Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A substitute teacher in a large Maryland public school system challenged the school board’s policy requiring all staff, including substitutes, to affirm that they would refer to students by their preferred pronouns and not disclose a student’s gender identity to parents without the student’s consent. The teacher, citing her sincerely held religious beliefs, refused to sign the affirmation and requested a religious accommodation, which was ultimately denied. As a result, she was not permitted to substitute teach in the following school years.She brought claims in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the school board, asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act related to religious accommodation, and First Amendment violations of her rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. She sought damages, declaratory relief, and a preliminary injunction. The district court dismissed her First Amendment claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, finding the policy to be neutral and generally applicable, thus subject to rational basis review, and rationally related to legitimate government interests, including compliance with Title IX and student safety. The court concluded that the speech at issue was part of her official duties as a teacher and thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court denied a preliminary injunction, finding no likelihood of success on the merits for the constitutional claims and no irreparable harm for the Title VII claim, which was allowed to proceed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the First Amendment claims and denial of a preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit held that the policy was neutral and generally applicable, survived rational basis review, and the compelled speech fell within the teacher’s official duties. Therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief on her constitutional claims. View "Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools" on Justia Law

Rodney Phath applied for a truck driving position with Central Transport LLC. He had the necessary qualifications and disclosed during the hiring process that he had a fifteen-year-old armed robbery conviction, for which he had served six years in prison. Upon learning of this conviction, Central Transport immediately decided not to hire him. Phath then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Central Transport violated a Pennsylvania statute that restricts how employers may use criminal history information in employment decisions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Phath’s claim. The court reasoned that the Pennsylvania Criminal History Record Information Act did not apply in this instance because Central Transport had learned of Phath’s conviction directly from him, rather than from a state agency’s records.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the matter de novo. The Third Circuit held that the Act’s protections are triggered whenever an employer receives information that is part of an applicant’s criminal history record information file, regardless of the source of that information. The court concluded that nothing in the statute requires the information to come specifically from a state agency’s file. Thus, by learning of Phath’s conviction—even through his own disclosure—Central Transport was subject to the Act’s provisions, including restrictions on how it may use that information and requirements for notifying the applicant if rejected on that basis.As a result, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the Act applies even when an applicant self-discloses criminal history information. View "Phath v. Central Transport LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a Massachusetts public college, serving as director of facilities and public safety, objected to the college’s failure to report a student’s sexual assault allegations as required under federal law. The employee, who was responsible for campus security and compliance with the federal Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act), learned that various college officials had been informed of the student’s allegations over several years, but the incidents were not reported to the U.S. Department of Education as required. The employee raised these concerns with State auditors and the chair of the college’s board of trustees. Subsequently, the college conducted internal and external investigations, which confirmed failures to report the incidents. The employee was later terminated, with the college citing performance deficiencies, including failure to comply with reporting obligations.The employee filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, claiming wrongful termination in violation of the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act (MWA). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court judge ruled that the employee engaged in protected activity under the MWA by objecting to the college’s failure to report as required by the Clery Act, but left the question of whether the employee’s whistleblowing or his own purported misconduct caused his termination for the jury. After trial, the jury found in the employee’s favor, awarding damages.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether the summary judgment ruling on protected activity was correct. The court held that, as a matter of law, an employee objecting to undisputedly unlawful activity—here, the failure to report as required by the Clery Act—engaged in protected activity under the MWA, even if the employee was involved in the underlying wrongdoing. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding the trial judge properly submitted the causation question to the jury. View "Galvin v. Roxbury Community College" on Justia Law

A group of former and current employees of a staffing agency alleged that the company misclassified recruiters as exempt from state overtime laws and failed to provide required meal and rest breaks. After the employees filed a putative class action in state court, which the company removed to federal court, the parties engaged in over a year of discovery and completed class certification briefing. Shortly after class certification briefing closed, the company implemented a new, mandatory arbitration agreement for internal employees, including the putative class members. This agreement required class members to either quit their jobs or affirmatively opt out of arbitration if they wished to remain in the class, effectively reversing the typical opt-out structure of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted class certification and, after reviewing the company’s communications about the new arbitration agreement, found them misleading and potentially coercive. The court determined that the communications disparaged class actions, omitted key information, and confused recipients about their rights and deadlines, especially as the emails were sent during a holiday period. Consequently, when the company moved to compel arbitration against class members who had not opted out, the district court denied the motion, relying on its authority under FRCP 23(d) to ensure the fairness of class proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that district courts have broad authority under FRCP 23(d) to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements when a defendant’s conduct undermines the fairness of the class action process, especially where communications are misleading and subvert the opt-out mechanism. The court also held that the arbitration agreement’s delegation provision did not prevent the district court from ruling on enforceability in this context. View "AVERY V. TEKSYSTEMS, INC." on Justia Law

