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Frederick Theodore Rall III, a political cartoonist and blogger, filed suit against the Los Angeles Times after it published a "note to readers" and a later more detailed report questioning the accuracy of a blog post plaintiff wrote for The Times. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions to strike the complaint. The court held that The Times' articles were published in a public forum and concerned issues of public interest, and thus the written statements were protected free speech activity. Furthermore, the articles were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), because they were a fair and true report of an LAPD investigation that was central to the substance of the articles. Therefore, plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. In regard to plaintiff's wrongful termination claims, the court held that plaintiff's employment claims arose directly from The Times's protected First Amendment conduct: deciding not to publish plaintiff's work. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his employment claims. View "Rall v. Tribune 365 LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the Labor Commissioner properly determined that the “repair” portion of a maintenance contract is a public work project under Nev. Rev. Stat. 338.010(15), even if the contract is predominantly for maintenance, and is thus not exempt from prevailing wage requirements. This case involved a maintenance contract for an airport shuttle system. The Labor Commissioner determined in this case that because a portion of the work under the contract in this case was repair work, that work was a “public work” project under the statute and thus subject to prevailing wage requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Labor Commissioner properly determined that twenty percent of the work involved repair rather than maintenance and was thus subject to the prevailing wage, and no exceptions applied that would allow Appellant to forego paying prevailing wages on that portion of the contract. View "Bombardier Transportation (Holdings) USA, Inc. v. Nevada Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation awarding partial summary judgment in favor of Claimant for existing medical expenses she incurred after she suffered a workplace injury to her right foot that required surgery. This appeal concerned Claimant’s second motion for partial summary judgment to recover existing medical expenses after the Department first award partial summary judgment for Claimant’s incurred medical expenses. Employer and its insurer paid the outstanding medical expenses and then argued that a decision on the second motion was unnecessary because the issue was moot. The Department granted partial summary judgment in favor of Claimant. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment affirming the Department’s decision and remanded to the circuit court with instructions that the court order the Department to vacate its order and dismiss Claimant’s claim for medical expenses, holding that the claim for medical expenses set forth in Claimant’s motion for partial summary judgment became moot prior to the Department’s final order granting summary judgment and was moot when the circuit court reviewed it on appeal. View "Skjonsberg v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court finding that an arbitration agreement between the parties in this case was enforceable, granting AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc.’s (AT&T) motion to compel arbitration and dismissing Nereida Rivera-Colon’s (Rivera) suit, holding that Rivera manifested her intent to accept the agreement to arbitrate legal grievances as per Puerto Rico law. Rivera filed suit against AT&T, her former employer, alleging age discrimination and wrongful termination. AT&T entered a special appearance and moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. In response, Rivera argued that there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under Puerto Rico law, Rivera was bound by the arbitration agreement because she failed to opt out of the agreement. View "Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's award of summary judgment for Virtus, plaintiff's former employer, in an action seeking to collect on a state court judgment entered against defendants. The court held that plaintiff's claims were not precluded under Virginia's doctrine of res judicata, because he could not have brought those claims at the time of his earlier litigation. In this case, plaintiff could not have brought his fraudulent transfer claims in the arbitration proceedings, because it was only after the state court judgment was entered that plaintiff would have actual notice of any potential fraudulent transfer claims. Similarly, because plaintiff was required to obtain a judgment against Virtus before bringing his alter-ego claim, the claim had not accrued at the time of the arbitration proceedings. View "Bennett v. Garner" on Justia Law

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Petitions for review of compensation orders arising under the Defense Base Act should be filed in the circuit where the relevant district director is located. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Benefits Review Board's decision concluding that a linguist who supported the military in Iraq was entitled to workers' compensation under the Defense Base Act. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that claimant met both the medical and the economic aspect of disability as defined by the statute; the ALJ applied the correct legal standard when considering the evidence in this case; and the ALJ correctly concluded that claimant met his burden to show that he was disabled. View "Global Linguist Solutions, LLC v. Abdelmeged" on Justia Law

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Linda Grina appealed a district court judgment affirming the denial of her unemployment benefits. Grina started coaching at Bismarck Gymnastics Academy in 1992. In 2015 or 2016 she was appointed interim executive director/program director with retained coaching duties. When a new executive director was hired, Grina was instructed to assist the executive director in acclimating to the gym and working environment. In July 2017 the employer informed Grina she was placed on probation for failure to assist the new executive director as instructed. A week later Grina sent a letter to the gym's board of directors relinquishing the interim program director title and job duties and expressing her desire to stay employed as a coach. In August 2017 Grina met with the gym board of directors. The board informed Grina her duties as interim program director were not separable from her coaching duties, and if she chose to resign as interim program director she also would be resigning from coaching. Grina indicated she would not continue performing the duties of interim program director. The board then issued a termination letter. Grina filed for unemployment benefits through Job Service. Job Service granted Grina benefits in October 2017 after finding the employer did not show her termination was due to misconduct. The employer appealed and a Job Service appeals referee conducted a hearing in December 2017. The referee reversed the initial decision and found Grina voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Grina appealed the referee's decision to the Job Service North Dakota Bureau and sought to introduce new evidence, including emails and a text message referencing Grina being "let go" or "terminated." The Bureau added the documents to the claim file but did not consider the information in its decision affirming the referee's determination. Grina appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the Bureau's decision denying Grina unemployment benefits. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding under its standard of review, a reasoning mind could have determined Grina left her employment voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer. View "Grina v. Job Service" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint claiming that he was fired from his job in retaliation for accusing his employer of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and making false representations in customer contracts, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that he engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim. The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that Appellant did not allege sufficient facts to show he was engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of the retaliation provision of the FCA. The First Circuit affirmed as to the contractual language claim but vacated and remanded as to the AKS claim, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that the concerns he raised about certain payments could have led to an FCA action. View "Guilfoile v. Shields" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court finding the board of regents of Harris-Stowe State University liable on Dr. Shereen Kader’s claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), holding that the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial. The jury returned a verdict in Dr. Kader’s favor on her claims of national original discrimination and retaliation, awarding $750,000 in actual damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. On appeal, Harris-Stowe argued that the circuit court’s disjunctive jury instructions Nos. 8 and 9 misled and confused the jury, thereby resulting in prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they included at least one alternative that did not constitute actionable conduct under the MHRA. View "Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Is operating engineers' offsite "mobilization work"—including the transportation to and from a public works site of roadwork grinding equipment—performed "in the execution of [a] contract for public work," Cal. Lab. Code 1772, such that it entitles workers to "not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar character in the locality in which the public work is performed" pursuant to section 1771 of the California Labor Code? View "Pena Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co." on Justia Law