Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Laurence Bonday, a former employee of Nalco Company LLC, filed an arbitration demand against Nalco, alleging that the company violated its severance plan by demoting him without offering severance pay. Nalco argued that a court needed to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement before proceeding. However, the arbitrator concluded that Bonday’s severance claim fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarded him nothing on that claim. Instead, the arbitrator awarded Bonday $129,465.50 on an ERISA discrimination claim that he never raised.Nalco moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by deciding the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on a claim Bonday never made. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Nalco's motion, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on an unraised ERISA discrimination claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by granting relief on an ERISA discrimination claim that Bonday did not submit for arbitration. The court emphasized that an arbitrator can only bind the parties on issues they have agreed to submit and that the arbitrator's decision to award relief on an unsubmitted claim was beyond her authority. The court did not address the district court's first reason for vacating the award, as the second reason was sufficient to affirm the decision. View "Nalco Company LLC v. Bonday" on Justia Law

In this case, Columbia Legal Services represented farmworkers in a class action against Stemilt AG Services, LLC, alleging forced labor and trafficking. During the litigation, the district court issued a protective order limiting Columbia's use of discovered information outside the case. The order required Columbia to seek court approval before using any discovery materials in other advocacy efforts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over the initial case. The court issued two protective orders during the discovery process. The first order protected sensitive employment data from the Washington State Employment Security Division. The second order, which is the subject of this appeal, restricted Columbia from using Stemilt's financial and employment records in other advocacy without prior court approval. The district court adopted this order to prevent Columbia from using discovered information outside the litigation, citing concerns about Columbia's intentions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Columbia had standing to appeal the protective order because it directly affected Columbia's ability to use discovered information in its advocacy work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a broad and undifferentiated protective order without finding "good cause" or identifying specific harm that would result from public disclosure. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's protective order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that discovery is presumptively public and that protective orders require a showing of specific prejudice or harm. View "COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES V. STEMILT AG SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Staci K. Shepherd, a Rhode Island State Police officer with a commendable 22-year career, suffered a heart attack during a firearms requalification program on May 2, 2017, which left her permanently disabled. She applied for a disability pension under Rhode Island law and the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Troopers Association. Superintendent Colonel James M. Manni denied her application, concluding that she failed to prove her heart attack was causally related to her employment. Shepherd then filed a declaratory-judgment complaint.The Superior Court found Superintendent Manni's decision arbitrary and capricious, declaring Shepherd entitled to a disability pension. The court criticized the superintendent's requirement for causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and his failure to consider the CBA's heart-attack presumption provision. The court granted Shepherd's motion for partial summary judgment, leading to the defendant's appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court noted that the superintendent applied an incorrect causation standard, requiring proof that the heart attack was caused by employment, rather than whether employment conditions contributed to the injury. The court emphasized that under the correct standard, it is sufficient if employment conditions contributed to the injury. Given the undisputed facts, including the stress and physical demands of Shepherd's job, the court concluded that her employment contributed to her heart attack. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, declaring Shepherd entitled to a disability pension. View "Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Drivers Management and Werner Enterprises on behalf of Victor Robinson, a deaf individual, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The jury found in favor of the EEOC, awarding Robinson compensatory and punitive damages. The district court awarded Robinson backpay, reduced the damages to comply with the statutory cap, ordered injunctive relief, and granted prejudgment interest. Werner appealed, challenging multiple aspects of the proceedings.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted a directed verdict on causation, dismissed Werner’s affirmative defenses of direct threat and undue hardship, and made several evidentiary rulings against Werner. The jury found that Werner failed to hire and accommodate Robinson in violation of the ADA. The district court reduced the punitive damages award to the statutory maximum and awarded backpay and prejudgment interest. Werner’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that there was direct evidence of discrimination, justifying the directed verdict on causation. The court found that Werner failed to provide sufficient evidence for its undue hardship and direct threat defenses. The evidentiary rulings were deemed appropriate, as the comments and policies of other companies were relevant to the case. The court also upheld the jury’s finding that Robinson was qualified for the position and that Werner acted with malice or reckless indifference, justifying the punitive damages award. The court affirmed the district court’s equitable awards of injunctive relief and prejudgment interest, finding no abuse of discretion. View "EEOC v. Drivers Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Pilot applied for a promotion with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Kansas City, Missouri. After another candidate was selected, Pilot sued the Secretary of Transportation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging race, sex, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for a previous employment discrimination complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. The court found that Pilot did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination and retaliation. Pilot then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which is used for claims lacking direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation. The court found that while Pilot made a prima facie case for her claims, the Secretary provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision: the FAA hired the highest-ranked candidate based on a standardized hiring process. The court concluded that Pilot failed to show that the Secretary's reason was pretextual. The court noted that the hiring process used a mix of objective and subjective criteria, and the top-ranked candidate was selected based on a standardized rubric. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary, finding no evidence of pretext or discrimination. View "Pilot v. Duffy" on Justia Law

