The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) did not err in ruling that an injury suffered by Plaintiff that arose while she worked as a Public Health Educator IV for the State Department of Health (DOH) resulted from an “accident occurring while in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place” and was therefore a covered injury under Haw. Rev. Stat. 88-336. Section 88-336 provides service-connected disability retirement benefits under the Employees’ Retirement System’s (ERS) Hybrid Plan to Class H public officers and employees, such as Petitioner. Petitioner submitted an application for service-connected disability retirement in connection with permanent incapacitating injuries she suffered to her elbow, arm, and hand. A hearing officer concluded that Petitioner’s excessive keyboarding over a period of time did not constitute an “accident” because it did not occur at a “specific time and place.” The ERS denied Petitioner’s application. The circuit court affirmed. The ICA vacated the circuit court’s decision and remanded to the circuit court with directions to vacate the ERS Board’s denial of disability retirement to Petitioner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner’s injury occurred “while in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place.” View "Pasco v. Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) declining to approve the agreement entered into Employer and Employee that Employer would make a lump sum payment to fully satisfy Employee’s award of permanent total disability benefits. Employee received a work-related injury and filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer. A final award granted Employee permanent total disability benefits to be paid weekly. The parties later agreed that Employee would make a lump sum benefit to fully satisfy the award. The Commission declined to approve the agreement, concluding that the Commission had no authority to approve the agreement either as a settlement under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.390 or as an application for a “commutation” under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.530. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not have the authority to consider or approve the agreement under section 287.390; and (2) the Commission properly refused to approve a commutation pursuant to the agreement. View "Dickemann v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s determination that because Robert Casey’s exposure to asbestos occurred while he was employed by Employer, its insurer (Insurer), was liable to Dolores Murphy, Casey’s widow, for benefits under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.200.4. Casey died from mesothelioma caused by repeated exposure to asbestos in the workplace. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Employer liable and awarded section 287.200.4’s enhanced mesothelioma benefits to Murphy and Casey’s eight children. The Commission largely affirmed, limiting recovery to Murphy and determining Murphy to be the sole proper claimant because the amended claim did not identify Casey’s child as dependents or claimants. The Supreme Court modified the Commission’s decision to include Casey’s children in the final award and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Insurer was liable for the enhanced mesothelioma benefits; (2) section 287.022 is constitutional as applied; and (3) because section 287.200.4 does not limit recovery to dependent children and because the children were properly listed on the amended claim, they should have been included in the final award. View "Accident Fund Insurance Co. v. Casey" on Justia Law

After defendant Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (Coastal Pacific) terminated plaintiff Terri Raines from her employment there, she sued Coastal Pacific for age and disability discrimination and other related claims. In addition, she sought recovery, both individually and in a representative capacity under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for Coastal Pacific’s failure to provide and maintain accurate wage statements as required by statute. Raines appealed after the trial court reversed its original ruling denying Coastal Pacific’s motion for summary adjudication and instead granted the motion as trial was about to begin. Raines contended triable issues of fact remained: (1) on her individual claim for statutory penalties; (2) whether she sustained an injury; and (3) whether Coastal Pacific’s failure to provide accurate wage statements was knowing and intentional. Raines also argued the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on her PAGA claim by improperly finding injury was required, and that the trial court erred in reversing its original order denying summary adjudication. The Court of Appeal found merit in only Raines' PAGA claim: a representative PAGA claim for civil penalties for a violation of Labor Code section 226(a) did not require proof of injury or a knowing and intentional violation. "This is true even though these two elements are required to be proven when bringing an individual claim for damages or statutory penalties under section 226(e). Because the trial court erroneously required proof of injury on the PAGA claim, the grant of summary adjudication was improper and we therefore reverse the judgment as to that claim." View "Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors" on Justia Law

