Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Alfreida Hogan, an African-American woman, was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a nurse practitioner from July 2012 until March 2019, when she was demoted to staff nurse and subsequently resigned. She alleged that her immediate supervisor harassed her and gave her false, negative performance reviews due to her race, leading to her demotion. In April 2019, Hogan contacted her agency counselor, claiming racial discrimination. On July 3, 2019, the counselor informed her that informal resolution efforts had ended and that she could file a formal administrative complaint. Hogan's counsel claimed to have emailed the complaint on July 19, 2019, but the VA never received it. Hogan's counsel did not follow up until April 2020, when he learned the VA had not received the complaint. The VA dismissed the complaint due to the missed 15-day filing deadline.The district court dismissed Hogan's Title VII claims for race discrimination and retaliation, citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Crawford v. Babbitt, which held that failure to exhaust administrative remedies was a jurisdictional bar. The district court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to Hogan's untimely filing of her administrative complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the 15-day deadline to file a formal administrative complaint, set by EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b), is a claims-processing rule subject to equitable tolling, not a jurisdictional requirement. The court noted that Crawford did not control this case because it involved a different issue. The court also referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Bend County v. Davis, which held that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional. Despite this, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that Hogan did not demonstrate due diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the 15-day deadline. View "Hogan v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a notice enforcing the mandate. Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges and awarded her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by giving her insufficient time to respond. The court awarded her back pay.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Bedard argued that her termination was improper because it was based on her refusal to sign an allegedly illegal contract, was too harsh a penalty, and violated her due process rights under Skelly v. State Personnel Board. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate justified her termination. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Bedard’s termination was not solely based on her refusal to sign the notice but also on her refusal to comply with the vaccination requirement. The court also held that the appropriate remedy for the due process violation was back pay, not reinstatement. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A group of current and former employees of Professional Transportation, Inc. filed a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 2014, alleging overtime and minimum-wage violations. The district court conditionally certified the collective action, and approximately 3,500 workers opted in. However, the court later decertified the collective action, deeming it overbroad, and the suit was abandoned without an appeal. Subsequently, a second collective action was filed in a different district court on behalf of over 1,400 workers, including a new claim regarding the company's commute-time adjustment formula. This case was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana, which conditionally certified a collective action on the commute-time claim but later decertified it due to the formula's inconsistent application across locations.The Southern District of Indiana severed the claims, leaving Joseph Miller as the sole plaintiff, and determined that the statute of limitations barred Miller's claim. The plaintiffs' lawyers filed a notice of appeal. However, the main issue on appeal was the lack of an appellant, as the named plaintiffs did not file written consents to join the suit as required by 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The court found that the consents from the earlier suit could not be recycled for the new case, and the forms authorizing counsel to represent the plaintiffs were not sufficient consents to join the lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs' lawyers prosecuted the appeal on behalf of individuals who were not parties to the case. The court emphasized that without proper written consents, the named plaintiffs were not parties and could not appeal. The court also noted that the district court's ruling on the statute of limitations for Miller's claim was not adequately contested on appeal. View "Ghafoor v. Professional Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In March 2020, Eva Osborne sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wage violations. Osborne, who worked as Slap’s executive assistant, claimed Slap required her to perform personal tasks without proper compensation. In response, Slap filed a cross-complaint against Osborne in August 2022, alleging libel, slander, and other claims based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that Osborne’s statements were protected activity made in anticipation of litigation and were privileged under Civil Code section 47. The court found that Slap could not show his claims had minimal merit because the statements were privileged and he failed to demonstrate malice.The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Osborne’s statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims. The court found that Osborne’s HR letter was sent in good faith contemplation of litigation, supported by her retention of counsel and subsequent legal actions. The court did not need to address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding conditional privilege and malice, as the litigation privilege alone was sufficient to affirm the trial court’s ruling. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

Appellant Yvonne Gant sued The Lynne Experience LTD (TLE) and Giant Foods, LLC (Giant) for negligence after allegedly being struck and injured by a golf cart operated by a TLE employee. Gant claimed that TLE and Giant failed to properly train and supervise their employees, leading to her injuries. TLE moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the District of Columbia’s Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) provided Gant’s exclusive remedy, thus removing the court’s jurisdiction over the matter. The Superior Court agreed, dismissing Gant’s claims against TLE with prejudice, and later granted summary judgment in favor of Giant, finding no employer-employee relationship that could support Gant’s negligence claim.The Superior Court determined that the WCA provided Gant’s exclusive remedy and that the District of Columbia Department of Employee Services (DOES) had primary jurisdiction over her claims. The court dismissed Gant’s claims against TLE with prejudice, reasoning that any claim under the WCA would be time-barred. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment for Giant, based on undisputed evidence that Giant was merely a sponsor of the event and had no role in managing or supervising the staff involved.On appeal, Gant argued that TLE failed to secure payment of compensation as required by the WCA and that she should be allowed to maintain her civil action. Alternatively, she requested a stay to present her claim to DOES. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the WCA appeared to provide Gant’s exclusive remedy but held that the Superior Court should have dismissed her claim without prejudice. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Giant, noting that Gant failed to present any arguments against it on appeal.The main holding by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was that the Superior Court should have dismissed Gant’s claim against TLE without prejudice, allowing her the opportunity to pursue her claim with DOES. The court affirmed the summary judgment for Giant, as there was no evidence to support an employer-employee relationship necessary for Gant’s negligence claim. View "Gant v. The Lynne Experience, LTD" on Justia Law