In several Minnesota cities, only members of a pre-approved union can work on municipal construction jobs. Multiple contractors, a carpenter, and a union objected to this requirement, alleging it violated the First Amendment. The contractors, Kaski, Inc.; Nordic Group, Inc.; and Roen Salvage Co., claimed they missed out on lucrative work due to these project-labor agreements. Luke Krhin, a carpenter, and the Christian Labor Association, which has a local chapter in Minnesota, also joined the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court found that the contractors, Krhin, and the Christian Labor Association could not succeed on their First Amendment claim. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on the issue of standing, a jurisdictional requirement. The court found that the contractors did not have standing because the relevant constitutional claims belonged to their employees, not to them. The court also found that Krhin, who opposed joining a pre-approved union, was exempt from the requirement as a supervisor, thus lacking standing. The Christian Labor Association also lacked standing because it failed to identify any members who would have standing to sue in their own right.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss based on a lack of standing. View "Christian Labor Association v. City of Duluth" on Justia Law

Wilfred Ramos, Jr. was employed by Steak N Shake as a grill operator. After sustaining a back injury in a car accident, Ramos alleged that Steak N Shake reduced his work hours and eventually terminated him in retaliation for his disability and requests for accommodations. Ramos filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, marking "Retaliation" and "Disability" and citing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991. The charge was dual-filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations but did not specifically reference the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Steak N Shake, concluding that Ramos failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FCRA because he did not specifically allege FCRA claims in his charge of discrimination. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that Ramos was not required to specifically allege FCRA claims in his charge of discrimination to exhaust administrative remedies. The Second District certified conflict with the Fourth District's decision in Belony v. North Broward Hospital District, which held that merely asserting a violation of federal law in a dual-filed charge was insufficient to satisfy the FCRA's requirements.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that a claimant does not need to specifically allege they are seeking relief under the FCRA to exhaust administrative remedies when dual-filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The Court approved the Second District's decision and disapproved the Fourth District's decision in Belony to the extent it held otherwise. View "Steak N Shake, Inc. v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Aaron Pulsifer was terminated from his position as Dean of Students and Assistant Principal at Westshore Christian Academy. He subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Academy, alleging various state and federal employment discrimination claims based on race and sex. Pulsifer claimed that his termination was retaliatory, following his complaints about unequal treatment and concerns regarding the school's main funder. The Academy argued that Pulsifer's role involved significant religious functions, invoking the ministerial exception to preclude judicial review of his claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the Academy. The court held that Pulsifer's position involved important religious duties, thus falling under the ministerial exception, which prevents courts from intervening in employment disputes involving key religious employees. Pulsifer appealed the decision, arguing both procedural and substantive errors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court had properly converted the Academy's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and provided Pulsifer with a reasonable opportunity to respond. On the substantive issue, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court, holding that Pulsifer's role at the Academy included vital religious duties such as leading devotions, conducting prayers, and guiding students' spiritual development. These responsibilities placed him within the ministerial exception, precluding judicial review of his employment discrimination claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, emphasizing that the ministerial exception applies to employees who perform essential religious functions, regardless of their involvement in secular administrative tasks. View "Pulsifer v. Westshore Christian Academy" on Justia Law

Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller Anderson, former Amazon warehouse employees, alleged that Amazon violated federal and Illinois wage laws by not compensating them for time spent in mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 screenings. These screenings, which included temperature checks and symptom questions, took 10-15 minutes on average and were required before employees could clock in for their shifts. Johnson and Miller Anderson argued that this time should be compensable as it was necessary for their work and primarily benefited Amazon by ensuring a safe workplace during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). The court found that the FLSA claims were barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), which excludes certain pre-shift activities from compensable time. The district court also concluded that the IMWL claims failed because it assumed the IMWL incorporated the PPA’s exclusions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclusions for compensable time. The court noted the lack of Illinois state court decisions directly addressing this issue and found the arguments from both parties plausible. To resolve this important and unsettled question of state law, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking a definitive answer on whether the IMWL includes the PPA’s limitations on pre-shift compensation. The court stayed further proceedings pending the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. View "Johnson v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

James Reilly, a deputy in the Will County Sheriff's Office, alleged that his employer and Sheriff Michael Kelley retaliated against him for criticizing Kelley during a 2018 election campaign by not promoting him to sergeant. Reilly filed his complaint over two years after his eligibility for promotion expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was untimely. The district court agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Reilly then requested the district court to set aside its judgment and allow him to amend his complaint, but the court denied this request, applying a heightened standard and requiring extraordinary circumstances for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had mistakenly applied a heightened standard to Reilly's Rule 59(e) motion instead of the liberal standard for amending pleadings. The appellate court concluded that Reilly's proposed amended complaint stated a plausible claim for relief and that he had not pled himself out of court based on the statute of limitations. The court noted that Reilly's claim could not be conclusively determined as time-barred at this stage and that the defendants could raise the statute of limitations defense later in the case on a more complete factual record.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Reilly to proceed with his amended complaint. View "Reilly v Will County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law