Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Three former employees of the Kentucky State Police alleged that their employer retaliated against them after they reported concerns regarding evidence irregularities and thefts at their post. Specifically, they claimed that they raised issues related to a fellow officer’s misuse of evidence and the improper handling of destruction forms, and further alleged that management covered up the misconduct instead of investigating it. The plaintiffs asserted that, as a result of these disclosures, they faced adverse actions such as threats of transfer, an internal affairs investigation initiated against one of them, and a constructive discharge.The Franklin Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them a total of $900,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied the employer’s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court had issued erroneous jury instructions regarding the elements of a claim under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs sought discretionary review of this decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether the employer had preserved its challenge to the jury instructions and whether the instructions were erroneous. The court concluded that the employer properly preserved its objection by tendering alternative instructions and that the final instructions failed to require the jury to find that the employer took a “materially adverse” employment action—a necessary element under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that, in whistleblower retaliation cases, the jury must be instructed to determine whether the employer took or threatened to take a materially adverse employment action, and remanded the case for new trial consistent with this standard. View "SGT. KEVIN BURTON V. KENTUCKY STATE POLICE" on Justia Law

An employee who had been working remotely due to a pandemic-related order was instructed by her employer to return to the office and begin a new hybrid work schedule. On the day she was to return, she packed her work equipment, which she had been using at home, and attempted to load it into her car earlier than her usual departure time so she could set up her workstation before her normal shift began. During this process, she fell and injured her back. She reported the injury, received medical care, and subsequently sought workers’ compensation benefits for her injury.A workers’ compensation judge initially heard her claim and determined that her injury was not compensable. The judge reasoned that the injury occurred during her commute and did not fall under the special-errand exception, relying on precedent from the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) in a prior case. The judge found that transporting the equipment was a routine part of her return-to-work commute and thus not a special errand.The employee appealed to the WCCA, which reversed the compensation judge’s decision. The WCCA found that, unlike the prior case, her employer had implicitly required her to return the work equipment before her shift began, and there was no evidence of backup equipment at the office. This, the WCCA determined, qualified her trip as a special errand.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case and affirmed the WCCA’s decision. The court held that the WCCA did not err in making a factual finding that the employer’s directive included an implied request to return equipment before her shift, nor was this finding manifestly contrary to the evidence. The court also held that, as a matter of law, the employee’s injury was compensable under the special-errand exception to the general rule barring compensation for injuries sustained during a commute. View "Ludwig vs. Dakota County, Self-Insured by SFM Risk Solutions" on Justia Law

Two former pilots for a major airline, who also served as reservists in the United States Air Force, brought suit against their employer. They claimed that the airline forced them out of their jobs because of their military service obligations, and that the company’s handling of their pension contributions and vacation accrual during military leave violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The pilots had been investigated by the airline for abusing military and sick leave policies, including instances where they claimed sick leave from the airline but performed military duties on those days, and for reporting false military obligations to avoid work.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the airline on all claims. The court found that, while the pilots established a prima facie case that their military service was a motivating factor in their resignations, the airline demonstrated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions: the pilots’ abuse of sick-leave benefits. Regarding the pension-contribution claim, the district court determined that the pilots’ rates of compensation were not reasonably certain and that the airline’s method of calculating pension contributions during military leave exceeded statutory requirements. For the vacation-time claim, the court held there was no evidence showing that pilots on comparable non-military leave accrued vacation time, as required by USERRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all counts. The appellate court held that the airline’s actions were justified by the pilots’ misuse of sick leave, the pension calculations met or exceeded legal obligations, and the vacation accrual policy did not violate USERRA because no comparable leave existed. View "McLean v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Keisha Lewis worked for the Indiana Department of Transportation, handling federal relocation claim vouchers for those displaced by highway projects. After receiving a remote-work accommodation due to a kidney condition, Lewis began experiencing conflicts with her supervisors over her work responsibilities, performance, and compliance with job duties. Issues escalated when she refused to process certain vouchers and failed to comply with supervisor instructions, resulting in a backlog of over 400 parcels. Despite being warned that failure to perform her job duties would be considered insubordination, Lewis continued to dispute her work obligations and was eventually terminated for poor performance and insubordination.After her dismissal, Lewis filed suit against the Department and two supervisors, asserting claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, as well as race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Some claims were voluntarily dismissed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining claims, concluding that no reasonable jury could find in Lewis’s favor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The appellate court held that the Rehabilitation Act requires plaintiffs to show that disability was the sole cause of an adverse employment action, a standard Lewis did not meet. The court further found no evidence of pretext or retaliatory intent in her termination, and that her race discrimination and retaliation claims failed due to lack of supporting evidence and waiver of arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. View "Lewis v Indiana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

