Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Several lieutenants and captains employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office alleged that Harris County violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to properly pay them overtime. These employees, who worked in either law enforcement or the county jail system, claimed that their primary duties were frontline law enforcement or correctional work. Harris County, however, argued that these plaintiffs were exempt from overtime under the FLSA’s administrative and executive exemptions, as their main responsibilities involved management and administrative oversight rather than frontline duties.The litigation began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in part for Harris County, finding that all captains and criminal justice lieutenants were administratively exempt, but concluded there were factual disputes regarding whether law enforcement patrol and investigative lieutenants were exempt. Those claims proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that the remaining lieutenants were also exempt as administrative and executive employees. The plaintiffs then moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, raising arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and an asserted inconsistency in the verdict. The magistrate judge denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. The court held that Harris County met its burden of proving that all plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis and that the criminal justice lieutenants qualified for the administrative exemption. The panel further found no error in the jury instructions or in allowing the jury to find both exemptions applied. The court also ruled that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial. Thus, the judgment in favor of Harris County was affirmed. View "Moreau v. Harris County" on Justia Law

Israel Bo Sword worked as a heavy equipment operator for VNS Federal Services, LLC at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio, where he and co-workers were represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18. VNS was bound by the General Presidents’ Project Maintenance Agreement (GPPMA) in its dealings with the Union. In February 2020, Sword complained to his supervisor that a side agreement guaranteeing another operator 40 hours per week violated the collective bargaining agreement, and he later sought assistance from his union representative to address his concerns. Shortly after the union meeting with management about Sword’s complaint, Sword was permanently laid off, while other operators returned to work.Sword filed unfair labor practice charges against VNS with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unlawful discharge in retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity. After a hearing, an administrative law judge found that VNS violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). VNS filed exceptions, but the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and issued an order requiring VNS to offer Sword reinstatement, provide backpay, and post remedial notices. The NLRB declined to resolve disputes over remedies at that stage, following its practice of deferring such issues to compliance proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s petition to enforce its order. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s determination that Sword engaged in protected concerted activity, that VNS discharged him because of animus toward that activity, and that VNS’s justification for the layoff was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order in full, declining to address challenges to the scope of remedies until compliance proceedings are completed. View "NLRB v. VNS Fed. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Dale Gourneau worked as a carman for BNSF Railway Company, inspecting railroad cars to ensure compliance with safety regulations. In January 2020, BNSF terminated Gourneau following a disciplinary proceeding. Gourneau subsequently filed a whistleblower complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor, alleging that BNSF unlawfully retaliated against him for reporting hazardous safety conditions in good faith.After administrative proceedings, an Administrative Law Judge found in favor of Gourneau, ordering reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. The Administrative Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and order. BNSF petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for review, arguing that the Department’s process violated the company’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined whether the administrative adjudication of Gourneau’s claims for legal remedies—liability, backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages—implicated the Seventh Amendment. The court determined that Gourneau’s claim was analogous to a common-law wrongful discharge action and sounded basically in tort, entitling BNSF to a jury trial. The court rejected arguments that the “public rights” exception allowed agency adjudication without a jury trial, finding that Gourneau’s claim was a standalone suit between private parties and not so integrated into a regulatory scheme as to justify agency resolution without a jury. The court concluded that Congress may not avoid a jury trial by assigning such disputes to an agency.The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the order of the Administrative Review Board, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, holding that BNSF is entitled to a jury trial on Gourneau’s claims for legal remedies before any equitable claims are adjudicated. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