In this workers’ compensation case, the Court of Appeals clarified an exception to the "going and coming rule" - the special mission or errand doctrine. Employee, who was employed by Montgomery County, was injured in a car accident while driving from her home to a mandatory work training on a Saturday, which was normally her day off. The Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded compensation, finding that Employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The County sought judicial review, arguing that the going and coming rule prohibited recovery because accidental injuries sustained while going to or coming from work do not ordinarily arise out of and in the course of employment, and none of the exceptions to the rule applied. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the County. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the going and coming rule, rather than the traveling employee doctrine, controlled Plaintiff’s case; but (2) the undisputed facts permitted a reasonable conclusion that the special mission exception to the going and coming rule applied in this case. View "Calvo v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Despite employment contracts providing for individualized arbitration to resolve employment disputes, employees sought to litigate Fair Labor Standards Act claims through collective actions. The Federal Arbitration Act generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements, but the employees argued that its “saving clause” removes that obligation if an arbitration agreement violates some other federal law and that the agreements violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board ruled that the NLRA effectively nullifies the Arbitration Act in such cases. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce the arbitration terms the parties select, 9 U.S.C. 2-4. The saving clause allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements only on grounds that exist for the revocation of any contract, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. The NLRA, which guarantees employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” 29 U.S.C. 157, does not mention class or collective actions nor indicate a clear and manifest wish to displace the Arbitration Act. The catchall term “other concerted activities” should be understood to protect the things employees do in exercising their right to free association in the workplace. The Board’s interpretation of the Arbitration Act, which it does not administer, is not entitled to Chevron deference. View "Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board, filed suit against DISH, seeking an injunction against unilateral changes to employee wages during collective bargaining. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of an injunction in part, holding that the district court did not err in recognizing the nearly 25 percent disparity between union wages and non-union wages; such a basis provided sufficient factual support to survive an abuse of discretion standard of review; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting relief under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act where exceptional circumstances were present. Finally, the court did not evaluate the district court's failure to issue a cease and desist order against other future unilateral changes by DISH. View "Kinard v. Dish Network Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court vacating an arbitration award that reinstated Michael Crenshaw to his position as a campus police officer for the Community College of Rhode Island. Crenshaw was allowed to continue in his employment for almost a year without completing the statutorily required police training academy or receiving a waiver from having to do so. When, eventually, Crenshaw’s application for a waiver was not approved, the college terminated his employment. CCRI Educational Support Professional Association/NEARI (the union) brought this grievance. The college denied the grievance, and arbitration ensued. The arbitrator ordered that Crenshaw be reinstated to his position and compensated for lost time. The superior court granted the college’s petition to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that it was irrational and manifestly disregarded a statutory requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by arbitrating a dispute that was nonarbitrable from the start because Crenshaw’s conditional offer of employment was conditioned on his satisfaction of the statutorily mandated academy requirement. View "Community College of Rhode Island v. CCRI Educational Support Professional Ass’n" on Justia Law

Indiana juvenile courts may establish juvenile facilities; the judge must appoint staff and determine budgets. The county must pay the facility's expenses from general funds. The Allen Superior Court established a juvenile center, where Harris began working in 1995. His offer of employment included the seal of the “Allen Superior Court,” and he signed the Court’s Employee Handbook, acknowledging an employment relationship with the Court. His job description bore the seal of the Board of Commissioners; his medical records authorization identified the Commissioners as his employer and the juvenile center as his department. Harris’s discipline was handled by the Court; his evaluations were titled “Allen County Employee Performance Appraisal.” Harris injured his back at work. County Attorney Murphy sent Harris a form listing “Allen County Government” as his employer so that he could collect workers’ compensation benefits. A doctor determined that Harris had reached maximum medical improvement and imposed work restrictions. Murphy stated that his restrictions prevented Harris from “perform[ing] the essential functions” of his position “with or without a reasonable accommodation.” Harris applied to several county jobs but did not obtain employment. Harris sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the County summary judgment, concluding that the Board was not Harris’s employer. Harris voluntarily dismissed the Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harris did not establish that the Board sufficiently controlled his employment, so a reasonable trier of fact could only conclude that the Board was not Harris’s employer. View "Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the Board's finding that it violated the unilateral change doctrine and the duty to provide relevant information during negotiations with its employees' bargaining representatives, SEIU, 121RN, and UHW. At issue in this appeal were the unfair labor practice charges filed by 121RN. The DC Circuit agreed with the Board that petitioner breached its duty to bargain when it unilaterally terminated employee anniversary step increases after the expiration of the parties' agreement. The court also held that the Board's conclusion that 121RN had no duty to provide any further explanation to justify the relevance of its employee health care program information requests was supported by substantial evidence. View "Prime Healthcare Services-Encino LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law