote teaching, citing operational and safety concerns during the pandemic. The teacher remained on unpaid leave for approximately a year before finding employment at another school without a vaccine mandate. He later resigned from the original district.The teacher filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting three claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA): religious discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation. The district moved for summary judgment, arguing that placing the teacher on unpaid leave was a reasonable accommodation and did not constitute discrimination or retaliation. The court found that the district had met its burden to show that unpaid leave was the only reasonable accommodation available for unvaccinated teachers without causing undue hardship and granted summary judgment for the district on all claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that, under FEHA, unpaid leave can be a reasonable accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs if no other accommodation avoids undue hardship to the employer. The court found that the district had explored accommodations and reasonably determined that alternative measures would pose an undue burden. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the district. Costs were awarded to the district. View "Smith v. Burbank Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff was employed as a wealth advisor for a bank and alleged that a coworker, who was an investment strategist, sexually harassed and assaulted her during a business trip. The alleged harasser, though considered influential and holding a senior title, was not designated as a supervisor of the plaintiff and had no authority over her employment, such as hiring, firing, or evaluating performance. However, he did supervise support staff known as associates. After the incident, the plaintiff reported the alleged harassment and assault to the bank, her supervisor, and law enforcement. The bank conducted an internal investigation and concluded that her allegations regarding the sexual assault and harassment were unsubstantiated, but found that coworkers had used her phone without consent and violated other company policies.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the bank and several individuals, asserting a cause of action for sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The bank moved for summary judgment, arguing it could not be strictly liable because the alleged harasser was not the plaintiff’s supervisor and, alternatively, that it was not negligent because it had responded promptly and appropriately to her complaints. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank, finding strict liability did not apply and that the bank was not liable under the negligence standard.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The main holding was that, under FEHA, strict liability does not apply to an employer for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor who does not supervise the plaintiff, even if the alleged harasser supervises other employees. The court affirmed the judgment, declining to extend strict liability in such circumstances and also determined the plaintiff forfeited her negligence and ratification arguments on appeal. View "Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man was employed by a company and took parental leave in early 2023. Upon his return, he alleged that the company retaliated against him for taking leave, denied him a comparable position, interfered with his right to additional leave, and ultimately terminated him. He also claimed that a superior repeatedly questioned him about his remaining leave. In February 2024, he filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims related to parental leave rights, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, and unfair competition. Notably, he did not initially assert a claim for sex-based harassment, though he was aware of facts that could support such a claim.When the company moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement, the man opposed the motion, focusing solely on the validity of the arbitration agreement and not raising the possibility of a sexual harassment claim or the applicability of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The Superior Court compelled arbitration. Subsequently, the man added a sexual harassment claim in arbitration and then filed a second lawsuit in Superior Court, seeking to invalidate the arbitration agreement under the EFAA and consolidate the two suits.The Superior Court consolidated the actions, invalidated the arbitration agreement based on the EFAA, and denied the company’s renewed effort to compel arbitration. The company appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, held that the plaintiff waived the protections of the EFAA by knowingly withholding his sexual harassment claim and the EFAA argument during the initial litigation and opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. The court reversed the Superior Court’s orders, directed that arbitration be compelled, and awarded appellate costs to the company. View "Chin v. DoorDash, Inc." on Justia Law