A former Boston police officer alleged that the Boston Police Department (BPD) retaliated against her after she reported a fellow officer for rape in 2009. Following her report, both she and the accused officer were placed on leave, and subsequent criminal and internal investigations found her allegations unsubstantiated. She later made additional complaints of misconduct by BPD officials, which were also found unsubstantiated. In response, BPD’s Internal Affairs Department sustained numerous disciplinary charges against her, and she resigned with these charges pending. After her resignation, she applied for various jobs, authorizing prospective employers to request her employment and disciplinary records from BPD. Additionally, BPD included her name and reason for departure in a list provided to the Washington Post in response to a public records request.The Massachusetts Superior Court dismissed her three successive lawsuits against BPD, primarily for procedural reasons, with the last dismissal in 2017 operating as an adjudication on the merits. In federal court, claims based on alleged retaliatory acts before February 2, 2017, were precluded due to the prior state court judgment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed her Title VII retaliation claims to proceed only as to BPD’s actions after that date, specifically regarding the release of her records to prospective employers and the Washington Post.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for BPD. The court held that no reasonable jury could find that retaliation was the but-for cause of BPD’s release of employment information, since Doe had authorized those disclosures and there was no evidence of deviation from standard procedure or retaliatory motive. The court also held that BPD’s response to the public records request was legally required and contained accurate information. View "Doe v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose after a public university system in California revised its student vaccination policy, reducing the number of mandatory immunizations required for incoming students as of fall 2023. The faculty union, representing teaching and academic staff, believed this policy change could negatively affect the health and safety of faculty members, especially those who are immunocompromised. Upon learning of the change shortly after its adoption, the union formally demanded bargaining over the policy’s effects. The university responded that the policy did not pertain to employment terms but was willing to meet and discuss the union’s concerns. The union declined this offer and instead filed an unfair practice charge, alleging the university failed to bargain in good faith.An administrative law judge for the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) heard the case and found that, while the vaccination policy itself was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, its foreseeable effects on faculty health required effects bargaining. The judge concluded the university violated its statutory duty by implementing the policy without bargaining and ordered remedies including rescinding the policy and compensating affected employees. The university contested these findings, asserting it neither implemented the policy before the charge was filed nor refused to bargain, and that accommodations for affected faculty were already available under disability laws.On review, PERB largely upheld the administrative law judge’s findings, holding the university had a duty to bargain over the effects of the policy and had begun implementing it without sufficient notice and opportunity for bargaining. However, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, found that while substantial evidence supported PERB’s conclusion that the policy had reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty health and thus required effects bargaining, there was no substantial evidence the university had implemented the policy or definitively refused to bargain prior to the union’s charge. Therefore, the court affirmed PERB’s ruling on the duty to bargain effects, but vacated the finding of a statutory violation and the associated remedies, remanding the matter for the parties to engage in effects bargaining. View "Trustees of the Cal. State Univ. v. Public Emp. Relations Bd." on Justia Law

A multiemployer pension plan regulated under ERISA and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) sought to recover withdrawal liability from Florida Glass of Tampa Bay and related entities after Florida Glass ceased performing covered work and entered bankruptcy. In 2016, the pension plan filed a contingent proof of claim in Florida Glass’s bankruptcy proceedings, but did not clearly determine or assert withdrawal liability at that time. Several years later, after confirming withdrawal had occurred, the plan issued a formal notice and demand for payment. The defendants did not timely seek arbitration under the statutory process, and, when sued to collect the withdrawal liability, argued that the plan’s earlier bankruptcy filing constituted both a statutory notice and demand and an acceleration of liability, thus triggering the statute of limitations before the suit was filed.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland rejected the defendants’ statute of limitations defense. The court held that the 2016 contingent proof of claim was neither a notice and demand nor an acceleration under the MPPAA, so the limitations period did not begin until the 2022 notice and demand letter. Alternatively, the court reasoned that even if the 2016 filing qualified as a notice and demand, the defendants had waived any related defenses by failing to timely arbitrate. The court granted summary judgment for the pension plan and awarded damages, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs, minus the bankruptcy distribution already received.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that a contingent proof of claim does not constitute a notice and demand, nor an acceleration, unless it clearly satisfies the statutory requirements. Since the 2016 filing was ambiguous and labeled contingent, it did not trigger the statute of limitations, rendering the suit timely. The court affirmed the judgment and associated relief for the pension plan. View "International Painters and Allied Trades Industry v. Florida Glass of Tampa Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