An employee was injured while working for BAE Systems, Inc. on January 7, 2020 and was also employed concurrently by another employer. ESIS, Inc., the insurer for BAE, paid workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s combined weekly wages from both jobs, as required by statute. In 2020 and 2022, ESIS submitted memoranda of payment to the New Hampshire Department of Labor, which included handwritten notes referencing the combined wages.After more than 100 weeks had passed since the injury, ESIS applied for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries for the additional compensation paid due to the employee’s concurrent employment. The Fund coordinator denied the claim, stating ESIS had not provided proper notice of a possible claim against the Fund within 100 weeks of the injury, as required by RSA 281-A:55-a, II. ESIS requested a hearing at the New Hampshire Department of Labor, where the hearing officer upheld the denial, finding that the memoranda of payment did not constitute notice of a possible claim. ESIS appealed to the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB), which reversed the hearing officer, concluding that the memoranda gave sufficient notice.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the CAB’s decision under RSA 541:13, which grants deference to the CAB’s factual findings unless there is an error of law or the order is unjust or unreasonable. The court held that the memoranda of payment, even with handwritten notes about combined wages, did not provide the Commissioner with notice of a possible claim against the Fund as required by RSA 281-A:55-a, II. The court reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the insurer did not provide timely notice and is therefore not entitled to reimbursement from the Fund. View "Appeal of Comm'r of Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

An applicant for a public sector web developer position was initially offered employment by a state agency, Minnesota IT Services (MNIT), contingent upon a background check. The background investigation revealed the applicant’s 2017 conviction for possession of child pornography. In compliance with the Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act (CORA), MNIT determined the conviction directly related to the position and requested evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness from the applicant. The applicant submitted documentation, including an early discharge from probation, evidence of law-abiding behavior since release, a description of the offense’s circumstances, and several reference letters. Despite this, MNIT concluded the conviction disqualified the applicant from employment and imposed a ten-year bar on reapplying.The applicant challenged the disqualification through the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. After both parties sought summary disposition, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found the applicant had provided sufficient evidence of rehabilitation and recommended the disqualification be rescinded. The Commissioner of MNIT, however, rejected the ALJ’s legal conclusions and recommendation, and remanded the matter for a contested case hearing. Following a related Minnesota Supreme Court decision clarifying that agencies lacked authority to remand to ALJs under the relevant administrative statute, the ALJ determined he lacked jurisdiction to proceed. The Commissioner then issued a final order affirming the disqualification, allowing the applicant to reapply in 2027. The applicant appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which reversed the Commissioner’s decision, holding that MNIT lacked discretion to disqualify the applicant after competent evidence of rehabilitation was provided.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the ALJ’s recommendation was not the final decision, as the Commissioner timely rejected it within statutory limits. On the substantive question, the Court found that a public employer retains discretion under CORA to determine whether an applicant has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness after the applicant submits competent evidence. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "McNitt vs. Minnesota IT Services" on Justia Law

A group of employees at the Starbucks Reserve Roastery in New York City wore shirts displaying the name and logo of the Starbucks Workers United union during a national campaign to negotiate a first union contract. Following this, Starbucks asked the employees to change into attire compliant with the company’s dress code, which included policies limiting union-related and other insignia on clothing. Workers United responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Starbucks’ dress code policies violated employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act by restricting union expression.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) initiated administrative proceedings against Starbucks, focusing on three dress code policies: the One-Pin Policy (limiting employees to one union button), the Issue-Pin Policy (prohibiting buttons or pins advocating political, religious, or personal issues), and the Logo-Shirt Policy (restricting shirts with non-approved logos or writings). An Administrative Law Judge sided with Starbucks regarding the One-Pin Policy—relying on Second Circuit precedent from NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. (“Starbucks I”)—but found Starbucks violated the NLRA with its other policies, applying the Board’s more recent Tesla, Inc. standard. The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s One-Pin Policy finding and concluded all three dress code policies violated the NLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case, granting Starbucks’ petition for review and denying enforcement of the NLRB’s decision invalidating the dress code policies. The court held that the Board’s Tesla test failed to properly balance employer and employee interests, as required by Supreme Court precedent, and that the One-Pin Policy was not an unfair labor practice under binding circuit precedent. The case was remanded to the NLRB for further analysis of the Issue-Pin and Logo-Shirt rules under a more balanced legal standard. View "Siren Retail Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Two Black employees, Hall and Hughes, worked as laborer-operators for Coal Bed Services, Inc., a subsidiary of Pate Holdings, Inc. They complained to their supervisor about alleged racially discriminatory conduct by another supervisor. About a month later, Hall and Hughes were fired after refusing a drug test on a jobsite. A White coworker, Ramsey, also refused the same test and was initially terminated, but was later allowed to return to work under conditions not imposed on Hall and Hughes. The company paid Ramsey for a full shift but only paid Hall and Hughes for the hours worked. Subsequent hires for their positions were White employees, including one previously fired for failing a drug test. Hall and Hughes alleged these events were motivated by racial discrimination and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Coal Bed Services and Pate Holdings, on all claims. Hall and Hughes had brought four claims: two under Title VII (race discrimination and retaliation) against Coal Bed Services, and two under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (race discrimination and retaliation) against both companies. The district court found, among other things, that the White coworker was not a valid comparator under the McDonnell Douglas framework and concluded that Hall and Hughes could not establish causation for their retaliation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the companies discriminated and retaliated against Hall and Hughes. The court held that circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination and retaliation under both Title VII and § 1981. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guthrie v. Coal Bed Services Inc." on Justia Law

