Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose after the County of Los Angeles decided to outsource security work previously performed by members of the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA). PPOA is the exclusive bargaining representative for certain county security officers under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the County. When PPOA learned of the County’s plan to contract out these services to a private company, it requested to meet and confer over the decision. The County refused, arguing that PPOA had waived its right to bargain over such decisions through provisions in the MOU, particularly a management rights clause and language addressing the transfer of functions to other entities.PPOA filed an unfair practice charge with the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM), alleging the County failed to meet and confer as required by statute. An ERCOM hearing officer found that while the County ordinarily would have a duty to bargain over outsourcing, the MOU’s language constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver of PPOA’s bargaining rights. ERCOM adopted this finding. PPOA then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to compel the County to meet and confer. The superior court agreed with the County, ruling that the MOU’s reference to “reorganization” included outsourcing and thus waived PPOA’s right to bargain over the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MOU did not clearly and unmistakably waive PPOA’s right to meet and confer over the County’s decision to transfer work to a private contractor. The court ordered the superior court to issue a writ of mandate requiring the County to meet and confer with PPOA regarding its outsourcing decision. View "L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

A visually impaired scientist was hired as a one-year fellow at the U.S. Department of State through a program administered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, with the possibility of a second year if all parties agreed. The State Department provided her with several accommodations, including screen-reading software and noise-cancelling headphones. She experienced difficulties with the software and office environment, and alleged negative treatment by her supervisor. After initially being offered a renewal of her fellowship, negotiations regarding the renewal paperwork stalled, and the offer was rescinded. She filed a formal complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation based on her disability. Later, she was not selected to lead a project portfolio, a position for which she did not self-nominate. She continued to request accommodations, which were addressed with varying speed and effectiveness.After the end of her fellowship, the plaintiff sued the State Department in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the State Department, finding that the agency had provided reasonable accommodations, had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, and had not retaliated against her.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the State Department did not deny the plaintiff reasonable accommodations, did not discriminate against her on the basis of disability, and did not retaliate against her for requesting accommodations or filing complaints. The court found that the agency participated in good faith in the interactive process, provided reasonable accommodations, and had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for its employment decisions. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State Department. View "Qashu v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer who had a long career with the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) was terminated after an off-duty incident at his daughter’s high school. During this incident, the officer, who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), confronted school counselors and school police in a threatening manner, displayed his badge and handcuffs, and threatened to arrest the officers attempting to respond to his daughter’s mental health crisis. Criminal charges were considered but ultimately dropped. DPS investigated and determined that the officer’s PTSD impaired his ability to reasonably perform his job, and terminated his employment.The officer then brought suit against DPS, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The trial court denied DPS’s motions for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s denial with respect to the officer’s disability discrimination claim related to his PTSD, but dismissed his other claims for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas granted review. It held that Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code prohibits disability discrimination only as to physical or mental conditions that do not impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform a job. The Court determined that the officer’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to serve as a DPS officer, based on the statutory standard and evidence in the record. Therefore, the statutory prohibition against discrimination did not apply, and the officer’s claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and rendered judgment dismissing the officer’s claims against DPS. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. CALLAWAY" on Justia Law

A union member employed by a county juvenile justice agency was terminated after it was discovered that he had failed to disclose instances of prior disciplinary actions related to his behavior with residents at a previous job in another county. During a background check required by the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), the county learned that the employee had misrepresented the circumstances of his departure from his earlier position, specifically omitting that he resigned while under investigation for inappropriate conduct. Based on PREA regulations, which mandate termination for material omissions regarding such misconduct, the county dismissed the employee.Following his termination, the union initiated a grievance on his behalf under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the county, which allows for arbitration of certain employment disputes. When the county denied the grievance, the union sought arbitration. The county then moved in the Eighth Judicial District Court to stay arbitration, arguing that terminations pursuant to PREA regulations were not subject to arbitration under the CBA. The district court agreed, determining that the arbitration clause was narrow and applied only to disciplinary actions defined as “corrective actions” intended to help an employee overcome deficiencies related to behavior or performance, not to terminations required by federal regulation.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the matter and affirmed the district court’s order granting the motion to stay arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause in the CBA was narrow and could not be interpreted to cover the termination at issue, as the action was implemented pursuant to federal regulation, not as a corrective measure for employee improvement. The Supreme Court of Nevada did not address the merits of the termination, only its arbitrability under the CBA. View "JUVENILE JUSTICE PROB. OFFICERS ASSOC. VS. CLARK CNTY." on Justia Law

