Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the BPA, in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that BPA violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by willfully interfering with her rights under the Act. The district court found that plaintiff did not prove that BPA willfully interfered with her FMLA rights and, therefore, that her claims were barred by the relevant statute of limitations.The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in determining that, even if plaintiff had proven a violation of her FMLA rights, BPA's interference was not willful. In this case, the district court applied the McLaughlin standard for willfulness, and properly concluded that there is little evidence in the record that BPA either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute. The district court did not clearly err in finding that these facts did not constitute willfulness. Therefore, plaintiff's claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. 2617(c)(1), rather than the three-year statute of limitations under section 2617(c)(2). View "Olson v. United States" on Justia Law

Vargas began working as a mail carrier in 2005. Mail carriers must be able to carry up to 35 pounds in their shoulder bags. Vargas’s route also required shuttling mail and equipment weighing up to 75 pounds between the post office and a satellite location. Vargas sustained an on-the-job foot injury in 2008. He was diagnosed with plantar fasciitis, received treatment, submitted a successful workers’ compensation claim, and continued working. In 2011, Vargas filed an EEO complaint, raising miscellaneous workplace grievances and alleging race- and disability-related discrimination. He withdrew this complaint. Vargas’s plantar fasciitis subsequently flared up. His doctor placed him on work restrictions, March 1-22, prohibiting him from carrying more than 15 pounds. On March 14, Vargas returned to work from a vacation; he wanted his route restructured to eliminate carrying heavy loads. His superiors did not oblige and he applied for workers’ compensation. He also made daily requests for “light duty” but there was no light duty work available, so he took paid sick leave.Vargas, who is Hispanic, sued, alleging disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, with retaliation and racial discrimination claims under Title VII. Vargas still works for the Postal Service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claims. Vargas could not perform the only job available to him, with or without reasonable accommodation, and there is no evidence he was treated differently because of his race or suffered unlawful workplace retaliation. View "Vargas v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sarah Coughenour worked for defendant-appellant Del Taco, LLC, starting when she was 16 years old. When she was first employed by Del Taco, she signed a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate” (Agreement). After Coughenour reached the age of 18, she continued working for Del Taco for four months. Coughenour quit and filed a lawsuit against Del Taco for sexual harassment committed by one of their employees, wage and hour claims brought pursuant to the Labor Code, and other claims under the Fair Housing and Employment Housing Act. Del Taco moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the Motion, finding that Coughenour’s filing of the lawsuit was a disaffirmance of the Agreement within the meaning of Family Code section 6710, which allowed a person upon reaching majority age to disaffirm a contract entered into while a minor. Del Taco appealed the denial of its motion, arguing that by working for Del Taco for four months after she reached the age of majority, Coughenour ratified the Agreement, which estopped her power to disaffirm the Agreement. In the alternative, Del Taco argued that Coughenour did not disaffirm the Agreement within a “reasonable time” after reaching the age of 18 as required by Family Code section 6710. The Court of Appeal affirmed denial of Del Taco's motion: [t]he filing of the lawsuit was notice that [Coughenour] disaffirmed the Agreement." The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Coughenour disaffirmed the Agreement within a reasonable time. View "Coughenour v. Del Taco" on Justia Law

