Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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This case involves a dispute between Dr. R. Michael Williams, a board-certified oncologist, and several defendants, including Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (DMCM) and various associated individuals. After a deterioration in their professional relationship, Williams alleged that the defendants acted to limit his medical practice and restrict his hospital privileges, affecting his ability to treat patients. Williams filed multiple lawsuits against the defendants, the second of which is the subject of this appeal.The trial court granted two anti-SLAPP motions in favor of the defendants, finding that Williams' claims arose from their protected activity and that Williams failed to establish a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court also awarded the defendants their attorney fees. Williams appealed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the awards of attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court erred in its application of the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished between the factual allegations that form the basis of Williams' claims and the defendants' protected activities, concluding that not all of the claims in the complaint arose from protected activity. As such, not all of Williams' claims were subject to the anti-SLAPP statute and the defendants were not entitled to attorney fees. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto" on Justia Law

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A dispute arose over Pennsylvania's rule requiring mail-in and absentee voters to date the return envelope carrying their ballot. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had ruled this requirement mandatory and declared that undated or incorrectly dated ballots were invalid under state law. The case centered on whether federal law, specifically Section 10101(a)(2)(B) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, mandated that these non-compliant ballots be counted. This provision prohibits the denial of the right to vote due to an immaterial error or omission on paperwork related to voting.The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring that rejecting timely received mail ballots due to missing or incorrect dates violated the federal provision. They reasoned that the date requirement was immaterial, as it played no role in determining a vote's timeliness.However, the appellate court reversed this decision. The court held that the federal provision only applies when the state is determining who may vote, not how a qualified voter must cast their ballot. They found that the provision does not apply to rules, like the date requirement, that govern how a qualified voter must cast their ballot for it to be counted. The court concluded that a contrary approach could not be reconciled with the text and historic backdrop of the statute. Therefore, the court ruled that the federal provision does not override Pennsylvania's date requirement for casting a mail-in ballot. The case was remanded for further consideration of the plaintiffs' pending equal protection claim. View "Pennsylvania State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Northampton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a private school, Concordia Preparatory School, was sued by a student and her mother for alleged violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally-funded educational programs. The plaintiffs claimed that the school's tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) constituted federal financial assistance, thus making it subject to Title IX.The school moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it did not receive federal financial assistance and was therefore not subject to Title IX. The district court denied the school's motion, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the school's tax-exempt status constituted federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes. However, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on this issue.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court reasoned that while tax exemption is a benefit, it is not equivalent to "receiving Federal financial assistance" as required by Title IX. The court explained that the term "assistance" implies aid, help, or support, which suggests a grant of funds. Tax exemption, however, is merely the withholding of a tax burden rather than an affirmative grant of funds. Furthermore, the court distinguished tax exemption from the indirect receipt of federal funds as was the case in Grove City College v. Bell.As such, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that tax-exempt status does not equate to "receiving Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title IX. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Buettner-Hartsoe v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Association" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined a dispute between the plaintiffs, John and Dawn Harrell, and the defendant, Douglas DeLuca. The Harrells sued DeLuca, a general contractor from whom they purchased a home, for fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DeLuca regarding the Harrells’ fraud claims based on one category of misrepresentations. The case otherwise proceeded to a bench trial where the court found DeLuca liable for breaching the contract, but not for the remaining claims. The Harrells appealed, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the district court should have made explicit findings related to their constructive fraud and breach-of-contract claims.The Court of Appeals upheld parts of the lower court's decision but also vacated parts of it. It agreed with the Harrells that the summary judgment was inappropriate, vacated it, and remanded the case for additional proceedings. It also agreed that the district court should have made explicit findings related to one of each of their constructive fraud and breach-of-contract claims. However, it affirmed the resolutions of the remaining claims which were not challenged by the Harrells on appeal. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Harrell v. Deluca" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around a copyright dispute between Whyte Monkee Productions, LLC and Timothy Sepi (Plaintiffs) and Netflix, Inc. and Royal Goode Productions, LLC (Defendants). Plaintiffs sued Defendants for copyright infringement, alleging that Defendants had used clips from eight videos filmed by Mr. Sepi without permission in the documentary series "Tiger King: Murder, Mayhem and Madness". The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, concluding that seven of the videos were works made for hire and thus Mr. Sepi did not own the copyrights. The court also found that the use of the eighth video constituted fair use and did not infringe on Mr. Sepi’s copyright.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs waived their argument regarding the first seven videos as they presented a new theory not raised in the lower court. Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the district court's judgment regarding these videos. However, regarding the eighth video, the appellate court ruled that the district court erred in determining that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their fair use defense. The court concluded that the first factor of the fair use analysis favored the Plaintiffs instead of the Defendants, and that the Defendants failed to provide any evidence demonstrating the absence of a market impact, which is necessary to apply the fourth fair use factor. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment as to the first seven videos, reversed the judgment as to the eighth video, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Whyte Monkee Productions v. Netflix" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard the appeal of Inline Plastics Corp. against Lacerta Group, LLC. Inline Plastics alleged that Lacerta infringed on several of its patents concerning tamper-resistant plastic containers and methods of making them. After a district court ruling in favor of Lacerta, Inline appealed on the grounds that the court erred in its judgment of invalidity and infringement. Lacerta cross-appealed, challenging the denial of attorney fees and the dismissal of certain patent claims Inline dropped near the end of trial.The Court of Appeals decided to affirm the district court's denial of Inline's motion for judgment as a matter of law of validity, but vacated the court's judgment of invalidity and remanded for a new trial on this issue. The court affirmed the district court's finding of non-infringement of various claims by Lacerta, but vacated the without-prejudice dismissal of Inline’s late-withdrawn claims. The court also vacated the district court's denial of Lacerta’s motion for attorney fees under § 285. Each party will bear their own costs. View "Inline Plastics Corp. v. Lacerta Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Marquez, an attorney who represented herself, claimed that an Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice harassed her and subjected her to inappropriate behavior during her service as his court attorney. Marquez challenged two interlocutory rulings that dismissed the complaint as to one defendant and denied reconsideration. However, the district court dismissed the case as a penalty for Marquez's failure to comply with discovery orders, which Marquez did not challenge in this appeal.The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Marquez's challenge to the interlocutory orders as it was not an appeal from a final decision of the district court. The Court explained that the merger rule, which allows an interlocutory order to merge into the final judgment, does not apply when a district court enters a dismissal as a sanction. If Marquez successfully challenges the sanction dismissal, she would then have the opportunity to challenge the interlocutory orders as part of any appeal from a final judgment on the merits. In this situation, however, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Marquez v. Silver" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition to defendant Denita D. Berg, preventing the Circuit Court of Grant County from enforcing orders to sell personal property before determining its ownership. The orders were part of a case brought by Denita Berg's stepchildren, who alleged that Berg had not properly inventoried their father's estate after his death and had committed fraud.The Supreme Court's decision was based on the fact that the orders to sell the property were issued despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact about who owned it. The Court explained that the circuit court's order was erroneous as a matter of law because it went beyond the requirements of Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment should only be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.The Court concluded that the circuit court had exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering the sale of the property when ownership was still in dispute. Therefore, it granted a writ of prohibition, as moulded, to preclude the circuit court from ordering the sale of the disputed property. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. Berg v. Ryan" on Justia Law