Jason Schmit, a truck driver for Trimac Transportation, Inc., was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2018. Following his diagnosis, Trimac provided informal accommodations, allowing Schmit to perform tasks that avoided climbing, pulling hoses, or making certain connections, and adjusting his work schedule to end earlier in the day. In 2021, after a new terminal manager was hired, Schmit was asked to formalize his accommodation requests, which Trimac largely approved. However, Schmit encountered difficulties, including changes in internal shop procedures that affected his ability to perform required tasks, disputes about hauling heavy loads, and disciplinary actions for job violations. Schmit complained to Human Resources about alleged harassment and difficulties related to his disability, but Trimac concluded its policies were being properly enforced. In August 2021, following a dispute, Schmit left work and Trimac treated his departure as a resignation. Schmit later applied for and received Social Security disability benefits, representing that his condition made it impossible for him to work.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Schmit’s state law claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to Trimac on the remaining claims. The district court found genuine disputes existed regarding whether Schmit resigned or was fired and whether there was discriminatory intent, but determined that Schmit’s statements to the Social Security Administration prevented him from showing that he was a “qualified individual” under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that Schmit failed to adequately explain the contradiction between his representations to the Social Security Administration and his litigation position, barring his ADA claim. The court also concluded that Schmit failed to establish a hostile work environment, retaliation, or wrongful termination under South Dakota law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Schmit v. Trimac Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Raunona Mays, an African American woman employed as a Sergeant with the Arkansas Highway Police, applied for four promotions between 2022 and 2023 but was denied each time. She alleges that less qualified Caucasian males or individuals with less experience and education received the positions. After filing an internal grievance regarding one promotion and receiving no relief, Mays filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint alleging race and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation. The EEOC dismissed her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter, after which Mays brought suit seeking damages, a promotion, and injunctive relief.The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied the Arkansas Highway Police’s motion to dismiss, which was based on sovereign immunity. The agency argued that it could not be sued under the United States Constitution and federal statutes, as well as the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, because it is protected by sovereign immunity. The circuit court rejected this argument, allowing all claims to proceed.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal and held that Mays’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act could not proceed against the state agency because the agency is not considered a “person” under these statutes and is protected by sovereign immunity. The court reversed and remanded those claims for dismissal. However, the court determined that claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not barred by sovereign immunity when brought against a state agency, and that Mays had pleaded sufficient facts to state a Title VII claim. The decision of the Pulaski County Circuit Court was affirmed as to the Title VII claim but reversed and remanded for dismissal of the other claims. View "ARKANSAS HIGHWAY POLICE v. MAYS" on Justia Law