A probation officer with the Cook County Juvenile Probation Department alleged that her supervisors created a racially hostile work environment, culminating in her termination for performance issues and insubordination. She cited several workplace incidents, including the enforcement of a no-children-in-the-workplace policy, reprimands related to her work product and interactions with colleagues, and a 2016 meeting where the department director, while reading from a document, said the N-word in front of African American employees (an incident the plaintiff learned about secondhand). The plaintiff’s children occasionally waited in her office after school, and she was reminded of the policy prohibiting this practice. She also disagreed with supervisors over the content of reports submitted to the court, and she was ultimately terminated after an internal investigation found repeated insubordination and issues regarding her communications with clients and the court.The plaintiff first challenged her termination through union arbitration but lost. She then brought a lawsuit under Title VII in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that her employer subjected her to a race-based hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, concluding that the incidents cited, even when considered together, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive as required by Title VII, nor did the plaintiff demonstrate that the alleged harassment was based on race.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of harassment that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment, nor did she establish that the alleged conduct was based on race. The court also found no error in the exclusion of late-disclosed witness testimony. The judgment for the employer was affirmed. View "Jones v. Das" on Justia Law

A parent enrolled his teenage son, who had a history of serious behavioral and mental health issues, in a residential treatment center after other interventions failed. The family’s health insurer initially approved and paid for the first 21 days of residential treatment, then denied further coverage, asserting that the treatment was no longer medically necessary. The parent appealed this decision through the insurer’s internal process, submitting medical records and opinions from the child’s treating clinicians that supported the need for continued residential care. The insurer upheld its denial after cursory reviews that did not address the treating clinicians’ recommendations or key evidence of the child’s ongoing difficulties.The parent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, alleging that the insurer’s denial was arbitrary and capricious under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and violated the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer on both claims, finding that the decision to deny coverage was not arbitrary and capricious and that there was no evidence of a parity violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the insurer’s coverage decision was procedurally arbitrary and capricious, as it failed to consider the treating clinicians’ opinions, selectively reviewed the medical record, and did not adequately explain its change from initially approving coverage to denying it. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the ERISA claim and remanded with instructions to send the matter back to the insurer for a full and fair review. However, it affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Parity Act claim, holding that the parent failed to produce evidence showing that the insurer’s limitations on mental health treatment were more restrictive than those applied to medical or surgical benefits. View "T. E. v. Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law

A tenured teacher employed by a city was charged with a criminal offense, resulting in his placement on paid administrative leave. Over a year later, while the charge was still pending, the city changed the teacher's status to unpaid suspension. The teacher’s union filed a grievance contesting the unpaid suspension, leading to arbitration, where the arbitrator determined that the city had good and just cause for the suspension without pay. After the criminal charge was dismissed, the city reinstated the teacher. The union then filed a second grievance seeking back pay for the period of unpaid suspension, which both parties agreed to arbitrate.Following this, while the arbitration on the back-pay grievance was still pending, the teacher independently filed an action for declaratory relief in the Providence County Superior Court, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to back pay under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the teacher had already selected the grievance and arbitration process as his remedy. The trial justice granted the motion, citing the election of remedies doctrine and relying on precedent, specifically Martone v. Johnston School Committee, which precludes pursuing multiple remedies for the same dispute when a party has already elected a process under a collective bargaining agreement.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Court held that once a party elects to pursue a remedy through the grievance and arbitration procedures in a collective bargaining agreement, they are foreclosed from simultaneously or subsequently seeking judicial relief for the same dispute under the doctrine of election of remedies. The disposition by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was to affirm the lower court’s judgment. View "Peasley v. City of Providence" on Justia Law