In this case, the real parties in interest and plaintiffs were former store managers for petitioner-defendant Big Lots Inc., who claimed they spent less than 50 percent of their worktime on managerial tasks and, as a result, should have been paid overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of a standard 40-hour week. Big Lots was an Ohio corporation. When this lawsuit was first filed, it retained a California law firm, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP (Haight Brown), as counsel of record. Big Lots later sought the superior court’s permission for attorneys from an Ohio law firm, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP (Vorys), to also represent it. The trial judge ultimately granted applications filed by three different attorneys in the Vorys firm. But after later being advised that these Ohio attorneys were attempting to represent various current and former Big Lots managers in depositions noticed by plaintiffs, the court revoked pro hac vice authorization for all three lawyers. Big Lots petitioned for a writ of mandamus to overturn that order. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that there was a between an attorney’s representation of the defendant corporation in a lawsuit and his or her representation of current or former employee witnesses. "Pro hac vice admission as to one client does not necessarily allow a lawyer to represent a different client even if substantive law does not otherwise prohibit it." The Court nonetheless concluded the total revocation of pro hac vice status for the Vorys attorneys was not supported by the record then before the trial court. The petition to vacated the revocation order was granted, but the matter was returned to the trial court for additional hearings/orders deemed necessary. View "Big Lots Stores v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation action, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Uninsured Employers' Fund's (UEF) motion for judgment, holding that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Tyson Farms, Inc. was Mauro Garcia's co-employer as a matter of law.Mauro Jimenez Garcia sustained an occupational disease of the lungs while working on a chicken farm. The chickens were raised for and owned by Tyson. The Uninsured Employers' Fund became involved in Garcia's workers' compensation claim, and Tyson was impleaded into the claim. The Commission issued an award of compensation, determination that Garcia was a covered employee that sustained an occupational disease arising of and in the course of his employment and that Tyson was Garcia's co-employer. On judicial review, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tyson, finding that Tyson was not Garcia's co-employer. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Tyson was not a co-employer of Garcia. View "Tyson Farms, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund" on Justia Law

Bob's Tire petitioned for review of the Board's order concluding that Bob's violated the National Labor Relations Act. Bob's argued, among other things, that subcontracted work was not bargaining unit work and that, even if it was, the unit employees are owed no remedy because the subcontracting did not cause the loss of any jobs or hours of employment. The Board and the union cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order.The DC Circuit denied the petition for review, agreeing with the Board that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting its findings that petitioner failed to bargain with the union before subcontracting bargaining unit work. The court also agreed that an employer's duty to bargain over subcontracting "is not limited to situations in which employees are laid off or replaced." The court expressed no view as to whether the employees affected by Bob's unfair labor practices are due any backpay. The court also rejected petitioner's "joint-employer" argument as specious, and found that it was without jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments regarding the performance-based bonus program where petitioner failed to present the issue before the Board. The court granted the cross-motion for enforcement of the Board's order. View "Bob's Tire Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Defendant, a governmental employer, and dismissed Plaintiff's age-discrimination claim for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act did not waive Defendant's sovereign immunity from this suit.Plaintiff sued for age discrimination. Defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to submit legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; and (2) because the legislature has not waived governmental immunity in the absence of such evidence, Plaintiff's age-discrimination claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center-El Paso v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment notwithstanding the verdict but reversed its remand in the interest of justice, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that the evidence did not show that Employer believed that its actions were substantially certain to injure Plaintiff and that remand was not appropriate.Plaintiff was injured in a workplace accident. Plaintiff received workers' compensation medical and disability benefits for his injuries. Plaintiff then sued Employer for negligence and gross negligence, arguing that the common-law exception to the rule that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for employees who sustain nonfatal work-related injuries requiring that the defendant have a specific intent to injure the plaintiff applied. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Employer. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed its remand in the interest of justice, holding that the evidence confirmed that the accident fell short of a "genuine intentional injury." View "Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) does not preempt application of California's ABC test, originally set forth in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, and eventually codified by Assembly Bill 2257 (AB 2257), to determine whether a federally licensed interstate motor carrier has correctly classified its truck drivers as independent contractors.The court held that defendants have not demonstrated, as they must under People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 785-87, that application of the ABC test prohibits motor carriers from using independent contractors or otherwise directly affects motor carriers' prices, routes, or services. Furthermore, nothing in Pac Anchor nor the FAAAA's legislative history suggests Congress intended to preempt a worker-classification test applicable to all employers in the state. The court granted a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its order granting in part defendants' motion in limine, and enter a new order denying that motion because the statutory amendments implemented by AB 2257 are not preempted by the FAAAA. View "People v. Superior Court (Cal Cartage Transportation Express, LLC)" on Justia Law

Chris Oden appealed a judgment entered against him in a collection action after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, through Workforce Safety and Insurance, (“WSI”). In May 2010, Oden was injured in Missouri while employed by Minot Builders Supply Associates as a truck driver. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oden’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, and did not err in granting summary judgment to WSI. View "WSI v. Oden" on Justia Law