A construction company operating in Michigan employed operating engineers represented by a union. Since at least 1993, collective bargaining occurred through a multiemployer association. In early 2018, with the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement approaching, the union gave notice that it wished to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining in order to negotiate individual contracts with employers, including the company at issue. Tensions rose when the company unilaterally stopped making benefit contributions, gave wage increases, and later sought to recover those payments directly from employees, all without bargaining with the union. The employer also participated in a lockout after the union refused to bargain on a multiemployer basis. Subsequently, the union organized a strike, citing the employer’s alleged unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the union’s withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining was timely and lawful, and that the company committed several unfair labor practices, including the lockout and unilateral changes to wages and benefits. The judge concluded, however, that the strike was economic in nature rather than an unfair labor practice strike. On appeal, the NLRB affirmed most of the administrative law judge’s findings but reversed on the nature of the strike, determining it was motivated at least in part by the company’s unfair labor practices. The NLRB issued an order requiring the company to bargain in good faith and temporarily prohibiting decertification attempts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the union’s withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining was timely under Supreme Court and Board precedent, that the company committed unfair labor practices by insisting on multiemployer bargaining, making unilateral wage and benefit changes, and implementing a lockout, and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the 2019 strike was partly an unfair labor practice strike. The court denied the company’s petition for review and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A man designated his sister as the beneficiary of his employer-issued life insurance policies, amounting to $150,000, with instructions that she distribute the proceeds to his three daughters. The man, suffering from declining health, relied on his sister to manage his finances, legal affairs, and healthcare decisions, creating a fiduciary relationship. After his death, the sister claimed the insurance proceeds for herself, contrary to the instructions. The daughters sought a constructive trust over the proceeds, claiming the sister was to hold the funds in trust for them, while the sister denied any fiduciary breach and asserted entitlement under the policy.The Allen Superior Court, after a bench trial, found no undue influence or fraud in the beneficiary designation but concluded that the sister breached her fiduciary duty by failing to distribute the proceeds as instructed. The court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the daughters, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased intended for them to receive the insurance money. The sister appealed, arguing that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted such state-law remedies and that the evidence did not meet the required standard. The Indiana Court of Appeals twice reversed the trial court, holding that ERISA preempted the remedy, but the Indiana Supreme Court remanded for application of the correct standard of proof without reaching the preemption issue.The Indiana Supreme Court, upon further review, held that the sister waived her ERISA preemption argument by not raising it in the trial court. The court affirmed the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust, concluding that the findings of a fiduciary relationship and breach of duty were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the daughters. View "Geels v. Flottemesch" on Justia Law

A Tennessee-based commercial bakery, which provides a self-funded health benefits plan governed by ERISA for its employees, structured its prescription drug benefits through a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) and created an in-house pharmacy offering lower copays to employees. Tennessee enacted laws targeting PBMs, requiring pharmacy network access for any willing provider and prohibiting cost-sharing incentives to steer participants to certain pharmacies, including those owned by the plan sponsor. The bakery and its PBM excluded a pharmacy from their network after an audit, and after the pharmacy filed administrative complaints under the new Tennessee law, the bakery sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, claiming ERISA preempted these PBM-focused state laws.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found that the bakery, as plan fiduciary, had standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. The court concluded that the Tennessee PBM laws were preempted by ERISA because they required specific plan structures, governed central aspects of plan administration, and interfered with uniform national plan administration. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bakery, permanently enjoining the Tennessee Commissioner from enforcing the PBM laws against the bakery’s health plan or its PBM.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court’s analysis, holding that the challenged Tennessee PBM statutes have an impermissible connection with ERISA plans and are therefore preempted. The court found that the laws mandated network structure and cost-sharing provisions, interfering directly with ERISA plan administration. The Sixth Circuit also held that the ERISA saving clause did not preserve these laws from preemption due to the deemer clause’s application to self-funded plans. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McKee Foods Corp. v. BFP Inc." on Justia Law

The case centers on Kenny Faulk, a Black man, who was conditionally offered a sales position by Dimerco Express USA, a transportation company. The offer was rescinded after the company’s president learned of Faulk’s race, despite Faulk successfully passing a background check that revealed only a prior misdemeanor conviction. Internal communications and testimony showed that Dimerco’s leadership, particularly its president, maintained a policy of hiring only white individuals for sales positions and had rejected non-white applicants for this reason. Faulk later learned that a white applicant with a more significant criminal history was hired for a similar position, and after discovering the discriminatory policy, he filed suit against Dimerco for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia presided over the trial. At trial, Dimerco sought to introduce evidence of Faulk’s unrelated 2019 arrest to undermine his emotional distress claim, but the district court ultimately excluded this evidence, finding it minimally relevant and highly prejudicial. The jury returned a verdict for Faulk, awarding him $90,000 in lost wages, $300,000 in emotional distress damages, and $3 million in punitive damages. Dimerco moved for a new trial, arguing that misconduct by Faulk’s counsel and evidentiary errors required one, or alternatively, for remittitur of the damages as excessive. The district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that any misconduct by Faulk’s counsel was effectively cured by the district court’s instructions and did not deprive Dimerco of a fair trial. The evidentiary rulings were not erroneous or, if so, were harmless. The compensatory and punitive damages were supported by the evidence and not unconstitutionally excessive. The judgment in Faulk’s favor was affirmed in all respects. View "Faulk v. Dimerco Express USA Corp." on Justia Law