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Hernandez filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in December 2016, reporting one sizable asset: a pending workers’ compensation claim valued at $31,000. To place that claim beyond the reach of creditors, she listed it as exempt under section 21 of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/21, applicable via 11 U.S.C. 522(b). Two days after filing for bankruptcy, Hernandez settled the claim. Hernandez owed significant sums to three healthcare providers who treated her work-related injuries. The providers objected to her claimed exemption, arguing that 2005 amendments to the Illinois Act enable unpaid healthcare providers to reach workers’ compensation awards and settlements. The bankruptcy court denied the exemption and the district judge affirmed. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Illinois Supreme Court the question: Whether the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, allows care-provider creditors to reach the proceeds of workers’ compensation claims. The court noted that Section 21 has been interpreted by bankruptcy courts to create an exemption for these assets; 2005 amendments imposed a new fee schedule and billing procedure for care providers seeking remuneration. The Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed the interplay between these competing components of state workers’ compensation law. View "Hernandez v. Marque Medicos Fullerton, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the University in an action brought by a sociology professor, alleging claims under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. The court held that, although plaintiff established a pay disparity between her and two former administrators, she failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that the administrators were appropriate comparators. The court also held that, in any event, the University based the administrators' higher pay on their prior service as University administrators, not their sex. View "Spencer v. Virginia State University" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Salvation Army, in an employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The panel held that the religious organization exemption (ROE) applied to the Salvation Army; the ROE reached claims for retaliation and hostile work environment; and the ROE barred plaintiff's claims because the ROE was nonjurisdictional and subject to procedural forfeiture, and may be first raised at summary judgment absent prejudice. Absent prejudice resulting from the failure to timely raise the defense, the panel held that the Salvation Army permissibly invoked the ROE at summary judgment and it foreclosed plaintiff's Title VII claims. The panel also held that plaintiff failed to make out a claim under the ADA because the Salvation Army was under no obligation to engage in an interactive process in the absence of a disability. In this case, after plaintiff's clearance for work, she failed to show that she was disabled. View "Garcia v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

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Employees at Seoul Garden, an Ann Arbor, Michigan restaurant, customarily work lunch and dinner shifts six days a week. Before August 2016, when the restaurant got a time clock, employees did not record their hours. The owners marked employees as present or absent for each shift without recording whether employees left early or stayed late. Employees work an average of 52 hours a week. The owners negotiate a “guaranteed wage” day rate with each employee, then derive an hourly rate (for 40 hours) and overtime rate. Although the rate is generous compared to minimum wage, some employees’ rates are too low to reach the guaranteed wage even working a full week, so the owners add a “bonus” to reach the agreed-upon weekly wage. In rare instances, employees exceed their guaranteed wage; the owners apply a “negative bonus” to reduce the pay to the guaranteed wage. The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division investigated and alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The district court held that the owners owe back pay of $112,212 to 28 employees and enjoined them from continuing violations, but excused them from paying liquidated damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the owners’ insufficient record-keeping but stating that they acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing they were in compliance with the Act. View "Acosta v. Min & Kim, Inc." on Justia Law

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Where a jury awarded plaintiff nominal compensatory damages and punitive damages for his claim of hostile work environment against his former employer, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's post-trial motions and grant of attorney's fees to plaintiff. The court held that the $250,000 award of punitive damages was supported by the record where plaintiff repeatedly complained to supervisors that his manager was using racial slurs and the company did not take action; plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim was timely under the applicable four year statue of limitations where the workplace abuse continued into the limitations period; the punitive damages amount was constitutionally sound in light of the degree of reprehensibility of defendant's misconduct; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and accepting the attorney's hourly rate as reasonable. View "Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs, who worked for Defendants’ company that grew, harvested, packages, and distributed bean sprouts, were entitled to overtime pay for the hours they worked over forty each week under the overtime statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A. The superior court judge concluded Plaintiffs were not entitled to overtime wages because the work they performed fell under the agricultural exemption to the overtime statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed after reading the plain language of the exemption in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A(19) narrowly in include only the work of planting, raising, and harvesting crops, holding that Plaintiffs were not “engaged in agriculture and farming” within the meaning of the agricultural exemption and thus were entitled to overtime pay as provided by the overtime statute. View "Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

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At the summary judgment stage, the district court found that an employee of Greenwald Neurosurgical, P.C. caused over $100,000 in losses to the P.C., while he was acting in the ordinary course of the P.C.’s business. The district court then issued a judgment to the P.C. for the policy amount of $100,000 pursuant to a Dishonesty Bond issued by Western Surety Company. Western appealed the district court’s determinations that the employee caused the loss while acting in the ordinary course of business and that the P.C. actually suffered the loss. The P.C. cross-appealed the district court’s findings that it was the only entity insured under the bond and argued it was awarded too little by way of attorney’s fees. The Idaho Supreme Court determined: (1) the district court correctly concluded that only the P.C. was an insured and the only entity that could recover under the bond; (2) whether the employee was acting the “ordinary course of [the P.C.’s] business” was a jury question; (3) a genuine issue of fact existed regarding the amount of losses the P.C. sustained; and (4) the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the P.C. The Supreme Court therefore vacated summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Greenwald v. Western Surety" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the jury verdict in favor of Charles Dawson as to his claim that the negligence of his employer, BNSF Railway Company, caused his back injuries, holding that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to whether Dawson’s claim was timely. In 1979, Dawson began his employment with BNSF as a switchman and brakeman and later worked as a conductor. In 2008, Dawson began experiencing back pain. In 2011, Dawson filed this action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) alleging that BNSF’s negligence led to his injuries. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dawson. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court erred when it denied BNSF’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because Dawson’s cumulative claim was time barred and that Dawson’s acute injury claims were time barred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err when it submitted the statute of limitations question to the jury. View "Dawson v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s suit against Nueces County, holding that governmental immunity barred the suit. Plaintiff served as an assistant district attorney in Neuces County for two years. After he was fired, Plaintiff sued the County, the district attorney’s office, and the then-district attorney (collectively, the County), alleging wrongful termination and seeking actual damages and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that governmental immunity barred Plaintiff’s claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985), nor the Michael Morton Act waived the County’s governmental immunity from Plaintiff’s claim. View "Hillman v. Nueces County, Texas" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action alleging that she had not been notified that her employment contract would not be renewed within the timeframe required by a collective bargaining agreement, holding that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff brought this action against the Board of the Nebraska State Colleges alleging that the Board had breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to timely notify her in writing of its intent not to renew her employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and dismissed this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that that Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against the Board was an action against the State, and Plaintiff failed to identify any statute that served to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. View "Burke v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges" on Justia Law