After Puerto Rico was struck by Hurricane Maria, a nonprofit organization based in Oklahoma, known as "The Facilitators: Iron Horse, Inc." (TFCI), received federal funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide post-disaster services. The plaintiffs in this case were hired by TFCI to perform this work. When TFCI’s federal funding was exhausted, it sought additional funds from FEMA, but that request was denied. Despite this, the plaintiffs continued working without full pay for several weeks before being terminated by TFCI.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking backpay from FEMA and TFCI, claiming they were entitled to wages as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). FEMA removed the case to federal court. The plaintiffs amended their complaint multiple times to clarify their FLSA claims and add additional plaintiffs. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for FEMA, finding the plaintiffs were not FEMA employees under the FLSA, and entered summary judgment for TFCI as well. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Commonwealth-law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court found that the uncontroverted facts established that TFCI, not FEMA, had the authority to hire, fire, supervise work, set pay, and maintain employment records for the plaintiffs. Arguments by the plaintiffs that FEMA exercised sufficient control were unsupported by the record. The First Circuit held that FEMA was not the plaintiffs’ employer under the FLSA and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. View "Perez v. FEMA" on Justia Law

An employee began working at a skilled nursing facility, which was later acquired by a new employer. As part of the onboarding process, the employer required the employee to sign three related agreements to arbitrate most employment disputes, except certain representative actions under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). After ending his employment, the employee filed a class action lawsuit for various wage-and-hour violations, including a PAGA claim. The agreements also contained class action waivers and a confidentiality agreement.The employer moved to compel arbitration of the employee’s individual claims, including his individual PAGA claim, and to enforce the class action waiver. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion, ruling that conflicting and ambiguous terms among the three arbitration agreements and other documents meant there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. The court also ruled, in the alternative, that the agreement was unconscionable due to both procedural and substantive defects, including an unenforceable waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action and certain provisions in the confidentiality agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the order denying arbitration. The court held that the agreements, although containing some ambiguities and minor inconsistencies, reflected a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment-related disputes. The court found the agreements were not so uncertain as to be unenforceable, and any conflicting provisions could be severed. The court further determined that, while the agreements reflected some procedural unconscionability as contracts of adhesion, they did not contain substantively unconscionable terms. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that arbitration be compelled. View "Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center" on Justia Law

A group of trustees managing an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), some issued as notes under indenture agreements and others as trust certificates. The trustees alleged that companies servicing the underlying mortgages mismanaged the loans, acted in self-interest, and failed to protect investors’ interests, in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The investments included three classes of notes and three classes of trust certificates, each backed by pools of residential mortgages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the underlying mortgages constituted plan assets under ERISA. The district court ruled that only the RMBSs themselves, not the mortgages behind them, were plan assets as defined by the Department of Labor’s regulation. Consequently, it granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding that the servicers did not owe ERISA fiduciary duties regarding the mortgages, and denied the trustees’ cross-motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the notes issued under indenture agreements were not equity interests and did not confer plan asset status on the underlying mortgages. However, it found that the trust certificates were beneficial interests in the trusts and thus qualified as equity interests under the Department of Labor’s regulation. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part (regarding the notes), vacated in part (regarding the trust certificates), and remanded for further proceedings, including determination of whether the servicers acted as fiduciaries with respect to the trust certificates. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