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The court case involves Ferrellgas, L.P., which was appealing against an order enforcing a subpoena issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The subpoena was part of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination charge filed by an employee, alleging that Ferrellgas had engaged in discriminatory hiring, pay, and termination practices.Ferrellgas contended that the subpoena was improperly served, was facially invalid due to procedural errors, was overly broad, and would impose an undue burden. Ferrellgas also argued that the subpoena sought information on hiring practices, which was irrelevant to the specific discrimination charge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all of Ferrellgas's arguments.The Court found that the subpoena was served properly, despite Ferrellgas's claims to the contrary. It also ruled that the procedural errors in the subpoena were harmless and did not preclude its enforcement. The Court concluded that the subpoena was not overly broad, as the information sought could shed light on the alleged discriminatory practices. The Court also held that Ferrellgas failed to demonstrate that complying with the subpoena would impose an undue burden.In conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's order enforcing the EEOC's subpoena, deciding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "EEOC v. Ferrellgas, L.P." on Justia Law

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This case involved the interpretation of an offer of judgment in a lawsuit where a prisoner, Samuel Lee Dartez, II, sued state officers for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The state officers offered a judgment of $60,000 “plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs allowed by law, if any.” The district court interpreted this offer as allowing attorneys’ fees exceeding the statutory cap and waiving the plaintiff's obligation to contribute to these fees.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation. The court determined that the offer of judgment was ambiguous in its language pertaining to the statutory cap on attorney fees and the requirement for the plaintiff to contribute to those fees. The ambiguity was resolved against the defendants, who had drafted the offer, and found that the defendants had waived the statutory cap and the plaintiff's contribution requirement.In Dartez's cross-appeal, he argued that the district court wrongly applied a statutory cap on hourly rates. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court's application of the cap and remanding for recalculation of the fee award without this cap. The court did not address Dartez's arguments that the statutory limitations on fees did not apply due to his obtaining non-monetary relief and because he received an agreed settlement amount rather than a monetary judgment. View "Dartez v. Peters" on Justia Law