Three individuals employed as customer service agents for a ground services provider and an airline at Denver International Airport brought a class action lawsuit asserting violations of Colorado’s wage laws. Their complaint alleged that the employers improperly deducted time for lunch breaks not taken, forced work during rest breaks, failed to pay overtime, and withheld commissions. Each employee’s contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the employers sought to enforce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Colorado law. The employees responded that, as transportation workers, their contracts were exempt from the FAA, and further argued that Colorado law voided such arbitration agreements for wage claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motions to compel arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court focused narrowly on the specific duties of the three employees, rather than considering the work typically performed by the broader class of customer service agents. It found that the employees “actually and routinely” handled passenger luggage and played a “gatekeeping” role with respect to cargo. On this basis, the court concluded they were transportation workers exempt from the FAA. The district court did not address the request to compel arbitration under Colorado law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by defining the relevant class of workers too narrowly—focusing only on the specific employees, rather than the typical duties of the class as a whole, as required by Supreme Court precedent (including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings to properly determine the attributes of the class of workers under the correct legal standard. View "Joyner v. Frontier Airlines" on Justia Law

A woman employed as a Sales Administrator at a global hygiene company in North Carolina was terminated after refusing to comply with her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The company had instituted a policy requiring all U.S. office and sales employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualified for an exemption. The employee, citing her religious beliefs, requested a religious accommodation to abstain from vaccination, and communicated her objections to the company’s Human Resources department. Her request was denied, with the company characterizing her reasons as secular and stating that granting an exemption would pose an undue hardship. After she confirmed she would not comply, her employment was terminated.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for the employer on all claims. The court found that while the employee’s beliefs were sincere, they were not religious in nature, and did not “go to an essential part of a religious faith.” The court also found that the employee failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981, holding that there were no valid comparators to support her claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the employee’s refusal to be vaccinated was plausibly connected to her religious beliefs and constituted an essential part of her faith within her own scheme of things, thus satisfying Title VII’s requirement that beliefs be “religious in nature.” The court reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment on the religious discrimination claim for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the race discrimination claim, finding the employer’s stated reason for denial was not pretext for racial discrimination. View "Wilkins-Bailey v. Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman participated in an employee pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After being diagnosed with cancer and while hospitalized, she initiated an online election to receive her accrued pension benefits as a lump sum and designated her sister as the beneficiary. She died three days later, before completing a required second step of confirming her election and beneficiary designation, according to the plan’s administrative process. After her death, her sister submitted a claim seeking the lump sum benefit.The plan administrator denied the claim, reasoning that the decedent had not finalized her election and beneficiary designation, and that “substantial compliance” with the plan’s requirements was not sufficient under ERISA. On administrative appeal, the committee upheld the denial for the same reasons. The sister then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging entitlement to the benefits. The district court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege that she was entitled to the benefits, even under a substantial compliance theory.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, just as it is for beneficiary designations, consistent with its previous decision in Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The court clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not eliminate the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged substantial compliance with the plan’s requirements and reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding for further proceedings. View "LIU V. KAISER PERMANENTE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN FOR THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law