On September 26, 2014, plaintiff filed suit against the school district, alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims (Welsh I). On December 16, 2014, the school district filed a plea to the jurisdiction in Welsh I, wherein the school district maintained, inter alia, that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations because she filed her lawsuit more than two years after she filed her charge. The state district court granted the plea and dismissed the claims in Welsh I. On May 12, 2005, plaintiff filed this case against the school district (Welsh II), alleging claims for discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as well as retaliation claims. The Fifth Circuit held that the only claims in Welsh II that were barred under res judicata were those that were mature at the time that plaintiff filed her petition in Welsh I. The court vacated and remanded because the parties have not brief this issue under this framework and because at least some facts supporting plaintiff's alleged claims clearly were not extant at the time Welsh I was filed such that a claim could not have been mature based upon those facts. View "Welsh v. Fort Bend Independent School District" on Justia Law

In a challenge to a Workers' Compensation Appeals Board order, the Court of Appeal held that a writ petition was timely filed. The court also held that despite significant changes in the law governing workers' compensation in 2004, disability resulting from medical treatment for which the employer is responsible is not subject to apportionment. In this case, petitioner contended that because her permanent total disability was the result of a failed surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, a condition she contracted primarily due to the clerical work she performed for Costco for more than 25 years, apportionment was not appropriate. The court annuled the Board's order and remanded for an increase in petitioner's disability award. View "Hikida v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Between 2011 and 2013, a labor union held demonstrations at Walmart stores throughout Maryland, protesting Walmart’s employment conditions. Consequently, Walmart sued the union for trespass and nuisance and sought an injunction against the union. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Walmart and issued a permanent injunction against UFCW. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Walmart’s claims for trespass and nuisance were not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied the union’s motion to dismiss; and (2) the circuit court properly ruled that this case did not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of Maryland’s Anti-Injunction Act. View "United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

An employer's attorney can be held liable for retaliating against his client's employee because the employee sued his client for violations of workplace law. In this case, plaintiff may proceed with his retaliation action against the attorney under sections 215(a)(3) and 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3) and 216(b), because the complaint manifestly fell within the purview, purpose, and plain language of the FLSA. The court explained that the wage and hours provisions of the FLSA focus on de facto employers, but the anti-retaliation provision refers to "any person" who retaliates. View "Arias v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

Workers in Waupaca foundries alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, by not treating the time that workers spend changing clothes and showering on-site after a shift to be compensable “work” time. They alleged that they end their shifts covered in a layer of “foundry dust,” which can irritate the skin and cause lung disease if inhaled. FLSA authorizes collective actions by employees on behalf of “similarly situated” employees. Unlike class actions under FRCP 23, collective actions under FLSA require would-be members to opt in (voluntarily join). The district judge ruled that he would “conditionally certify” the class since the plaintiffs showed a “reasonable basis” for believing that all the class members were similarly situated. After discovery, the judge would determine whether plaintiffs who had opted in were actually similarly situated. After several hundred current and former employees from three states opted in, Waupaca moved to decertify the class. The plaintiffs, deciding to proceed with only Waupaca’s Wisconsin employees, moved to certify a Rule 23 class just for Wisconsin state-law claims, and did not oppose the decertification of Indiana and Tennessee employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Waupaca’s request to decertify the entire FSLA class; division of the FLSA class into three subclasses and their transfer to district courts in their respective states; and Rule 23 ceritfication of the Wisconsin claims. View "DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Toyota, for discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment for Toyota. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that a substantial motivating factor for his termination was invidious sex or gender stereotyping related to his sexual orientation (the perception that he was "too gay"). However, the court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact to support his FEHA retaliation and related common law tort claim. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to enter an order granting Toyota's alternative motion for summary adjudication as to these causes of action. View "Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp." on Justia Law

MHA filed suit against defendants, two former employees, based on the alleged breach of non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in its employment contracts, tortious interference, and theft of computer files. The Fifth Circuit vacated the award of exemplary damages to MHA because there was insufficient evidence to support the award; affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings; affirmed the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law where the jury's verdict was consistent; affirmed the district court's take-nothing judgment in favor of Defendant Bowden; affirmed the award of attorneys' fees; and affirmed the district court's denial of equitable remedies. View "Merritt Hawkins & Assocs. v. Gresham" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act against their employer, FTS, a cable-television business for which the plaintiffs work or worked as cable technicians. The district court certified the case as an FLSA collective action. FTS Technicians are paid pursuant to a piece-rate compensation plan; each assigned job is worth a set amount of pay, regardless of the amount of time it takes. FTS Technicians are paid by applying a .5 multiplier to their regular rate for overtime hours. They allege that FTS implemented a time-shaving policy that required its employees to systematically underreport overtime hours. A jury returned verdicts in favor of the class, which the district court upheld. The Sixth Circuit affirmed certification of the case as a collective action and a finding that sufficient evidence supports the verdicts, but reversed the calculation of damages. Following a remand by the Supreme Court, for further consideration in light of Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo (2016), the Sixth Circuit held that Tyson does not compel a different resolution; the court again affirmed certification of the case as a collective action and that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdicts, and again for recalculation of damages. View "Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the hospital's petition for review of the Board's determination that it violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interfering with nonemployee union representatives' use of its cafeteria; the Board's determination that it violated section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing its cafeteria access rules; and the Board's determination that the hospital violated section 8(a)(1) when it engaged in surveillance of two nonunion representatives. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that the hospital violated the Act when it prohibited an employee from wearing union insignia in the hospital's atrium on the day of picketing. Therefore, the court denied the hospital's petition for review as to this issue. However, the Board incorrectly determined that the hospital violated the Act by telling two nonemployees that they were prohibited from wearing union shirts in the facility. Accordingly, the court granted the cross application for enforcement in part and granted the petition for review in part. View "North Memorial Health Care v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, NCC, for breach of contract and alleging claims under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act. Applying Nebraska's two-part test to determine whether an agreement was voidable as a product of duress, the court held that there was, at least, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the threat of termination would support a claim of duress. Therefore, the court remanded for a determination of this factual issue. The court also held that, considering all relevant circumstances then existing and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Term Sheet was unjust and thus voidable as a product of duress given the alleged pressure brought to bear on him to sign the Mutual Rescission and Term Sheet. Therefore, the district court erred by granting summary judgment for NCC on the breach of contract claim. Likewise, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for NCC on the state law claim. View "Gilkerson v. Nebraska Colocation Centers" on Justia Law