Eric and Todd Romano, trustees of the Romano Law, PL 401(k) Plan, filed a class action against John Hancock Life Insurance Company. They claimed that John Hancock breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not passing through the value of foreign tax credits received from mutual funds to the defined-contribution plans. The Romanos argued that John Hancock should have used these credits to reduce the administrative fees charged to the plans.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of John Hancock, concluding that John Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary regarding the foreign tax credits and did not breach any fiduciary duties. The court also ruled that the Romanos and the class lacked Article III standing because they failed to establish loss causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that John Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary concerning the foreign tax credits because these credits were not plan assets. The court explained that the foreign tax credits were a result of John Hancock's ownership of mutual fund shares and were not held in trust for the benefit of the plans. Additionally, the court found that John Hancock did not have discretionary authority over the management or administration of the separate accounts that would make it a fiduciary under ERISA. Consequently, the Romanos' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and engaging in prohibited transactions failed as a matter of law. View "Romano v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company (USA)" on Justia Law

Professional Labor Group, LLC (PLG) is an Indiana-based staffing firm that employs skilled tradesmen and assigns them to remote job sites for temporary work. PLG provides per diems and mileage reimbursements but does not compensate employees for travel time to and from these assignments during normal working hours. James Walters, a former PLG employee, filed a lawsuit claiming that this travel time should be compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied PLG's motion for summary judgment and granted Walters' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The district court concluded that federal law requires PLG to treat employee travel to overnight work assignments as compensable worktime when it occurs during normal work hours. The parties then stipulated to damages, and PLG reserved the right to appeal the summary judgment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that PLG violated the FLSA by not compensating employees for travel time to overnight assignments during normal working hours. The court clarified that 29 C.F.R. § 785.39 requires compensation for overnight travel that cuts across an employee's workday, including travel during normal working hours on nonworking days. The court rejected PLG's arguments that the travel was normal commuting and that the Portal-to-Portal Act applied, emphasizing that the regulation's substitution language is a rationale, not a prerequisite for compensation. View "Walters v. Professional Labor Group, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioners sought to disqualify a trial court judge based on alleged bias and prejudice. The key facts revolve around a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit initiated by the real parties in interest against the petitioners, their employer. During the litigation, the trial judge made comments suggesting the petitioners were attempting to evade liability through corporate restructuring. These comments were cited by the petitioners as evidence of bias.The Fresno County Superior Court judge struck the petitioners' statement of disqualification as untimely. The petitioners then sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) precluded the application of the timeliness requirement in section 170.3(c)(1) when a party alleges judicial bias or prejudice. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the nonwaiver provision should be interpreted to prohibit all forms of waiver, including implied waiver due to untimeliness.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeal's interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) applies only to judicial self-disqualification and does not affect the timeliness requirement for party-initiated disqualification attempts under section 170.3(c)(1). The Court emphasized that the statutory text, structure, legislative history, and case law support this interpretation. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment and remanded the case for the lower court to determine whether the petitioners' statement of disqualification was filed in a timely manner. View "North Am. Title Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Several contractors and an employee, who regularly handle public works projects for PennDOT and SEPTA, challenged Philadelphia's requirement for project labor agreements (PLAs) on public projects. These PLAs mandated union recognition and membership, and set workforce diversity goals. The plaintiffs argued that these requirements violated their First Amendment rights and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They were ineligible to bid on certain city projects due to their existing collective bargaining agreements with the United Steelworkers, which is not affiliated with the required unions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to Philadelphia. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the union-eligibility requirement and failed to show that the diversity requirement caused them harm based on race. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' § 1981 claim failed because race was not a but-for cause of their inability to work on city projects with PLAs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the union-eligibility requirement under the First Amendment. The court determined that the plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury by being ineligible to bid on city projects due to the PLAs. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims were not moot despite Philadelphia's subsequent changes to the PLAs, as the plaintiffs sought damages for past violations and prospective relief.The Third Circuit also found that the plaintiffs had standing to raise an Equal Protection claim, as they demonstrated an intent to bid on future projects covered by the PLAs. The court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the merits of the plaintiffs' First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and § 1981 claims. View "Road-Con Inc v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Jason Lee, an American citizen of Chinese ancestry, was employed by the FBI and held a Top Secret security clearance. After failing three polygraph examinations, the FBI revoked his security clearance and subsequently terminated his employment, as his job required such clearance. Lee contended that the revocation was based on race, national origin, and protected speech, and he brought claims under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and Title VII.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Lee's claims. It held that his Title VII claims were not timely exhausted, that Title VII preempted his Fifth Amendment claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that Lee lacked a cause of action to press constitutional claims for damages against individual DOJ officials. The court also denied Lee's motion for leave to amend his complaint to include additional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), barred judicial review of Lee's statutory and constitutional claims. The court reasoned that the decision to grant or revoke a security clearance is a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch. The court also found that Lee's constitutional claims were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as they involved national security matters committed to the political branches and lacked judicially manageable standards for resolution. View "Lee v. Garland" on Justia Law