A former emergency medical technician employed by a private ambulance company brought a class action alleging that his employer systematically miscalculated the “regular rate of pay” by excluding certain nondiscretionary bonuses from that calculation. This exclusion, he contended, resulted in the underpayment of overtime, double time, and meal and rest period premiums for himself and approximately 135 current and former employees during the alleged class period. The company paid ten types of bonuses, and the plaintiff received one of these—a bonus awarded during National Emergency Medical Services Week—on a single occasion.The plaintiff filed his class action in the Superior Court of Tulare County, seeking class certification for wage and hour violations, including claims for unpaid overtime, inaccurate wage statements, waiting time penalties, and other Labor Code violations. The employer opposed class certification, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was not typical of the proposed class because he received only one type of bonus and that each type of bonus involved unique circumstances and potential defenses. The trial court denied class certification solely on the ground that the plaintiff did not establish typicality, reasoning he would be subject to unique defenses regarding the inclusion of his bonus in the regular rate of pay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the purported defenses related to the nature of the bonus (as a gift or discretionary payment) were not unique to the plaintiff, since other employees received the same type of bonus under similar circumstances. Therefore, the trial court committed legal error in its analysis of typicality. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the class certification motion, not inconsistent with the appellate opinion. View "Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar" on Justia Law

After his employment as a wet plant foreman was terminated in January 2022, the plaintiff sent a certified letter in April 2022 to his former employer, requesting a service letter as required by Missouri law. He did not receive a response. The plaintiff later filed suit against the company, alleging a violation of section 290.140 for failure to provide the service letter. He also initially included a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but that claim was dismissed in federal court, and the remaining statutory claim was remanded to state court.The Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County granted summary judgment to the defendant company. The defendant had argued that the plaintiff’s service letter request and lawsuit were directed at the wrong corporate entity, asserting that another related company had actually employed the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to properly respond to the summary judgment motion as required by Rule 74.04(c)(2), instead making bulk admissions and denials without specific references to the record. Because of this failure, the court deemed the defendant’s factual statements admitted and found no genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that summary judgment is not an “extreme or drastic remedy” and reaffirmed the requirements for summary judgment motions and responses under Missouri law. The Court concluded that, because the plaintiff did not properly preserve or raise any arguments demonstrating error by the circuit court, and failed to comply with procedural rules, there was no basis to overturn the grant of summary judgment. The judgment of the circuit court in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Wilkinson vs. Farmers Holding Companies" on Justia Law

Two builders’ associations, whose members are largely non-union construction contractors, challenged a federal procurement mandate issued by executive order in February 2022. The order, issued by the President, presumptively requires all contractors and subcontractors on federal construction projects valued at $35 million or more to enter into project labor agreements with unions. The order allows for three specific exceptions if a senior agency official provides a written explanation. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council issued regulations implementing the order, and the Office of Management and Budget provided guidance. The associations argued that the mandate unfairly deprived their members of contracting opportunities and brought a facial challenge under several statutory and constitutional grounds, seeking to enjoin the mandate’s enforcement.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the associations’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that the associations were likely to succeed on their claim under the Competition in Contracting Act, since the government was not meaningfully applying the order’s exceptions, but concluded that the associations would not suffer irreparable harm because they could challenge individual procurements in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The district court did not consider irreparable harm as to the associations’ other claims.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, although for different reasons. The Eleventh Circuit held that the associations were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their facial challenge under the Competition in Contracting Act, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. The court emphasized that the existence of written exceptions in the executive order precluded a facial invalidity finding, and that the government acted within its statutory and proprietary authority. The court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Associated Builders and Contractors Florida First Coast Chapter v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law